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I.

INTRODUCTION

Commentators often advocate that the privileges and immunities language found in the United States Constitution represents authority for some
right along the spectrum of natural law, the Bill of Rights, or fundamental
law in general.1 This Article provides contextual background for the argument by examining medieval royal privileges and immunities and tracing
the crown’s charter to the American colonies and the United States Constitution. This Article goes beyond merely providing a short background for
the use of the language in revolutionary pamphlets and the U.S. Constitution; rather, this Article discusses the concept of royal privileges and immunities and traces its growth in England and influence on the colonies.
Along the way, useful comparisons are made between English institutions
and American institutions.
During the medieval period, landholders owed customs and services to
the state, and from these burdens, the crown, by charter, granted privileges
and immunities.2 Royal privileges and immunities to municipalities and
merchant associations gave authority, for example, to have markets and

1. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 15–32, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. –
–, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/mcdonald-v-city-of-chicago/; Brief of Amicus Curiae of Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence in Support of Petitioners at 5–33, McDonald, 561 U.S. ––, 130 S. Ct. 3020
(No. 08-1521); Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4–20, McDonald, 561 U.S. ––, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521). Privileges and
immunities language is found in Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
2. See infra Part II.A–B.
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fairs, to trade, and to exercise self-government.3 In Part II, following a
brief introduction of feudal tenure and royal immunities, the Article examines the development of mercantile institutions and borough governance.
Part III discusses adventuring merchants and the extension of municipal institutions overseas. When Europe expanded its boundaries in the late
fifteenth century, royal charters permitted explorers such as Christopher
Columbus and John Cabot to load ships, travel from England, and discover
foreign lands.4 After discovery and exploration, explorers received privileges to establish trading colonies.5 In this Part, charter privileges and immunities to early American proprietors are introduced and discussed. Unlike charters to trading associations, grants to proprietors in the latter part
of the sixteenth century focused on colonization as well as commercial interests.6
In Part IV, the Article discusses the influence of English institutions in
colonial America. Under royal charters, three types of colonies and a variety of English institutions took root in America.7 Among other topics,
this Part discusses tenure, colonial governance, and the colonial assembly.
The colonial assembly was an instrumental force in colonial development
as colonists sought to free themselves from royal and proprietary control.8
Part V examines the emergence of the “privileges and immunities of
Englishmen” concept and traces its influence in the colonies. The seventeenth century was a period of revolution and transformation.9 In the first
part of the seventeenth century, Englishmen invoked the “liberty of the
subject” to combat royal monopolies.10 Once introduced, the concept
served advocates and pamphleteers in a variety of ways.11 Revolutionaries
felt their rights as natural-born Englishmen entitled them to the benefit of
ancient statutes and fundamental law.12 When this concept, supported by
similar but distinct clauses in colonial charters,13 reached the colonies, col3. See infra Part II.C–G.
4. See infra Part III.A.
5. See infra Part III.B–D.
6. See infra Part III.B–D.
7. See infra Part IV.A–C.
8. See infra Part IV.D.
9. See infra Part V.A.
10. See infra Part V.A.
11. See infra Part V.A (discussing grievances against royal monopolies, pleas for liberty of the subject, debates on Petition of Right, and Leveller writings).
12. See infra note 503 and accompanying text.
13. Colonial and explorer charters typically contained clauses that subjects traveling to
the colony were to enjoy the privileges and immunities of Englishmen. See infra notes 306–
11 and accompanying text.
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onists argued that they too enjoyed the privileges and immunities of English subjects and thus enjoyed the same rights and law as subjects resident
in England enjoyed, including the right to be free from taxation without
consent.14
English taxation without colonial representation was a major cause of
the American Revolution.15 Following Independence, the colonies no
longer needed to reference the privileges of Englishmen. Nonetheless, the
privileges and immunities concept made it into the text of the Articles of
Confederation16 and the United States Constitution.17 After the Civil War,
similar language found its way into the Fourteenth Amendment.18 When
drafting these documents, the Framers provided little comment on what
“privileges and immunities” meant or how the language should be used.
Commentators and courts have argued that these provisions are selfexecuting grants of natural law, confer specific rights such as the right to
travel and the Bill of Rights, or protect fundamental law in general.19
Summarizing the history and concept of the phrase, this article concludes
by offering a contrary interpretation of the language.
II. ROYAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
A. Land, Burdens, and Immunities

14. See infra Parts IV.D, V.B. For example, the Colonists stated
[t]hat the foundation of English liberty, and of all free government, is a right in the
people to participate in their legislative council: and as the English colonists are
not represented, and from their local and other circumstances, cannot properly be
represented in the British Parliament, they are entitled to a free and exclusive
power of legislation in their several provincial legislatures, where their right of
representation can alone be preserved, in all cases of taxation and internal polity,
subject only to the negative of their sovereign, in such manner as has been heretofore used and accustomed.
October 14, 1774 Declarations and Resolves, in 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 68 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1904) [hereinafter
JOURNALS].
15. See infra notes 502–09 and accompanying text.
16. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV (“[F]ree inhabitants . . . shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States . . . .”).
17. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”); see also infra Part V.D.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”); see also infra
Part V.E.
19. See infra notes 530–33, 543–44.
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Following the fall of the Roman provinces, the Anglo-Saxon king, as
a supreme landholder, granted or gifted large tracts of lands to spiritual
leaders for remission of sins.20 Distinct from other lands and methods of
transfer, the conveyance of these privileged lands occurred by written charter (boc, freols-boc, or privilegium).21 This land, sanctioned by church and
state, was known as bookland (bocland).22 Most grants of bookland went
to churches, but later kings booked lands to important individuals without a
spiritual purpose.23
A grant or gift of land by the king was a two-way street. In addition
to giving land, the king as a donor was also receiving some degree of revenue and services from the donee.24 From an early time, predial burdens attached to the occupancy of land. Landholders might owe customs such as
rents, royal fines, building services, military services, or agricultural ser-

20. FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY BOOK AND BEYOND 226–58, 293–318 (Boston,
Little Brown & Co., 1897) [hereinafter MAITLAND, DOMESDAY]; J.E.A. Jolliffe, English
Book-Right, 50 ENG. HIST. REV. 1, 5, 8–9 (1935).
21. The diploma was the land book (land boc) or charter preceding the use of the Anglo-Norman writ. F.E. HARMER, ANGLO-SAXON WRITS 34–35, 129–30, 432 (1952); 2
WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 24, 68–72 (photo. reprint 1966) (4th
ed. 1936); 3 id. at 73 (bookland and alienation); id. at 103 (powers of book); id. at 225–26
(book, charter, and royal writ); MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 226, 230, 257; Jolliffe, supra note 20, at 10, 13, 15 (superiority, heritability, and mobility of bookland considered privileged, libera terra). The land book, of ecclesiastic origin, carried a threat of excommunication and received the consent or witness of the witan, a type of Anglo-Saxon
council consulted on significant affairs. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 230, 247–
52.
22. 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 60 (2d ed., Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1899). Bookland
contrasted with other types of land such as folkland and laenland. Folkland was land held
by private persons according to the folk or customary law without written book of the grant
and subject to common royal burdens. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 257;
FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAND LAWS 20–24 (3d ed., London, MacMillan and Co. 1896)
(noting differences between bookland and other types of land); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND,
supra, at 61–62; FRANK M. STENTON, ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND 311–12 (3d ed. 1971) (defining folkland as subject to royal burdens of king’s farm). Laenland or loanland was a
temporary gift of land, perhaps to common men, in which the grantee may return services or
rent. 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 70–71; MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at
313–16.
23. 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 74; MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 226,
229–30, 241–43.
24. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 241–43 (bookland granted in exchange for
spiritual services); see also infra note 28 (few reserved fundamental burdens on bookland
but additional common burdens on other non-immune lands such as folkland).
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vices.25 From these burdens, the king granted immunities.26 During the
Middle Ages, several types of immunities were granted to lords, their men,
and their lands.27 In generalized terms, to grant an immunity was to create
a privilege from a burden otherwise due. Before the Norman Conquest,
several grants of bookland to lords and churches allowed the holder to be
free or immune from all earthly or secular burdens—excepting a few reserved burdens including military service, repairing bridges, and repairing
borough walls.28 As a recipient of the king’s grant, the privileged church or
lord stood in place of the king for all that the king would have received
from the occupants of the land.29 If a holder of bookland neglected his responsibility, he could lose possession of the land.30
With the Norman Conquest, William the Conqueror claimed to inherit
the kingdom from his predecessors and thus inherited Anglo-Saxon laws in

25. WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM, THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE
DURING THE EARLY AND MIDDLE AGES 148–56 (3d ed., Cambridge, Univ. Press 1896) [hereinafter CUNNINGHAM, ENGLISH INDUSTRY] (identifying sources of royal revenue);
MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 234–40 (king’s royal farm included fiscal payments and other dues: profits of justice, agricultural obligations, and structural and military
services); PAUL VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY IN THE ELEVENTH CENTURY 141–42 (1908)
[hereinafter VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY] (public revenue included both indirect income from tolls, market dues, and forfeitures as well as direct income from customary payments in kind and in money, ordinary land taxes, and extraordinary impositions).
26. See, e.g., 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 60 (describing king’s alienation of royal profits by book to grantee and suggesting that inhabitants owing their customary dues to new grantee might not notice change).
27. See MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 269–83 (discussing book’s immunity
(liberty, freols) from all secular obligations with reservation of three fundamental duties); 1
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 571–94 (discussing various fiscal and judicial immunities).
28. Three frequent exceptions to the immunity, which some label the trinoda or trimoda
necessitas, were bridge building, wall building, and military service. MAITLAND,
DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 186–87 (repairing bridge and borough walls); id. at 236, 240
(grants of bookland contained immunity from all burdens except military service and building or repairing bridge and borough walls); id. at 270–71, 273 (discussing the term trinoda
necessitas); STENTON, supra note 22, at 289–90 (criticizing the label trinoda necessitas); see
also ADOLPHUS BALLARD, THE DOMESDAY BOROUGHS 106 (1904) [hereinafter BALLARD,
DOMESDAY BOROUGHS]. See generally W.H. Stevenson, Trinoda Necessitas, 29 ENG. HIST.
REV. 689 (1914).
29. STENTON, supra note 22, at 307 (suggesting king’s only concern in grant of bookland was reservation of fundamental burden (military service, borough and bridge repair),
leaving grantee free by unwritten custom to collect remaining royal farm and services in
place of king).
30. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 295 (loss of bookland if grantee failed
military duty or committed high crime).
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place of the former king.31 As the lawful king and proprietary owner of
land, he too could give it away and demand services in return.32 To punish
those who rebelled against his inheritance, William installed Norman barons in military service as feudal lords of English estates with jurisdiction
over the occupants of the land.33 Bookland and other Anglo-Saxon lands
merged into feudal tenures after the Conquest.34
The feudal concept was a relationship between lord and vassal.35 The
tenant received defense, warranty, and heritable possession of land from
the lord.36 The lord in turn received homage or fealty, and a combination
of rents, aids, services, marriage and wardship, escheats, and reliefs from
the tenant.37 The lord owed gelds and services, especially military service,

31. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 88, 92.
32. Id. at 232–40; MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 241, 300 (explaining that
“all land is held of the king,” directly or indirectly).
33. 3 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 38 (photo. reprint 1966)
(5th ed. 1942) (describing Norman military tenure after Conquest); GEORGE NORTON,
COMMENTARIES ON THE HISTORY, CONSTITUTION, & CHARTERED FRANCHISES OF THE CITY OF
LONDON 44–45 (3d ed. Revised, London, Longmans Green & Co. 1869); 1 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 92; STENTON, supra note 22, at 624–34 (discussing the imposition of French aristocracy on English estates).
34. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 317–18 (bookland and loanland swept
into feudum); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 62–63 (pre-Conquest tenures
merged into feudal tenure); David Roffe, From Thegnage to Barony: Sake and Soke, Title,
and Tenants-in-Chief, in 12 ANGLO-NORMAN STUDIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE BATTLE
CONFERENCE 1989, at 157, 164–70, 173, 174–76 (1990) (comparing tenure by bookland
with grants of sake and soke and discussing the transition into feudal tenures postConquest); VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 255–57, 341 (discussing
bookland and folkland after Conquest). The king confiscated folkland as his own terra
regis, along with forfeitures and confiscations. POLLOCK, supra note 22, at 37, 43. The
crown invented nominal services for those religious houses retaining their extensive immunities. Id. at 35–36.
35. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 66–68.
36. Id. at 235–36, 306.
37. Id. at 234–40, 296, 307, 318, 349, 351; see also MARSHALL HARRIS, ORIGIN OF THE
LAND TENURE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 25–27 (Greenwood Press 1970) (1953); 3
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 54–73 (describing different feudal incidents). Relief and
primer seisin were payments an heir paid to take the place of the deceased tenant. 3
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 57–61. Wardship was the right of the lord to take over the
land and education of the minor heir upon the death of the tenant in order to preserve a worthy tenant. Id. at 61; NORTON, supra note 33, at 47 (wardship was right to sell ward to highest bidder or receive fine); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 319. Marriage was
the right of the king or oldest lord to have a say in (or receive a fine for lack of permission
for) the marriage of an infant heir to compensate for loss or to prevent association with enemies. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 61–65; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at
319–23 (noting that the lord might sell rights in wardship and marriage to a third party).
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to the king, and when the lord was burdened or taxed, he passed the obligation to his tenants.38 Lords receiving land and privileges could in turn, perhaps with license from the king, grant land to other lords and individuals,
passing some or all of the burdens and services in the exchange.39 As the
well-known English legal historians Frederick Pollock and Frederic Maitland noted, the feudal ladder might have many rungs—a tenant may hold of
a more powerful lord, who in turn may hold of another or of the king directly.40

B. Franchises and Seignorial Jurisdiction

Wardship and marriage, often described as the most burdensome feudal obligations, were
common in military tenures but not in socage, fee farm, or burgage tenures discussed infra.
3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 64–65; NORTON, supra note 33, at 48 (explaining that
wardship and marriage served a military function and thus were not claimed by the lord on
socage lands). Escheat was the loss of the estate to the lord for felony or failure of heirs or
loss to the king for treason. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 67–73.
38. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 232–33, 236–38, 277. Geld was a land
tax. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 120–24. The king typically received geld
from most, but not all. BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra note 28, at 59, 67; id. at 68–
69 (explaining that full geld was due even if portions of borough became wasteland; some
French were exempt from geld); VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 182–84
(listing examples of classes immune from geld); id. at 326 (finding that tenants of ancient
demesne did not pay geld).
39. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 232–40. Though a matter of controversy
prior to the statute of Quia Emptores Terrarum, a high lord enjoying feudal incidents from
his immediate grantees could suffer a loss in estate quality when his immediate grantees
subinfeudated to others with few or none of the original incidents. See id. With common
reduction of estate by subinfeudation, the statute of Quia Emptores Terrarum was passed in
1290. Quia Emptores Terrarum allowed alienation but provided the subgrantee was to hold
the same tenure as the grantor, i.e., the subgrantee became a tenant of the high lord of whom
the grantor originally held. Quia Emptores Terrarum, 1290, 18 Edw. 1, c. 1, § 1 (Eng.); 3
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 80–81 (describing effect of statute); 1 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 337. For a discussion of Quia Emptores Terrarum in the colonies, see infra Part IV.E (discussing colonial charters and subinfeudation in proprietorships)
and B.H. McPherson, Revisiting the Manor of East Greenwich, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 35,
44 (1998).
40. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 233. For lands held of the king directly
(in capite), the king restricted alienation to those with his license and imposed a reasonable
fine for unlicensed alienation. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 83–85; see also infra notes
439–49 and accompanying text (discussing charter clauses to colonial promoters that expressly avoided tenure in capite).
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Feudal tenure provided revenue and services to the king.41 The increase in the needs of the state translated to a greater need of revenue and
services from the land.42 The king, unable to govern the realm by his own
hand, often sold immunities and franchises to raise revenue for various
causes.43 A “franchise” can be defined “as a portion of royal power in the
hands of a subject.”44 Royal privileges granted to individuals and entities
included financial and personal immunities as well as jurisdictional immunities from the national system of justice.45
Common fiscal immunities included exemptions from national and local taxation, from fines and assessments, and from various types of tolls.46
Entities and lords also received royal grants of immunity from military service, various personal services, and from the burden of attending communal courts.47
Feudal tenure and the management of immunities required a judicial
relationship between lord and tenant. Pollock and Maitland described the
private or seignorial jurisdiction of lord over tenant as composed of two
strands: the jurisdictional relationship between the lord and tenant arising
from the relationship itself and a jurisdictional relationship by express grant
of franchise.48 A lord might have held a court with simple pleas over his
41. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 232–40.
42. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 240.
43. VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 108. Throughout English borough history, see infra Part II.C–G, the controversies of the realm resulted in increased liberties and charter confirmations for burgesses as they bargained for liberties in exchange for
their support of the king. 1 ALICE S. GREEN, TOWN LIFE IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 237–38
(New York, MacMillan & Co. 1894) [hereinafter GREEN, TOWN LIFE].
44. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 384.
45. Id. at 574–94.
46. Id. at 574.
47. Id. at 537, 540–42, 544, 574. Unless exempted, men of the township and county had
to serve as suitors in the hundreds and county courts. VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 97–99, 104 (explaining that the hundred was a territorial unit of townships
and estates and that free owners and estate representatives served as suitors); id. at 103
(commenting that the hundred was more than a court, it also served as an administrative and
police unit); see also 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 529 (“England is divided
into counties; the county is divided into hundreds; the hundred is divided into vills or townships.”); id. at 529–30, 544, 557 (noting that county court was more important than hundred
and met less frequently than hundred court); id. at 548–53 (suitors of communal courts).
Many hundreds were in private hands. HELEN CAM, LAW-FINDERS AND LAW-MAKERS IN
MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 59–70 (1962) (discussing the prevalence of private hundreds before
the Conquest); VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 105 (noting that feudalism alienated native jurisdiction in hundred courts to private subjects).
48. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 43, 531–32, 571–72 (distinguishing
common feudal courts from franchise courts).
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tenants by the relationship itself. Other privileges and franchises, above
and beyond simple aspects of feudal jurisdiction, varied from those of the
petty manor, which may have held view of frankpledge and associated police powers, to those of the palatine earl.49
The king, before and to a lesser extent after the Conquest, granted or
confirmed jurisdictional immunities or franchises by granting sake and
soke to the grantee.50 The full formula often consisted of sake, soke, toll,
team, infangenetheof, and occasionally utfangenetheof.51 The grant of sake

49. Id. at 530–32, 570–71, 580–81 (defining view of frankpledge (court leet) as the privilege of a grantee to hold court to present offenses and punish minor crimes); id. at 571–72
(commenting that franchises required crown charters). For an in-depth picture of thirteenthcentury local government before Edward I’s quo warranto proceedings, see HELEN M.
CAM’s work, THE HUNDRED AND THE HUNDRED ROLLS (1930) [hereinafter CAM, HUNDRED
ROLLS] (discussing in detail Edward I’s inquiry into private franchises and usurpation of
royal rights). See also HELEN CAM, LIBERTIES & COMMUNITIES IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 173
(1963) [hereinafter CAM, LIBERTIES] (describing quo warranto proceedings under Edward I);
DONALD W. SUTHERLAND, QUO WARRANTO PROCEEDINGS IN THE REIGN OF EDWARD I 1278–
1294, at 2–15 (1963) (discussing thirteenth-century franchises in context of Edward I’s quo
warranto campaign).
50. DAWN M. HADLEY, THE NORTHERN DANELAW: ITS SOCIAL STRUCTURE, C.800–1100,
at 168–69 (2000) (comparing bookland and grants of sake and soke; “bookright,” or sake
and soke, enjoyed by recipient of bookland); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 576
(finding sake and soke granted minor criminal jurisdiction); STENTON, supra note 22, at
494–95 (noting supplementation of Anglo-Saxon bookland with express jurisdictional privilege of sake and soke for grantee to manage immunities in place of crown). A grant of immunity, sake and soke, relieved the grantee of, or confirmed the grantee’s privileges from,
certain obligations to the king but also expressly enabled the grantee to collect the profits of
justice and the royal farm in place of the king. Roffe, supra note 34, at 164–66 (comparing
grants of sake and soke to bookland and associated immunities and privileges); see also infra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (discussing grant of immunity as an opportunity for
the immunized to collect penalties or forfeitures in place of the king). Grants of sake and
soke were often judicial references for the collection of the profits of justice, but sake and
soke might also cover the customs running on land. C.A. Joy, Sokeright 21–23, 25, 66, 70,
72, 77, 223–25 (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Leeds), available at
http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/820/ (discussing non-judicial components of sokeright and
commenting that sokeright might resemble a grant to collect burdens running on folkland);
see also CAM, HUNDRED ROLLS, supra note 49, at 161–63 (describing collection of
hundredal profits by private lords with various privileges); R.H.C. DAVIS, THE KALENDAR
OF ABBOT SAMSON OF BURY ST. EDMUNDS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS xiv (1954) (listing regalia revenues); id. at xxxi–xxxii (suitor fines for failure to render suit or to purchase exemption); id. at xxxii–xlvii (identifying several components of hundred profits that might be
collected by an immunized grantee); HADLEY, supra, at 183–85 (noting the Abbot’s
hundredal jurisdiction).
51. HARMER, supra note 21, at 73–76 (commenting that the first known use of this formula occurred during the reign of Edward the Confessor); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra
note 22, at 576.
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and soke, perhaps surplusage to the inherent rights of a lord by the thirteenth century, was a judicial right over a man or land.52 Sake was the
cause or right to hold a plea over an individual, and soke was the right to
seek or collect the fines and profits of that justice.53 Toll was the right to
collect a toll from those not exempt from toll.54 Team allowed the grantee
to hear warranties in which the person suspected of theft may prove his
honesty by providing a witness to the transaction.55 Infangenetheof was the
right to summarily punish thieves caught in the act within the grantee’s jurisdiction, and if a grantee had utfangenetheof, the grantee could punish
those caught outside his territory.56 A grant of jurisdiction to lords, however, might be limited by the king’s reservation to protect the peace for cer52. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 576–77 (finding that twelfth-century developments in the national criminal justice system altered the significance of the sake and
soke formula and that subsequent requests for criminal franchises likely resulted in more
specific charter language); id. at 579 (noting that by the thirteenth century, the grant of sake
and soke had lost much of its earlier significance). In later years, lords held court baron and
court leet. Court baron was the right to hear feudal claims; court leet covered minor criminal claims, similar to the franchise of view of frankpledge. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. Though the sake and soke formula may have meant more during earlier periods,
by the late thirteenth-century sake and soke meant court baron and not view of frankpledge.
1 F.W. MAITLAND, SELECT PLEAS IN MANORIAL AND OTHER SEIGNORIAL COURTS xix, xxii–
xxiii (London, Bernard Quaritch 1889).
53. HADLEY, supra note 50, at 167–68, 183–86 (listing multiple definitions of “soke”
(socn) and discussing characteristics of sokemen); HARMER, supra note 21, at 74;
MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 84–88, 259–60; VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY,
supra note 25, at 115–16 (explaining that sake and soke concern the men, the claim, and the
court involved in deciding cases; those under sake and soke had to attend the lord’s tribunal
and render suitors’ services); id. at 128 (commenting that persons under sake and soke were
generally removed from the ordinary jurisdiction of the hundred and county and placed under the grantee’s jurisdiction); id. at 131, 133 (describing soke as the jurisdictional unit encircling a territory, such as a manor); id. at 322 (soke was a portion of the king’s public administration granted to private lord). The crown’s grant of soke might extend over freemen,
sokemen, villeins, and other lesser status persons. Id. at 125, 133 (some sokes might have
sokemen in majority with lesser status persons as their tenants). One of the most important
duties of sokemen was rendering suit as a suitor to the forum court of the soke. HADLEY,
supra note 50, at 185.
54. ADOLPHUS BALLARD, BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS 1042–1216, at liv, lxvi–lxx
(1913) [hereinafter BALLARD, B.B.C.]; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 578.
55. BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra note 28, at 115 (commenting on the importance of witnesses for market transactions); HARMER, supra note 21, at 76–77 (toll and
team involved the testimony of a witness who witnessed a toll paid at the purchase of the
disputed chattel; witnesses were required for certain market transactions; grant of team allowed collection of pledges if the accused failed to produce the warrantor); STENTON, supra
note 22, at 498; FRANK M. STENTON, THE FIRST CENTURY OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM 1066–
1166, at 101 (2d ed. 1961).
56. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 577.
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tain crimes.57
When the king granted a jurisdictional immunity with a charter stating
that the land was free of the national system of justice for several crimes,
the grantee, as a result of the immunity, collected or developed the private
jurisdiction or court58 to collect the profits of justice from which the grantee
received immunity.59 To give land free of national justice was not to say
that the lord could not punish crimes in that land. Freedom from national
justice meant that the penalties or forfeitures of criminous tenants would
not go to the king but rather to the lord with the franchise.60
57. Id. at 576–78; MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 86–88, 260–61. While the
crown granted jurisdictional franchises, it typically reserved jurisdiction and forfeitures over
several crimes, sometimes labeled major crimes: hamsocn (breaking into a house), grithbreche/grithbryce (breach of king’s shared peace), foresteal (ambush or attack on the king’s
highway), murder, fihtwite (fine for fighting), reception of an outlaw, and leyrewite (adultery). HARMER, supra note 21, at 79–82; VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at
111–12. For a discussion on the character of these forfeitures, see Naomi D. Hurnard, The
Anglo-Norman Franchises, Part I, 64 ENG. HIST. REV. 289, 294–95, 298–301, 310, 322
(1949) (criticizing the characterization of certain forfeitures as major crimes and comparing
several reserved forfeitures with grant of sake and soke). See also Naomi D. Hurnard, The
Anglo-Norman Franchises, Part II, 64 ENG. HIST. REV. 433 (1949). See generally T.B.
LAMBERT, PROTECTION, FEUD AND ROYAL POWER: VIOLENCE AND ITS REGULATION IN
ENGLISH LAW, C.850–C.1250 (2009) (Ph.D. dissertation, Durham University), available at
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2/. Supplementing common grants of sake, soke, toll, and infangenetheof, the king might, as a special honor, grant additional jurisdiction to collect fines
from his reserved forfeitures. HARMER, supra note 21, at 73, 79; STENTON, supra note 22, at
499–501; VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 112–14.
58. The theory that pre-Conquest grants of sake and soke included the right for the
grantee to have a court to collect the profits of justice has been questioned. JULIUS GOEBEL,
JR., FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR 371, 374, 377 (Edward Peters ed., Univ. of Pa. Press 1976)
(1937); PATRICK WORMALD, LEGAL CULTURE IN THE EARLY MEDIEVAL WEST: LAW AS TEXT,
IMAGE AND EXPERIENCE 318, 325 (1999) (challenging the evidence supporting pre-Conquest
private jurisdiction).
59. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 80–82, 277–79; STENTON, supra note 22,
at 306–07 (bookland gave immunity; grantee, by unwritten custom, free to collect profits in
place of the king); id. at 492–95 (discussing the likelihood of a court for a privileged lord to
handle disputes concerning the collection of customs and profits of justice that the lord collected as part of his bookland immunity). Granting sake and soke to a lord broke off a piece
of the king’s native jurisdiction or soke in the hundred court. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 576. A lord’s soke might overlap with the king’s jurisdiction in the hundred
court. CAM, HUNDRED ROLLS, supra note 49, at 161–63 (describing collection of hundredal
profits by private lords with various privileges); MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at
90–97 (discussing hundred jurisdiction and manorial soke and overlapping collection of forfeitures). The lord with sake and soke might not need a court; lords with soke over criminals or land might collect their forfeiture profits in the hundred court. Id. at 95, 102, 259;
see also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
60. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 576–78.
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Far above the basic privileges granted to lords, the crown enfranchised
the palatine earl with jura regalia.61 Palatine lords, as supreme landholders,
held privileges and immunities in their district similar to those of the
king.62 The Bishop of Durham, for example, with his own assembly and
council, had the ability to appoint officers, protect the peace of the palatinate, create fairs and markets, pardon convicts for most crimes, and hear all
pleas and collect the profits of justice in his jurisdiction.63 The bishop’s
council had equitable, common law, appellate, and admiralty jurisdiction.64
Generally, the royal writ did not run in the palatinate and royal officials
were excluded.65 Grieved inhabitants of the liberty of Durham needed to
petition the bishop and council similar to the manner in which subjects petitioned the king.66 Before the reforms of Henry II were applied to the palatinate,67 the palatine courts heard all pleas except for perhaps the rare case

61. The palatinate was a privileged district governed by a palatine earl who enjoyed
royal rights (jura regalia) similar to the king. See infra note 62. Both “palatine” and “palatinate” trace back to ancient Rome’s Palatine Hill. According to Roman mythology, the Palatine Hill was central to the founding of Rome. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Palatine Hill,
BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYCLOPAEDIA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/
439237/Palatine-Hill (last visited Oct. 28, 2011).
62. GAILLARD THOMAS LAPSLEY, THE COUNTY PALATINE OF DURHAM: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 31, 75, 215–16, 257 (1900). Within the palatinate, landholders
held directly or mediately of the bishop, not the king. Id. at 54–55; see also James W. Alexander, The English Palatinates and Edward I, 22 J. BRITISH STUDIES 1, 2–3 (1983). Durham
had privileges from ancient times, reinforced by grants of bookland and confirmed by Henry
II. LAPSLEY, supra, at 21–27, 156–58, 295–96.
63. LAPSLEY, supra note 62, at 32–33 (bishop’s peace); id. at 33–34 (jail and capital
punishment); id. at 34 (delegation and appointment powers); id. at 35 (creation of corporations; Durham had five boroughs which generally received their privileges and immunities
from the bishop); id. at 40–41, app. II (admiralty jurisdiction); id. at 41, 47–48 (escheat for
felony and, for a long time, escheat for treason—an unusual franchise typically reserved for
the king); id. at 58 (grant of mines, wrecks, and treasure-trove); id. at 62 (right to create fairs
and markets); id. at 68–69 (right to pardon); id. at 71–72 (prerogative to suspend laws); id.
at 74, 168, 173, 215 (pleas of crown); id. at 106, 114, 136, 149 (assembly and council).
However, the bishop did not have foreign treaty powers. Id. at 36, 40.
64. Id. at 149, 180 (commenting on the functions and powers of the bishop’s council);
id. at 186–90 (discussing the bishop’s chancery and its powers).
65. Id. at 68, 74–75, 162–64, 166–68, 173, 226. But see Jean Scammell, The Origin
and Limitations of the Liberty of Durham, 81 ENG. HIST. REV. 449, 455–56 (1966) (describing the proposition that royal writs did not run in palatinate as a “half-truth”).
66. LAPSLEY, supra note 62, at 68.
67. The tenants of the liberty obtained a royal charter extending Henry II’s judicial reforms to them notwithstanding the bishop’s liberty. Id. at 166–68, app. I (noting the Geoffrey Fitz Geoffrey case and the controversy concerning the effect of Henry II’s grand assize
in the palatinate); Scammell, supra note 65, at 459–61. After the royal reclaim, the bishop,
absent a royal eyre, could hear only a limited number of pleas. Id. at 461–70.
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of a direct attack on the king’s person or property.68 By the fourteenth century, legislation of Parliament, unless otherwise indicated, applied to the
palatinate.69
Above the feudal tenure of the lord, the king was the supreme landholder. Both the king and lord had manors.70 The manor, with its court,
was a symbol of status and authority.71 Manors were estates of various sizes occupied by freeholders, by villeins performing services for the lord of

68. LAPSLEY, supra note 62, at 27. The king reserved jurisdiction for defects of justice
or for matters affecting his person. Id. at 75, 162, 209, 211–12, 213–15; Scammell, supra
note 65, at 457–58.
Before the sixteenth century, the extensive liberties of palatine lords presented obstacles to royal justice. In the process and execution of judgments, royal justice encountered
a second layer of difficulty as courts struggled with summons, inquests, venue, vouching to
warranty, and execution of judgments crossing the palatinate. LAPSLEY, supra note 62, at
216–55. When a royal court sought process against an inhabitant of the palatinate, the first
step was to distress the inhabitant’s lands outside of the palatinate. Id. at 218. If unsuccessful, royal courts sought to compel the bishop to produce the individual. Id. at 218–20, 223.
Royal courts could also outlaw the individual and direct the bishop to arrest him. Id. at
220–21, 225, 251–52. Because of its immunity, the palatinate served as a haven for criminals. Id. at 226, 255. In 1536, King Henry VIII and Parliament removed many of the privileges of territories such as Durham. Id. at 70, 196–97 (noting that many territories lost the
powers of pardon and of appointing judicial officials and that all royal writs ran in king’s
name rather than bishop’s); 2 HERBERT L. OSGOOD, THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 5–7 (1904) (discussing the effect of the 1536 legislation on the palatine lord’s powers).
69. LAPSLEY, supra note 62, at 125–26, 189, 256–57. When the crown or Parliament
sought revenue, however, the objection was raised that the assembly of the liberty did not
consent to the tax. See id. at 117–18, 297–300. Eventually, the palatinate sent representatives to Parliament. Id. at 299.
70. VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 323–24, 326 (describing characteristics of royal manors in Domesday Book). Tenants of the royal manor on ancient demesne might enjoy qualified immunities from toll, freedom from rendering suit at the communal courts, freedom from the sheriff’s interference, and immunities from many common
fines and taxes. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 264. Tenants of the ancient demesne did
not pay taxes and fines that others paid but were burdened with heavy food-rents for the
king’s household. VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 326–28, 350.
71. 1 E. LIPSON, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1–3 (12th ed. 1959) (discussing
literature on the origin of the manor); id. at 22–25, 27 (describing military, political, administrative, and jurisdictional features surrounding the manor); VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH
SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 305, 311, 316–17, 320–21 (providing definitions, functions, and
characteristics of English manors); id. at 340–43 (defining the Conquest manor as a function
of, among other things, a grant of soke in the context of preexisting bookland enfranchising
lords with privileged lands); id. at 363–64 (commenting on the function of the manor’s
court).
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the manor, and by lower classes in unfree tenure.72 Although villeins were
often landholders, they held an unfree tenure because of the level and character of the services they performed.73 The villein after the Conquest was
the aggregate of the slave and the dependent farmer.74 Villeins of a private
baron did not have access to the king’s courts and were forced to abide by
the customs of the manor and the lord’s customary court.75
Common before the Conquest, a third manorial class, sokemen, existed between the freeholder and the villein.76 Economic and other post-

72. Freemen on the manor were far less common than burdened classes and enjoyed a
sharply privileged status over the villein and lesser classes. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 50
(noting that, by the thirteenth century, freemen were protected by the king’s courts); id. at
45–49 (describing classes of unfree below villein); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22,
at 363 (finding freeholders of manor in socage or military service and villeins in unfree tenure). Lipson summarized that several fiscal, economic, and governmental forces imposed
the manor system, with its dependent farming, on free villages. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at
12–13, 15–23, 28 (burden of dangeld tax created divisions among classes on farms; economic forces and harsh conditions surrounding laenland; jurisdictional forces of commendation and required suretyship of a lord (nulle terre sans seigneur); bookland with seignorial
jurisdiction and the imposition of immunized manorial lord collecting royal dues or farm in
place of king; and military obligations fostering division among the classes with property
being the currency for political status). “Thus either by a royal grant placing a district under
a feudal lordship, or by the submission of individuals, village after village acquired a lord
and could no longer boast itself a free village community.” Id. at 22.
73. Villeins were neither slaves nor serfs. One common test of villeinage was the level
and character of services performed. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 39–40; 1 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 372–75. Villeins performed undefined services at the will of
the lord. Those with defined services were of a higher status. The manorial incidents of
unfree tenure included amercements at will, merchet, heriot, manuring duties, and miscellaneous personal services throughout the week (week-work). 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra
note 22, at 366–72; see also 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 200.
74. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 491, 493 (explaining the difficulty of imposing
the Roman classification of unfree on the complex nature of Anglo-Saxon classes). The villein of the Domesday Survey had a better status than the serf he would become a century
later. See infra note 75.
75. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 30 (examining limitations on the use of courts for
the unfree); id. at 491 (noting a lord’s absolute power over the bodies and goods of his villeins); id. at 492–93 (observing that a villein’s protection was limited to the customs of
manor); id. at 495 (finding a villein’s legal disabilities applied to contests between lord and
villein but not necessarily villein against others). Villeins of the eleventh century were freer
and had more access to the national courts than the corresponding rank in the thirteenth century. KEECHANG KIM, ALIENS IN MEDIEVAL LAW: THE ORIGINS OF MODERN CITIZENSHIP 6
(2000) (discussing the legal disabilities of post-Conquest villeins); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71,
at 28–29, 38–39 (noting the change in villeins’ status from the time of the Domesday Book
to Bracton).
76. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 66–107 (describing characteristics of
sokemen and sake and soke generally); VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at
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Conquest forces depressed many sokemen into villeinage.77 The sokemen
on the ancient demesne, protected to a degree from such forces, performed
services for the crown and held land in privileged villeinage.78
Eventually a strong central government and the rise of trade and
commerce transformed the agricultural characteristics of medieval England.79 With economic forces making commutation of services for mone120–25, 320–22, 436 (noting that a grant of soke to a private lord gave private rights over
sokemen who rendered suit and services to the grantee). Sokemen, like the absolute villein,
could be subjected to services and customs, but those dues differed from the dependent
week-work of the villein. Id. at 322. Sokemen generally had a certain degree of restraint on
the ability to sell their lands. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 52 (observing that sokemen could
abandon land if conditions under the lord were poor); SUSAN REYNOLDS, FIEFS AND
VASSALS: THE MEDIEVAL EVIDENCE REINTERPRETED 338 (1994) (finding that some sokemen
enjoyed a full set of rights); VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 432–33, 435
(commenting that within the category of sokemen there might have been free sokemen with
greater alienation rights and unfree sokemen without such rights).
77. The status of sokemen tempore regis Edwardi (T.R.E.) was reduced considerably
after the Conquest. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 27–28 (describing the reduction of the
sokemen population in Cambridgeshire after Conquest). Sokemen who might have been
mostly free before the Conquest could be dragged into villeinage. HADLEY, supra note 50,
at 108–09, 167, 188 (noting oversimplification of Domesday records); VINOGRADOFF,
ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 133–35 (observing that the distinction between freer
sokes in north, segregated from the manor, and less free manorial sokes in southern England
became lost in the Domesday Survey).
78. Generally, tenure on the ancient demesne could be freehold and absolute villeinage
at the ends with sokemen in privileged villeinage in between. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 406. Sokemen of the ancient demesne, distinguished from absolute freemen
and absolute villeins, had some access to the royal courts and some rights of alienation. 3
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 264–67 (identifying the legal rights available to privileged
villeins); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 385–96; VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH
SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 432–33, 435, 437 (comparing ordinary sokemen enduring restrictions on alienation with sokemen on ancient demesne enjoying greater rights of alienation). Even if privileged ancient demesne land (measured from the Conquest and recorded
in the Domesday Survey) were alienated, the tenants theoretically preserved their privileged
status vis-à-vis private conditions under the grantee. VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 429–30 (discussing the ancient demesne doctrine). However, this was not
the case for outside land coming into the king’s hand post-Conquest to be granted away at a
later time. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 384–85 (observing that ancient demesne was immunized and immunity ran with land after alienation); id. at 385 (noting that
non-ancient demesne land falling into crown’s hand did not enjoy immunity and was alienated by crown with full privileges available to grantee); cf. 1 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note
43, at 253–55, 270–71, 299–303 (alienated royal towns advocated for privileged status under
new private lords, though townsmen typically had to fight to retain or regain such privileges).
79. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 202–06 (describing the transformation from an
agricultural society to a commercial society and noting the effect of this transition on feudal
services based on the agricultural and military model).
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tary rents feasible, those outside of heavy feudal obligations, sokemen, especially sokemen on the ancient demesne, paid money rents in lieu of services.80 Landholders paying rent in exchange for most services held their
land in what would later be termed socage tenure.81
Within or adjacent to the manor, a typical vill was a small organization of homes forming an agricultural village.82 The vill or township might
have a lord from an adjacent manor and borrow its court.83 Medieval vills
and townships across the realm were the fundamental units of rural organization and administration.84 The more organized and privileged vill or
township with a court was known as a borough.85 Medieval England had
royal boroughs and baronial boroughs, but most boroughs were under royal
control.86

80. PAUL VINOGRADOFF, VILLAINAGE IN ENGLAND 178–183 (Oxford, Clarendon Press
1892). The commutation of services was easier where labor service was not important.
VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 327–28 (noting that on ancient demesne
there was more focus on farm-rent than typical manorial services). Forces like the plague
also contributed to the commutation of services for money rents. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71,
at 101–07. Providing rent payments in exchange for services was not limited to sokemen of
the ancient demesne. Id. at 88–91 (manorial lord commuted services and loaned his demesne land to tenants paying rent); see also RICHARD H. BRITNELL, THE
COMMERCIALISATION OF ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1000–1500, at 36–52 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing
commutation of services and importance of cash in medieval economy). Eventually, the
heavy services of the villein were also commuted into money payments. 1 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 375 (commutation of villein’s week-work for money rents and
emergence of copyhold tenure).
81. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 51–54 (describing socage tenure); see also infra
Part IV.E.1 (discussing socage tenure and colonial charters).
82. HADLEY, supra note 50, at 94–101 (examining the characteristics of the vill in medieval England); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 531, 560–62; VINOGRADOFF,
ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 265–266 (discussing husbandry from homestead to village).
83. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 605–08.
84. VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 216, 390–91, 395, 475; 1
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 529 (noting that vills and townships formed hundreds, hundreds formed counties, and England was divided into counties).
85. 1 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 139 (photo. reprint 1966)
(7th ed., revised 1956). The attributes that distinguished a borough from other territories
were changing by the Domesday Survey as the village tended to have access to a court and
the king’s peace became commonplace. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 184–85,
217; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 44–48; see also LAMBERT, supra note 57, at
149–61 (observing that national criminal legislation replaced Anglo-Saxon system of feud
and its network of special protections for certain people and certain places).
86. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 202 (remarking that towns existed on ancient demesne,
on lands of secular lord, and on church lands); MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 218
(noting that most burgesses held of the king and the king was the only official lord of most
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C. Lords of the Borough
Knowledge of royal privileges and immunities granted to boroughs
and merchant institutions is essential to unlocking the development of
American colonial institutions as many colonial institutions find their ancestry in the royal privileges and immunities of these entities. Moreover,
borough privileges advanced principles of community and self-government
and ultimately became a benchmark for common notions of the liberty of
Englishmen—a concept with a long history in the American colonies.87
For these reasons, a detailed discussion of borough privileges and immunities is necessary.
Privileges and immunities to boroughs flowed readily as the walls,
markets, and mints of the medieval borough, burh, or port were royal interests.88 Serving these interests, English boroughs developed as post-Roman
fortifications89 and as administrative trading centers of the surrounding territory.90 The borough maintained a trading function under the king’s special protection.91 The crown protected traders entering and leaving the
market or borough, and a crime committed in or directly outside the borboroughs); STENTON, supra note 22, at 529–30 (same); JAMES TAIT, THE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH
BOROUGH 141 (Manchester Univ. Press 1968) (1936) (discussing royal boroughs with royal
reeves); id. at 343 (finding that the extinction of manorial lordship increased the king’s ownership of boroughs); see also BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra note 28, at 4–9 (classifying Domesday boroughs by organization rather than by lordship); M.W. BERESFORD &
H.P.R. FINBERG, ENGLISH MEDIEVAL BOROUGHS: A HAND-LIST 40–47 (1973) (discussing
data on borough lords). Royal boroughs enjoyed freedom from the sheriff’s oppressions and
a privileged status vis-à-vis townsmen of the private borough under a lord. See infra note
148.
87. See infra note 486 (observing the influence of London’s liberties on Englishmen);
see also infra Part V (discussing Englishmen’s liberty in American colonies).
88. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 195 (describing royal mints); CARL STEPHENSON,
BOROUGH AND TOWN: A STUDY OF URBAN ORIGINS IN ENGLAND 17, 66–67, 186–87 (1933);
TAIT, supra note 86, at 27–29 (noting that boroughs served military and financial function).
89. COLIN PLATT, THE ENGLISH MEDIEVAL TOWN 19, 44 (1976) (illustrating the design
and structure of medieval town walls).
90. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 185–96 (discussing the borough’s military
purpose but also its more permanent characteristic as a center of trade); STEPHENSON, supra
note 88, at 52–54, 70, 187–88, 207; TAIT, supra note 86, at 11–14, 26–29, 65–66; CHARLES
R. YOUNG, THE ENGLISH BOROUGH AND ROYAL ADMINISTRATION, 1130–1307, at 91–121
(1961) (noting the military function of medieval boroughs).
91. After the fall of the Roman Empire, the local markets were poor and in need of special protection by the king. 5 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 86–87
(photo. reprint 1966) (3d ed. 1945). Burgesses were attracted to the borough for the market
and the king’s peace. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 99 (observing that borough
peace was similar to house peace); id. at 184–85, 190 (noting that the king’s house peace
extended to borough); id. at 192–93 (finding that borough peace facilitated trade).
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ough was a breach of the king’s peace.92
Like other individuals and entities, medieval English boroughs were
burdened with obligations and privileged with immunities.93 During this
period, burgesses’ tenements were assessed various customs. Domesday
borough customs might include house and land rents, royal dues, court
fines, tolls, heriots, merchet, as well as light personal, military, and agricultural services.94
As a center of trade, markets and fairs authorized by the crown were
often held in the borough, market town, and village.95 From ancient times,
the king charged tolls for the benefit of his markets and the peace of the
borough.96 Most burgesses of the Domesday borough paid tolls, but some

92. KIM, supra note 75, at 25–29 (noting that the king granted safe passage to foreign
merchants as if they were king’s men); MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 184–85,
192–93; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 44–46 (describing the king’s peace over
house, highways, and special lands); TAIT, supra note 86, at 36 (observing that breach of
borough peace was six times the cost of other breaches).
93. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 287. Many of the privileges enjoyed by boroughs were
also held by other subjects, entities, and territories. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at
lxxxviii–lxxxix.
94. TAIT, supra note 86, at 86–100, 107 (defining and tracing receipt of or exemption
from borough customs typically rendered to the king and earl before the Conquest; defining
burgess as one paying borough customs); see also BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra
note 28, at 63–91 (discussing and listing examples of borough customs and other burdens).
Merchet was a fine paid upon the marriage of a daughter or son. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at
42; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 368, 372–73. The ancient heriot, a form of a
relief paid upon the death of a tenant, consisted of giving the arms or best beast of the dead
man to his lord. MORLEY DE WOLF HEMMEON, BURGAGE TENURE IN MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND
22–24 (1914); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 312–13, 316–17. Over time, a
monetary payment was substituted for most borough customs. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at
201; supra notes 79–80 (discussing the commutation of services for rents).
95. The king granted the privilege of holding a market or fair to boroughs, to individuals, and frequently, to churches. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 225 (safety of boroughs for
markets and fairs); id. at 227 (noting that the crown granted markets to boroughs, private
individuals, and churches); id. at 235–37, 238 (commenting that the duration of a fair was
limited by charter to protect townsmen’s mercantile privileges); EDWARD MILLER & JOHN
HATCHER, MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: TOWNS, COMMERCE AND CRAFTS 1086–1348, at 159–60
(1995) (formation of markets in twelfth and thirteenth centuries); see also 2 GREEN, TOWN
LIFE, supra note 43, at 26–27 (discussing market privileges). The king might seize a lord’s
market and tolls if the lord violated the king’s charter authorizing the market. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 236–237. On markets and England’s medieval commerce, see generally
BRITNELL, supra note 80.
96. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 194, 203. A large portion of borough revenue came from tolls. Tolls were collected on transactions and from strangers entering and
leaving the town. BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra note 28, at 73–74 (describing
customs and tolls); MAURICE BERESFORD, NEW TOWNS OF THE MIDDLE AGES: TOWN
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burgesses enjoyed the privilege of freedom from toll.97 Only the king
could grant freedom from toll throughout the realm, but lords who themselves were granted such immunities might extend the freedom to the extent of their immunity.98 The crown’s grant of privileges to have a fair or
market included jurisdiction for a merchant court (piepowder court) in
which merchant law applied.99 Merchant courts were light on technical
procedure as local merchants assembled ad hoc to decide controversies in
commerce by the customs of merchants.100
Because of the king’s peace, many boroughs attracted a diverse group
of traders and military personnel with different statuses and different obligations.101 Some traders held burgage tenements of the king adjacent to
other traders who held burgages of various lords.102 Maitland articulated
that the “heterogeneity” of many Domesday boroughs explained the differ-

PLANTATION IN ENGLAND, WALES, AND GASCONY 63–64 (1967) (observing that towns had
market privileges and lords of towns collected tolls from markets). Burgesses’ collection of
tolls and the town’s judicial system were slightly different when the lord collected tolls during a market or fair on town land; the former was suspended during the latter. KIM, supra
note 75, at 24–25; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 247 & n.7, 248, 284–86 (describing the struggle between a lord’s collection of market tolls and claims of immunities by tenants of ancient demesne, Cinque Ports, municipalities, and religious houses).
97. TAIT, supra note 86, at 117, 127. Gildsmen were also privileged from toll. See infra note 176.
98. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at lxix; 1 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 263
n.2; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 279–86 (noting that entities, towns, and lords were often
free from tolls).
99. 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 91, at 106; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 250–57 (observing that a piepowder court usually outranked other authorities on matters concerning market
affairs); Charles Gross, The Court of Piepowder, 20 Q. J. ECON. 231, 233–34, 237–38
(1906) (commenting that merchants had a separate court or part of borough court).
100. Many merchant courts did not follow common law procedures. 5 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 91, at 106–07. Common law courts eventually absorbed merchant customs. Id.
at 115–16, 145–47.
101. A majority of burgesses held of the king, but the king typically shared lordship with
other lords. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 182, 217–18 (noting that older boroughs were typically more diverse but, as a whole, were controlled by the crown). New
boroughs, those planted or elevated from vills, were more likely to be fully under a lord or
the king, thus homogenous rather than heterogeneous. Id.; see also infra notes 102–03.
102. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 178–82, 191, 217–18 (discussing and
coining the phrase “tenurial heterogeneity”); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 191–93; see also
BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra note 28, at 6, 8–9 (noting heterogeneity in composite boroughs not held fully of either king or lord and contrasting homogeneity of simple
boroughs).
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ent jurisdictions and different levels of privileges of borough inhabitants.103
Before the Conquest, borough land was somewhere between custom-land
liable to the king and land wholly exempt.104 As noted above, one who had
sake and soke over a house received jurisdiction and the profits of justice
from the tenants over specified crimes committed therein.105 The king
might have retained sake and soke over men in the borough who provided
services and paid rent and customs; alongside the king’s men, a lord may
have held sake and soke over burgesses and received some or all of the
rent, customs, and forfeitures of the land.106 Some burgesses, in return for
performing special services, received sake and soke and freedom from customs of the borough for themselves.107 Other burgesses may have lost privileges or burgess status where they were too poor to pay the customs or rent
due on their burgage tenement.108
Maitland commented that the heterogeneous characteristics of many
boroughs marginalized the intermediary lordship standing between the king
and the burgess for those burgesses holding of an intermediary lord.109 The

103. BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra note 28, at 58–59 (describing the varying
privileges of burgesses); STEPHENSON, supra note 88, at 107–08, 110, 114, 118; see also supra note 102 (discussing tenurial heterogeneity).
104. TAIT, supra note 86, at 91–95; see also BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra
note 28, at 41–43 (observing that before the Conquest, the earl might have received a third
of borough receipts from some boroughs; after the Conquest, the king might have alienated
or retained the earl’s third); STENTON, supra note 22, at 530–31 (finding that the king might
allow a high lord to receive all borough customs or retain part or all for himself);
STEPHENSON, supra note 88, at 107–08.
105. BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra note 28, at 48–50 (noting that forfeitures
for offences go to the holder of sake and soke over land or men); see also supra notes 50–60
and accompanying text (discussing grant of sake and soke).
106. BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra note 28, at 36–37, 48–50, 51–52, 58–59,
81; MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 210; TAIT, supra note 86, at 93–94 (commenting that king’s customs might be granted to lord or church).
107. BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra note 28, at 81 (discussing exchange of
shipbuilding services for profits of justice for certain crimes); STEPHENSON, supra note 88,
at 118–19, 156 (exemption from toll and custom); TAIT, supra note 86, at 93, 125–27 (noting
that the burgesses of Dover and other towns received sake and soke but performed the additional services of shipbuilding); VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 128–29
(describing grants of soke privileges to townships, manors, and lords).
108. TAIT, supra note 86, at 87–88; see also BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra
note 28, at 55, 112 (commenting that some burgesses were too poor to pay customs); 1
GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 248 n.3 (noting cases where towns lost privileges for
arrearages and other reasons); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 197–98 (describing the effect of
Norman castlebuilding on burgesses).
109. FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, TOWNSHIP AND BOROUGH 72 (New York, Macmillan Co.
1898) [hereinafter MAITLAND, TOWNSHIP & BOROUGH].

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2011

21

BURRELL.DOCX

1/9/12 12:00 PM

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3

28

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:7

lord never developed a stronghold in such a borough and was not able to
establish his court because of his inability to form a critical mass.110 The
powers of the intermediary lord were further reduced by the high mobility
of burgage tenements and the ability of burgesses to devise tenements
freely, making escheat to a lord a distant possibility.111 Reliefs, marriage
and wardship, and heriots owed to the lord upon the death of the tenant
were abandoned and the intermediary lord was left with a small money
rent, which eventually became insignificant.112
D. Borough Charters
The crown’s development of borough institutions took place through
the royal charter. From the Middle Ages through the Anglo-American period, the royal charter authorized much of England’s government—and the
institutions of the American colonies were no exception. Charter privileges
and immunities to boroughs and gilds provided a distant foundation for the
charters and institutions of the American colonies.113
The period covering the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was the age of
borough charters.114 The borough charter was a valuable possession, and
burgesses paid significant sums for charter franchises, privileges, and immunities.115 As noted above, most burgesses held land of the king, and the

110. Id.; MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 210 (noting an example in which a
lord might have held enough houses to form a seignorial court to compete with a borough
court); TAIT, supra note 86, at 207 (commenting on competition between a manorial court
and a borough court in mesne boroughs with a court).
111. MAITLAND, TOWNSHIP & BOROUGH, supra note 109, at 71–72.
112. Id.; TAIT, supra note 86, at 102–03 (describing heritable burgage tenure with fixed
rent as an essential feature of the borough, though occasionally obscured by presence of additional personal services); cf. supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text (commenting on
the commutation of services for money rents); infra notes 136–39 and accompanying text
(discussing burgage tenure).
113. See infra Part IV.
114. TAIT, supra note 86, at 154 (noting that the age of borough charters began with
Henry I); see also 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 215 (noting King John was known as “charter-monger”); SUSAN REYNOLDS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH MEDIEVAL
TOWNS 105–08 (1977).
115. CUNNINGHAM, ENGLISH INDUSTRY, supra note 25, at 211–12 (remarking on the importance of borough’s charter to claim, protect, and confirm immunities); 1 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 85, at 87–89, 90 & n.5, 139; 3 id. at 476 (noting that a community needed a charter to possess or claim a franchise); Paul P. Harbrecht & Joseph A. McCallin, The Corporation and the State in Anglo-American Law and Politics, 10 J. OF PUB. L. 1, 7 (1961). Eventually, lords and entities were successful in claiming privileges by prescription if held from
time immemorial.
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king frequently granted charters to boroughs.116 After the Conquest, the
crown took a more direct role in granting liberties and franchises to
townsmen. William the Conqueror saw the borough as crown land and developed boroughs with liberties in exchange for rents and services.117
In many cases, borough charters were merely confirming privileges
the town already possessed. Norman and Angevin kings proclaimed that
no previously granted immunities and privileges were valid unless confirmed and confirmation required purchase.118 When granting or confirming privileges, kings often promised the burgesses that they would have
their liberties as they had in Edward the Confessor’s day, or in later periods, as they had in Henry I’s day.119 The royal franchises the king granted
were the king’s to give and safeguard.120 The king, as owner, was liable to
revoke or seize liberties that had not been confirmed by him or that had
been abused or abandoned.121 Borough charters revoked for abuse or for
other reasons had to be repurchased.122
At some point in the life of a borough, by prescription or charter, burgesses received immunities and privileges. As noted above, privileges
were typically the immunities granted to the individual or community that
removed common burdens and provided liberty or freedom to the recipient.123 The privileges section of particular charters varied on factors such
as who was granting or confirming the privileges, who was receiving the

116. See supra note 86; infra note 117.
117. STELLA KRAMER, THE ENGLISH CRAFT GILDS AND THE GOVERNMENT 13–14 (1905)
(noting Conqueror’s policy toward boroughs); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at
638 (burgesses collected liberties from king).
118. ADOLPHUS BALLARD & JAMES TAIT, BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS 1216–1307, at
xvii–xviii (1923) (observing that the crown’s inspeximus became common in the thirteenth
century); 1 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 211 & n.1 (noting that new reigns meant
burgesses had to buy confirmations); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 574 (remarking that the king granted liberties and resumed privileges for abuse or non-use).
119. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at xlii–xliii, 7–14 (discussing charter confirmations).
120. BALLARD & TAIT, supra note 118, at lxxii, lxxiv; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra
note 22, at 571–72, 574. Liberties and privileges belonged to the king, and if seized, restoration became a matter of grace.
121. CAM, LIBERTIES, supra note 49, at 173; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at
572–74; SUTHERLAND, supra note 49, at 9–15.
122. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 574; see also 1 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 211.
123. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 43, 49–50, 270, 272.
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privileges, and what privileges had been purchased.124
Privileges to burgesses, like those to other entities, often included fiscal privileges, jurisdictional privileges, mercantile privileges, and privileges from various personal services.125 Many boroughs received some variation of the generic charter language granting sake and soke, toll, team, and
infangenetheof.126 The grant of sake and soke to a borough has been described as the right to form a borough court if it did not already have one.127
The borough court exercised administrative and judicial functions.128 Borough courts were sheltered somewhat from developments in the royal
courts such as the royal jury system.129 Burgesses also received judicial
immunities to be free from pleas outside the borough walls.130 Some bor-

124. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at xxii, xl–xlii, xlvi–xlvii; TAIT, supra note 86, at
192. A new borough needed more definition than an ancient borough. BALLARD, B.B.C.,
supra note 54, at xxii, xlvi–xlvii.
125. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at xix, xliv–lxxi; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra
note 22, at 642–52.
126. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at liv; see supra notes 50–57 and accompanying
text (sake and soke formula).
127. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at liii–liv, lvi–lx (grant of sake and soke to borough creates court; grant of sake and soke to individuals or entity within borough creates
soken: a jurisdictional oasis within larger borough jurisdictional oasis); 1 LIPSON, supra note
71, at 195 (borough court’s importance). But see BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra
note 28, at 50 (commenting that not all holders of sake and soke had courts; instead, some
grantees might merely collect owed forfeitures from another tribunal). Grants of sake and
soke began to disappear as the town developed a community status. 3 WILLIAM STUBBS,
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 580 (5th ed. 1903); see also supra note 52 (disappearance of sake and soke grant).
128. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 275 (describing the important functions of borough
court in collection of revenue, administration of justice, and election of borough officers);
YOUNG, supra note 90, at 69–91; see also 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 85, at 148–49; 2 id. at
386 (civil and criminal jurisdiction of borough court); MAITLAND, TOWNSHIP & BOROUGH,
supra note 109, at 75.
129. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 295–96, 643–45; STEPHENSON, supra
note 88, at 134, 137. The preferred method of proof in the borough was compurgation, a
form of an oath of character. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at lxi; 2 MARY BATESON,
BOROUGH CUSTOMS xxvii (1906). In most boroughs, the administration of trial by battle
was prohibited. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at lxi; 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at
386, 389–90, 397–400 (examining the influence of common law in boroughs).
130. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at liv–lvi (jurisdictional immunities); BALLARD &
TAIT, supra note 118, at lix–lxi (noting, with few exceptions, boroughs could not try pleas of
the crown); id. at lxi (observing the merchant law exception to pleading within borough’s
walls); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 217 (discussing reasons for immunity from external justice); id. at 256 (stating immunity did not extend to piepowder court during fairs); 1
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 643, 676 (burgesses privileged from foreign
courts; procedure for obtaining jurisdiction of claims involving burgesses in king’s courts);
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oughs had the privileges of return of writ and non-intromittant, in which
cases the burgesses were generally free from the sheriff and royal officers.131 Many charters also provided that burgesses were immune from suit
in the general hundred and shire courts.132
As boroughs evolved, similarities developed between borough privileges and immunities. The crown’s twelfth-century charter accelerated this
uniformity by granting boroughs the generic liberties and free customs pertaining to a free borough.133 In the early part of the twelfth century, new
boroughs were created with grants of burghal privileges in “liberum burgagium” (free burgage).134 Toward the end of the twelfth century, crown
charters used the equivalent term “liber burgus” (free borough) to denote
the general liberties and free customs of a free
borough.135
The free customs of a free borough contrasted with heavy labor services of villein tenure. The basic and most important aspect of a free borough was holding land by borough or burgage tenure.136 Burgage tenure
meant holding heritable land and a house in the borough free of most services in exchange for burgage money rents, similar to the tenurial characteristics of socage tenure.137 Though aspects of burgage tenure appear beYOUNG, supra note 90, at 70–72, 86–91 (noting that most burgesses held pleas except for
pleas of the crown, though some exceptional boroughs also heard pleas of crown).
131. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at lvi; BALLARD & TAIT, supra note 118, at lxi,
lxiii–lxiv (discussing return of writ and non-intromittant clauses; noting exceptions to bar on
sheriff entering borough when the town failed to do its duty); TAIT, supra note 86, at 346;
YOUNG, supra note 90, at 88.
132. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at lv.
133. See infra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
134. TAIT, supra note 86, at 106–07 (discussing grants of free customs of reference borough or grants of free burgage generally).
135. Id. at 215–17 (noting the migration from “free burgage” to “free borough” language
and the general equivalence between terms); see also BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at
xl–xli.
136. TAIT, supra note 86, at 195–96, 211.
137. Hemmeon defined burgage tenure as
a form of free tenure peculiar to boroughs, where a tenement so held might be alienated by gift, sale, or devise to a degree regulated only by the custom of the borough, unburdened by the incidents of feudalism or villeinage, divisible at pleasure,
whose obligations began and ended in the payment of a nominal quit-rent, usually
to an elected officer of the borough.
HEMMEON, supra note 94, at 5, 62–80, 92, 108, 130; see also BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note
54, at xliv–xlvii; MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 217 (defining burgage tenure as a
tenement for money rent in exchange for services); CHARLES I. ELTON, THE TENURES OF
KENT 152 (London, James Parker & Co. 1867) (discussing burgage tenure and describing it
as burgage “socage” or “town-socage”); TAIT, supra note 86, at 96–104 (detailing character-

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2011

25

BURRELL.DOCX

1/9/12 12:00 PM

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3

32

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:7

fore the Domesday Book,138 this tenure became more common in the
twelfth century.139 Both free burgage and free borough grants were generic
and variable concepts that might extend beyond simple burgage tenure.140
The concept of free borough status for private boroughs might be basic
burgage tenure—a lord could enfranchise a manor, abolish villein customs,
charge money rents, and allow tenants to form a borough court and collect
profits.141 A free borough for established boroughs may take simple burgage tenure for granted and its application of free borough status might include greater franchises.142
In addition to the basic grant of free borough status, charters to mesne
lords or boroughs facilitated the incorporation of the liberties and free customs of another borough. Many lords and boroughs crafted their requests
for charters by expressly referencing a mother charter, or a well-known
borough with whom the burgesses wanted to associate as the definition of
their liberties and free customs.143 Other charters might empower a mesne
istics of burgage tenure). In the evolution of the borough, for a time, burgage tenure was
more than merely holding land and a house in a borough; it was also an element of burgess
status and a means for burghal privileges and membership to the borough. TAIT, supra note
86, at 103 (vehicle for burghal citizenship before gilds assumed this task); id. at 134, 214–
15, 219 (finding burgage tenure represented a whole body of burghal privileges).
138. The Domesday Book was a type of medieval census book collecting demographic,
economic, and other data for the King in 1086. The primary purpose of the book was to assist the king in collecting taxes. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 1, 3–5.
139. TAIT, supra note 86, at 100–03, 106–07, 214–15, 218. Increased mobility distinguished post-Conquest burgage tenure from other tenures. HEMMEON, supra note 94, at
107–53; MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 198.
140. TAIT, supra note 86, at 211–12, 214–17 (summarizing that free borough status
might clumsily vary from the privileges of London to the lowly privileges of a seignorial
borough).
141. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 295, 639–40 (abolishing villein customs
such as heriot and merchet in exchange for money rent).
142. TAIT, supra note 86, at 195–97, 206 (observing that burgage tenure was taken for
granted in more advanced boroughs); id. at 211–17 (summarizing various definitions and
applications of free borough grants ranging from mere burgage tenure to specified liberties
above simple burgage tenure). The free borough clause, though generic and variable, likely
did not include privileges to have a market or fair, the gild merchant, or exemption from
tolls throughout the realm which must be specifically granted by charter. Id. at 195–96,
198, 209–11, 215 (finding that liberties beyond the concept of free borough status were usually specified). But see 1 CHARLES GROSS, THE GILD MERCHANT 5–6 (London, Oxford
Press 1890) (listing set of privileges which might be associated with free borough including
independent judiciary, firma burgi, commutation of tolls, markets, self-election of officers,
judicial privileges, and gild merchant).
143. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 88, app. E at 242–43; see also BALLARD, B.B.C., supra
note 54, at xli–xlii (characteristics of affiliation); id. at cviii (describing frequency of borough affiliation); 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 85, at 140.
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lord as grantee to choose the reference borough.144 Common mother towns
included London, Winchester, and Hereford.145 The mother borough became more than a town with a reference charter and often served as counsel
and support for the child borough.146 In some cases, the child town served
as the parent of another town.147
Direct association and free borough status were powerful tools assisting many private boroughs as the liberties of both royal and mesne boroughs converged in favor of the protections of free boroughs.148 Cities
sought to gain from the struggles of other cities by associating with their
underlying liberties or with their charters directly and thereby obtaining the
benefits they had achieved.149 With association and charter, boroughs of
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries achieved a level of uniformity not present in earlier times.150
144. TAIT, supra note 86, at 197–208. The grantee might have discretion to choose between royal and other boroughs, but burgesses of a private borough might prefer association
with a royal borough for greater judicial privileges. Id. at 199–200, 200 & n.5; see also infra note 148 (recognizing conditions under the king were better). A mesne lord would be
restricted from granting some privileges without the crown’s authorization. BALLARD,
B.B.C., supra note 54, at xcii; BALLARD & TAIT, supra note 118, at xlix.
145. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at app. E at 254–57. The Ipswich charter at the turn of the
thirteenth century also served as a model for English boroughs. TAIT, supra note 86, at 270–
72.
146. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at app. E at 242, 259–64 (illustrating procedure and practice of association with examples); see also BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at xlii.
147. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at app. E at 243–44.
148. See supra notes 134–47 and accompanying text (discussing grants of free borough
status to mesne (lords) and royal boroughs). The liberties and free customs of royal towns
often became the standard for a free town. 1 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 197–98
(observing that private lords imposed heavy burdens, taxes, and imprisonment; controlled
membership and burgesses’ travel); id. at 227–49 (noting king had more important concerns
and was less worried about his towns’ privileges and thus was willing to grant privileges to
royal towns in return for support or revenue); id. at 250–51 (finding private burgesses’ privileges were obtained through weakness of overlord rather than through his goodwill); id. at
250–55, 270–76 (hardships for townsmen under private lord); id. at 277–308 (comparing
stark contrast between royal town with ample privileges and oppressed town under ecclesiastic control); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 202–03 (royal town’s superior status);
STEPHENSON, supra note 88, at 140–41; see also infra note 486 and accompanying text (noting towns’ liberties, especially London’s, not only a reference for other boroughs but also a
benchmark for liberty of Englishmen).
149. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at app. E at 241–67. Boroughs under royal control obtained liberties more quickly than those under private rule. See supra note 148 (contrasting
free and private towns); infra notes 223–24 (influence of free towns and royal privileges on
private towns under lord or church).
150. BALLARD & TAIT, supra note 118, at xviii–xix (discussing uniformity of borough
charters while recognizing greater variety of privileges in grants to private boroughs under
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E. Firma Burgi
Borough uniformity was further developed by the crown’s community
privilege of farming the borough. The farm of the borough (firma burgi)
was the lump sum paid from the court fines, market tolls, mints, and other
sources of royal revenue for which the borough was responsible.151 By the
compilation of the Domesday Book, the sheriff was farming the revenue of
the borough and paying a fixed sum to the crown.152 In royal boroughs, a
royal officer collected the income and accounted to the sheriff for the farm,
sometimes directly to the king.153 In a private borough, the collection was
handled by the lord’s officers.154
The sheriff sometimes leased the borough to a speculator who paid the
fixed sum and gained what he could from the farm beyond the amount of
the lease due to the king.155 To acquire independence, burgesses desired to
pay for their own farming right.156 In exchange for large fees, by the end of
the twelfth century, kings granted to boroughs the privilege to farm the
borough perpetually in fee and the right to elect an officer to pay the rent to
the royal treasury directly.157 Many boroughs were willing to pay oppressive amounts—above the fixed amount for which the sheriff was responsible—to be free of the sheriff as the financial agent of the borough’s farm.158
The grant of firma burgi provided a sense of community, reduced the extor-

mesne lords); 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at app. E at 243, 257 (pointing out that affiliated
boroughs shared many features but also retained differences).
151. HEMMEON, supra note 94, at 154; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 215 (observing that
firma burgi did not cover all royal income); MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 204;
TAIT, supra note 86, at 141, 146–47.
152. TAIT, supra note 86, at 140.
153. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at lxxxv–lxxxvi.
154. Id. at lxxv; cf. CAM, HUNDRED ROLLS, supra note 49, at 93–95, 142–45, 161–64
(discussing characteristics of and collection procedures for both royal and private hundred
farms).
155. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at lxxv; BALLARD, DOMESDAY BOROUGHS, supra
note 28, at 91–92.
156. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at lxxvi.
157. TAIT, supra note 86, at 123, 139–93, 345–46; see also BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note
54, at lxxvii, lxxxv–lxxxvii (describing office of elected reeve or bailiff to collect farm);
YOUNG, supra note 90, at 16–30 (borough officers and firma burgi). The bailiffs collected
the fees, and the officers and burgesses of the borough were liable jointly and severally for
the fixed rent due to the king. BALLARD & TAIT, supra note 118, at lxxi–lxxii (noting full
corporate characteristics not yet developed); MAITLAND, TOWNSHIP & BOROUGH, supra note
109, at 76–77.
158. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at lxxvi, lxxvii.
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tion of the sheriff, and helped emancipate the borough.159 The privilege of
firma burgi, like other privileges, might be seized by the king if a town violated or abused a privilege or failed to make its payment.160
With various privileges, franchises, and freedoms, burgesses began to
develop a community status free of the sheriff and royal management.161
Because farming the borough treated burgesses as an entity, commentators
note that the grant of firma burgi, along with the collective influences of
the gild and borough court, was a leading step in the formation of the municipal corporation of the late Middle Ages.162
F. Gilds and Gild Merchant
One of the borough’s most important features for students of American history is the formation and development of the gild.163 After the Conquest, burgesses received mercantile privileges to establish a gild merchant,
a monopolistic union of traders within the borough.164 The gild’s main
possessions were mercantile and fiscal immunities to buy and sell retail and
159. TAIT, supra note 86, at 157–58; see also 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 215–17; cf.
CAM, HUNDRED ROLLS, supra note 49, at 93, 143–44, 163 (similar accounts of oppression
occurring with collection of hundred farms). By the beginning of Henry III’s reign, most
larger towns had farming privileges. BALLARD & TAIT, supra note 118, at lvi. Burgesses
also desired the privileges of non-intromittant and return of writ to rid themselves of the
sheriff’s judicial powers and royal officers. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
160. HEMMEON, supra note 94, at 155; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 215 (noting occasional revocation of grant of firma burgi). If the town abused its charter, the king might seize its
liberties, and restoration became a matter of grace. See supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text.
161. TAIT, supra note 86, at 159, 234, 264, 345–46.
162. Id. (suggesting election of royal officers to collect firma burgi was a step in formation of borough community); see also MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 20, at 205–06;
1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 651 (commenting on quasi-ownership with grant
of firma burgi, but noting town did not have full community status as escheats did not go to
community); infra Part II.F (illustrating gild’s influence in boroughs).
163. The grant of gild merchant typically required a royal charter. BALLARD & TAIT, supra note 118, at lxxxiii; 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 91; TAIT, supra note 86, at 210. For a
discussion of medieval gilds merchant, see MILLER & HATCHER, supra note 95, at 290–98.
164. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 4 (monopolistic union); id. at 25–26 (discussing Ipswich monopoly on buying and selling certain products). But see REYNOLDS, supra note 114,
at 81–82 (noting presence of gild societies before Conquest); 1 WILLIAM R. SCOTT, THE
CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND IRISH JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES TO
1720, at 5–6 (1912) (describing gild merchant’s formation from earlier societies and discussing rationale behind exclusivity in medieval trade); TAIT, supra note 86, at 120–21, 136
(commenting on gild’s presence before Conquest). For history on early family and religious
gilds, see JOSHUA TOULMIN SMITH & LUCY TOULMIN SMITH, ENGLISH GILDS (London, N.
Trubner & Co. 1870).
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wholesale without toll and free of other restrictions.165
Before England saw the governor of the company or the mayor of the
town, the gild had elected an alderman as its leader.166 Gild aldermen were
accompanied by assistants of various titles.167 The gild’s business took
place at a periodic meeting (morning-speech) where the gild admitted
members, adopted bylaws, and carried out administrative duties.168
To become a member of the gild, one paid admission to the gild and
swore an oath to preserve the privileges of the fraternity.169 Foreign merchants who were not members of the borough could join the gild.170 The
crown perceived the foreign merchant as a source of crown revenue.171 The
barons, too, felt merchants were useful as they lent money and lowered
prices.172 But burgesses felt foreign merchants were a threat.173 Locals
165. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 39–52 (summarizing non-gildsmen’s restrictions on
owning shops, on free trade of certain products, on trade of other products at certain times,
and restrictions on non-gildsmen’s buying or selling retail); see also infra notes 173, 175
and accompanying text (noting discrimination against and regulation of aliens and nongildsmen).
166. Lujo Brentano, Introduction to JOSHUA TOULMIN SMITH & LUCY TOULMIN SMITH,
ENGLISH GILDS, at xxxviii (London, N. Trubner & Co. 1870); see also infra note 167.
167. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 24–28 (describing the election of gild alderman and
assistants); id. at 78–79 (noting the distinction between gild aldermen and ward aldermen of
town council). By the sixteenth century, the alderman might be known as “governor” presiding over the governance of the gild house. 1 SCOTT, supra note 164, at 7. Assistants typically came in multiples of twelve, e.g., twenty-four assistants to the alderman or governor.
Id.; see also infra notes 193, 196–205 and accompanying text (commenting on borough
councils of twelve and twenty-four).
168. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 32–33; Brentano, supra note 166, at xxxii–xxxiii. The
gild recorded customary bylaws as the gild’s particular privileges were not specified in their
charters. 1 SCOTT, supra note 164, at 7–8.
169. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 29, 38. To retain good standing, gildsmen had to be lot
and scot with the burgesses, i.e., had to pay their town dues alongside burgesses. Id. at 53–
57.
170. Id. at 66–68; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 276.
171. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 517, 537 (noting payment of higher alien duties and resource for loans). In the early part of the fourteenth century, the crown protected alien merchants’ trading privileges with the Carta Mercatoria in exchange for new alien customs.
T.H. LLOYD, ALIEN MERCHANTS IN ENGLAND IN THE HIGH MIDDLE AGES 26–28 (1982).
172. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 464.
173. WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM, ALIEN IMMIGRANTS TO ENGLAND 124–29, 203 (New York,
Macmillan Co. 1897) [hereinafter CUNNINGHAM, ALIEN IMMIGRANTS] (examining animosity
toward aliens in late medieval period); 2 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 94–95 (identifying conflict over job shortages and foreign merchants); 9 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 94–95 (photo. reprint 1966) (3d ed. 1944) (noting discrimination
against aliens and protection of foreigners through national legislation); 1 id. at 540–41 (observing that burgesses suppressed foreign merchant’s ability to trade in town); 1 LIPSON,
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complained that they could not compete with outside merchants who were
free from local expenses but traded freely in the town alongside burdened
locals.174 Because of the tension, boroughs protected their mercantile privileges by regulating the ability of non-gild foreign merchants to trade, buy,
sell, set up shop, and hold land in the borough.175
One of the highly valued privileges of the gild was the grant of freedom from toll throughout the realm to members of the gild.176 If a gildsman or burgess of a privileged borough went to another fair or market and
was tolled despite presenting charters of exemption, the gild or borough
could seek to recover the injury to its privilege by litigation or reprisal.177
Many foreign merchants were also exempt from certain tolls by a provision
in their home charter, and in these cases the towns had to sort out the conflicting privileges.178
The privileged trading communities and markets were the driving
force of the nation’s commerce.179 For many towns, especially private
towns under a mesne lord, the only town function was commerce through
the gild.180 Over time, specific craft gilds grew as offshoots to the general

supra note 71, at 499–501, 516–37 (discussing tension between alien merchants and locals);
1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 464–65.
174. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 466–67 (noting presence of foreign weavers who enjoyed benefits but did not have to pay royal fees that local weavers had to pay);
CUNNINGHAM, ALIEN IMMIGRANTS, supra note 173, at 98 (detailing change in policy so that
aliens residing in city more than forty days had to contribute proportion of taxation that fell
on denizens).
175. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 41–42, 45, 46–48, 133, 134; see, e.g., 2 GREEN, TOWN
LIFE, supra note 43, at 39–50 (explaining relations between foreign merchants and towns;
burgess could lose citizenship for assisting foreign merchants in evading restrictions); 1
LIPSON, supra note 71, at 265–69 (emphasizing restrictions placed on foreign competition);
id. at 499–501, 516–35 (discussing conflict with aliens); see also supra note 173.
176. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 43–44; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 279.
177. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 666–67.
178. BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at lxix (explaining that some towns were exempt
in England and some were exempt throughout realm); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 284–86
(noting burgesses might carry charter with them to outside fair as proof of immunity).
Many charters provided a clause saving London’s privileges so there would be no confusion
in a conflict between privileges. See, e.g., BALLARD, B.B.C., supra note 54, at 14, 15, 35;
BALLARD & TAIT, supra note 118, at 29; cf. NORTON, supra note 33, at 67–69.
179. 2 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 55–56 (finding that commercial community
privileges of borough or gild were a “great engine” for abolishing restrictions and creating
national commerce).
180. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 90–92 (discussing gild’s presence in small mesne borough as only town function and contrasting gild’s lesser influence in royal boroughs with
independent court). London never received the right to form a gild merchant, though crafts
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mercantile interests of the gild merchant.181 Craft gilds included merchants
of particular trades and those in various stages of production.182 The increase in craft gilds decreased the power of the gild merchant.183
G. Borough Governance and Municipal Incorporation
A second feature vital to the study of American history is the development of local government in the borough. Medieval borough and gild
governance provided the seeds for self-government in merchant and adventurer societies, ultimately leading to similar features in colonial governments. By the time the American colonies had settled, there were three
forms: the proprietary colony, the royal colony, and the corporate colony.184 In all three instances, colonies borrowed from medieval institutions,
especially borough and gild governance.185
The gild was one of many dynamics influencing borough citizenship
and governance. In some boroughs, craft gilds merged with the gild merchant; in other boroughs, the gild merged with the borough’s governing
body—a characteristic explained by the fact that gild officers composed a

gilds flourished. Leonard W. Hein, The British Business Company: Its Origins and Its Control, 15 U. TORONTO L.J. 134, 135–36 (1963).
181. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 114–16; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 308 (observing that
craft gild consisted of masters, journeymen, and apprentices); id. at 328 (concluding that the
craft gild’s primary function was to control a segment of industry through a network of restrictions); id. at 337 (noting craft gilds regulated prices); id. at 349–50 (control of craft resided with assembly and wardens; wardens generally elected by assembly of company); id.
at 364 (comparing craft gild with gild merchant). See generally KRAMER, supra note 117
(describing transition from gild merchant to craft gild). The craft gild might have a charter
like the gild merchant but it was not necessary; adulterine craft gilds in twelfth-century
London that did not purchase charters of association were stigmatized. 3 STUBBS, supra
note 127, at 585. But see KRAMER, supra note 117, at 42–43 (observing that many crafts in
Bristol did not have charter).
182. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 120–29 (distinguishing gild merchant from crafts and
crafts from other crafts); 2 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 112–13 (describing types of
crafts).
183. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 114–23. Over time, craft gilds merged with gilds merchant and together both merged with the governing body of the borough. Id. at 107, 115–
26, 158–61; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 371–75 (noting crafts’ submission to town authority
and town’s removal of restrictions on crafts accelerated their growth and absorption of gild
merchant); id. at 423–26 (amalgamation of crafts); 3 STUBBS, supra note 127, at 583, 584–
85.
184. See infra note 331, Part IV.A–C.
185. See infra note 376, Part IV.D.
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large proportion of the borough’s leading officials.186 After some time, the
qualifications for membership or freedom of the town expanded beyond
burgage tenure to include gild apprenticeship and purchase or inheritance.187 Freedom of a craft or gild became synonymous with freedom of
the city.
Gild leadership and organization influenced town leadership and organization. Ancient communal features of the gild provided the borough
with a community status—a characteristic further reinforced by the borough’s community farming privileges discussed above.188 Before the turn
of the thirteenth century, the king had appointed the official town leader,
the king’s reeve.189 The gild had elected its leader for some time, but the
borough did not have an elected leader. Because of the overlap in the entities, Professor Tait suggested that the influence of an elected officer in the
gild facilitated the development of a similar institution in the town.190
Shortly before the thirteenth century, London received the right to elect its

186. 2 GREEN, supra note 43, at 145–60 (finding heavy regulation of gild eventually generated town dependency on gild officers and resources); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 277–78
(recognizing that borough governance and gild function merged); TAIT, supra note 86, at
226–27 (noting that borough and gild shared features and personnel); see also supra notes
182–83 and accompanying text (interrelationship between gild merchant and craft gilds).
Though there often was overlap, the gild was not fully interchangeable with the town’s administration. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 61–63, 65–72, 75, 85, 92, 111–13, 126 (suggesting
that crafts may have assisted town oligarchies but did not supplant them); 1 LIPSON, supra
note 71, at 369 (explaining that crafts did not want to be absorbed into taxation and jurisdiction of town and gild merchant).
187. 1 FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 18–19 paras. 18–23 (1835) [hereinafter FIRST
REPORT] (stating that, in some towns, gild membership was required for town membership);
1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 71 n.3, 123–26 (membership through birth, apprenticeship, inheritance, gift, or purchase); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 385–86 (town membership through
gild membership); 3 STUBBS, supra note 127, at 583–84, 585–87, 593, 596 (gilds’ growth
and interaction with municipal governance and freemanship); TAIT, supra note 86, at 249
(gild membership occasionally required).
188. TAIT, supra note 86, at 234 (farming and associated privileges unified community);
id. at 263–64 (gild gave semi-corporate status to borough community).
189. Id. at 225–28, 255.
190. Id. at 225–26 (gild influences enabled community growth); id. at 227 (noting double
capacity of citizens who were members of both gild and borough). At times, the gild’s alderman, whose authority was generally limited to commercial matters, was considered the
town leader even on matters outside of trade, as Tait noted “one body with two aspects.” Id.
at 227, 231–32, 248. Burgesses, for example, might borrow gild institutions for town activity, promoting the eventual linkage between the two institutions. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at
82–83, xviii–xvix (borough open-air gatherings borrowed gild’s hall, which eventually became part of town).
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mayor.191 Following London’s example, several boroughs, especially the
larger, more advanced boroughs, provided for civic leaders.192
In the evolution of the English municipality, bodies of assistants, aldermen and common councilors, to a greater or lesser degree representative
of the borough and often in multiples of twelve, grew alongside civic leaders.193 Membership in these councils was reserved to the more important,
wise and discrete men of the borough (probi homines), from whom the
councils were chosen or by whom councils were otherwise influenced.194
Gilds, too, played a role in influencing and providing membership to borough councils.195
Accompanying the town’s civic leader, a formal town council of
twelve or twenty-four good men assembled as a sworn body of aldermen to
assist the mayor.196 By the thirteenth century, London’s mayor and aldermen were summoning an assembly from the community to help perform
the work of the city as a second council assisting the mayor and town
council.197 By the middle of the fourteenth century, gilds were included in
the summons.198 As London had election privileges, summoned assemblies

191. TAIT, supra note 86, at 291, 347 (mayor followed London’s commune).
192. 2 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 274–76 (election of mayor varied from town
to town); MILLER & HATCHER, supra note 95, at 307–08; TAIT, supra note 86, at 291 (noting
examples of boroughs following London’s mayor). The office of mayor did not always require a royal charter. BALLARD & TAIT, supra note 118, at lvii (finding presence of mayor
without royal charter and observing mayor’s interaction with gild aldermen).
193. See infra notes 196–205 and accompanying text. In the early thirteenth century, to
help carry the burden of governance or to curb abuse of taxation by the ruling class, London
elected assemblies to assist in governance. TAIT, supra note 86, at 267–69.
194. 2 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 249–53; TAIT, supra note 86, at 244, 264,
266, 268, 282, 307, 312–13, 317, 323; GWYN A. WILLIAMS, MEDIEVAL LONDON: FROM
COMMUNE TO CAPITAL 34–37 (1963).
195. See supra notes 183, 186–90 and accompanying text (shared officers and merger of
institutions); infra notes 198–203 and accompanying text (gild influence in election assemblies and common council).
196. TAIT, supra note 86, at 264, 266–67, 270, 280–81, 284. London’s twenty-four aldermen were nominated by the citizens of their respective wards. Id. at 281; see also 2
GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 277–78 (selection of town council in other towns).
Aldermen had power ranging from co-management to mere advice. These elected aldermen
or assistants, though subordinate to the mayor, grew in election, appointment, and judicial
responsibilities. Aldermen at times were restricted to one-year terms but eventually this restriction was removed and aldermen were in office for life, removable for reasonable cause.
TAIT, supra note 86, at 282–84, 311–12, 313.
197. TAIT, supra note 86, at 303–05.
198. Most of London’s work was done by the town council and aldermen, but if the
commonalty was needed, the town might summon the crafts. PAMELA NIGHTINGALE, A
MEDIEVAL MERCANTILE COMMUNITY: THE GROCERS’ COMPANY & THE POLITICS & TRADE OF
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had to differentiate between functions—forming administrative assemblies
for ordinary business and election assemblies for the election of the mayor
and other officers.199 With London’s 1376 reforms and the amalgamation
of the two types of assemblies, gilds were able to appoint assembly (common council) representatives.200 Some felt the gild was a better body than
the ward for electing the common council because its influence was able to
reduce the arbitrary rule of the ruling class.201 Gild representatives, at least
initially, were seen as useful to the commoners to help break up the monopoly powers of the mayor and aldermen and promote free trade.202 Direct gild election also secured participation by minority gilds.203 Many of
the 1376 reforms, however, were short lived, and election of the common

LONDON, 1000–1485, at 203 (1995) (gilds provided common council representatives in 1351
to discuss loss of city’s commercial privileges; gilds helped collect loans for king); GEORGE
UNWIN, THE GILDS AND COMPANIES OF LONDON 76–77 (1908) (noting presence of gild
membership in mid-fourteenth century).
199. TAIT, supra note 86, at 305. Election of the mayor in London was initially entrusted
to the aldermen and nobles. Later the mayor was elected by the aldermen assisted to some
degree by an election assembly attended by ward or gild designees. Id. at 305–10; see also
NORTON, supra note 33, at 115; WILLIAMS, supra note 194, at 27, 40–41, 43 (tension and
transformation in procedure for electing mayor). Elected mayors and bailiffs might be presented to the king for approval. 3 STUBBS, supra note 127, at 587; TAIT, supra note 86, at
349. Until the mid-fourteenth century, men of the ward generally nominated representatives
for the administrative assembly. TAIT, supra note 86, at 307–08 (tracing evolution of both
assemblies and noting ward’s selection of administrative assembly); id. at 310, 311 (distinguishing election and administrative assemblies).
200. London’s 1376 reforms temporarily combined the election and ordinary assemblies,
referred to as the “common council,” and required the body meet several times a year rather
than be summoned. TAIT, supra note 86, at 309–10 (describing circumstances and gild influence before and after 1376 change); id. at 311 (merger of assemblies in 1376 reforms);
UNWIN, supra note 198, at 130–31.
201. See infra notes 202–03 and accompanying text.
202. TAIT, supra note 86, at 309–10, 311; UNWIN, supra note 198, at 63–64, 130–131,
135 (abuse by aldermen led to gilds’ involvement in common council); see also 2 GREEN,
TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 167–68 (commoners looked to gild resources to fight ruling
party); id. at 170–77 (privileged gild in Exeter mobilized commonalty against arbitrary government and taxation by municipal authority until king revoked gild’s privileges in favor of
municipality). Tait noted that confidence in the gild was further confirmed by the fact that
legislation with only gild approval was acceptable but legislation of mayor and aldermen
alone was void and needed further support. TAIT, supra note 86, at 310–11.
203. Gild representation might have also served lesser gilds seeking to gain a voice
among the larger trading companies. CAROLINE M. BARRON, LONDON IN THE LATER MIDDLE
AGES: GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE, 1200–1500, at 130–31 (2004); NIGHTINGALE, supra note
198, at 245–46.
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council returned to the wards.204 Following London’s example, many
towns added a common council to their governing body.205
A brief review of medieval town governance highlights a few trends.
On the one hand, arbitrary rule by a select ruling class during the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries, especially concerning taxation, resulted in the formation of councils, more or less representative of the wards, or at times, the
gilds.206 On the other hand, there was a common perception that the com-

204. TAIT, supra note 86, at 312–13. During this period, election of the common council
volleyed back and forth between men of the wards and the companies. Shortly after the reforms of 1376, other probi homines who were not members of the gild were added to the
common council, a change that soon became a permanent substitution for gild designees.
Id. at 313. Within a decade of the 1376 reforms, the assemblies again differentiated and the
election of the common council (administrative assembly) returned to the wards.
NIGHTINGALE, supra note 198, at 284; TAIT, supra note 86, at 313–14. With the separation,
the election assembly became a larger body attended by the common council and the gilds.
Id. at 313–14.
London’s representatives to Parliament were also selected by the larger election
body. NORTON, supra note 33, at 114–15, 116; 3 STUBBS, supra note 127, at 596. The
crown frequently sought burgesses’ support and input on the great affairs of the realm, and
borough representatives became a regular part of Parliament by 1300. YOUNG, supra note
90, at 151–54. The idea behind the Model Parliament is captured in the famous phrase,
“quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus aprobetur” (what touches all, shall be approved by all).
GEORGE L. HASKINS, THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 72 (1960).
The related principle that no taxation should be raised without common consent became
commonplace in England with the statutes Magna Carta (1215), De Tallagio Non Concedendo (1297), and subsequent taxation statutes of 1340. 2 STUBBS, supra note 127, at
148–49, 401–02; see also supra note 69 (palatinates and representation in Parliament). For
criticisms of the authenticity of De Tallagio Non Concedendo, see J.H. Round, The House of
Lords and the Model Parliament, 30 ENG. HIST. REV. 385, 396 (1915).
205. TAIT, supra note 86, at 315–16 (describing London’s influence on other towns adding common councils and noting that London remained representative while many other
towns became closed oligarchies).
206. The community, as distinguished from the mayor, aldermen, and sometimes from
the common council, fought with the ruling body. TAIT, supra note 86, at 241–47. Lack of
participation was a frequent grievance concerning municipal taxation. BARRON, supra note
203, at 133–34 (by fifteenth century, London’s common council consented to taxation);
JENNY KERMODE, MEDIEVAL MERCHANTS: YORK, BEVERLEY AND HULL IN THE LATER
MIDDLE AGES 56–60 (1998) (noting rioting by discontented commoner seeking greater access to town governance in late medieval period); MILLER & HATCHER, supra note 95, at
358–61 (abuse of taxation by ruling class led to greater involvement by community); 3
STUBBS, supra note 127, at 588 (lack of participation and unfair assessments by governing
class prompted rise in commons); TAIT, supra note 86, at 267, 303, 317, 319, 332–33 (detailing popular resentment against arbitrary taxation and explaining how perceptions of arbitrary rule by powerful individuals (potentiores) in various towns prompted creation of council); id. at 319 (burgesses and lesser inhabitants petitioned king over taxation without
representation and as a result obtained a more representative committee including both
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monalty in many towns went too far, was of poor quality, and elected unsuitable officers to run the town.207 In response, Parliament and the crown
limited participation to stifle the agitation and democracy of the multitude.208 Though gilds were once regarded as a liberating force in breaking
up elite ruling classes,209 by the end of the medieval period, wealthy gilds
were viewed as detrimental to the town’s general welfare and came under
heavy regulation.210 Eventually the governing body, perhaps aided by

common and lesser inhabitants); Charles W. Colby, The Growth of Oligarchy in English
Towns, 5 ENG. HIST. REV. 644–46 (1890) (arbitrary taxation and abuse of government by
few burgesses roused greater borough community); see also supra note 204 (borough representation in Parliament and principle of no taxation without common consent); cf. BALLARD
& TAIT, supra note 118, at lxxiii–lxxiv (commenting on examples of towns’ citation to
Magna Carta against excessive amercements but also noting Magna Carta’s limited effect as
crown granted privileges by grace and could resume privileges when burgesses abused
them). Charter provisions requiring some degree of “common consent” and “better governance” were common themes in borough and merchant charters in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. See infra notes 210, 243–47 and accompanying text.
207. TAIT, supra note 86, at 323–24. In the latter part of the fourteenth century, officers
of Norwich were of the opinion that the commonalty had been disruptive, and they successfully petitioned the king to allow the bailiffs and twenty-four aldermen to make ordinances
for the good of government as needed without the addition of the commonalty in the process. Id. at 317. In the first half of the fifteenth century, though, the commonalty to some
degree was added back in the form of a common council. Id. at 317–18.
208. Id. at 322–24 (regulations closed council membership to oligarchical body of discrete and wise men); see supra note 194. Despite earlier victories for representative government, Lynn, by a 1524 charter, became closed in the hands of the mayor, twelve aldermen, and eighteen common councilors. TAIT, supra note 86, at 321; Stephen Rigby, Urban
‘Oligarchy’ in Late Medieval England, in TOWNS AND TOWNSPEOPLE IN THE FIFTEENTH
CENTURY 68 (J.A.F. Thomson ed. 1988); Jennifer I. Kermode, Obvious Observations on the
Formation of Oligarchies in Late Medieval English Towns, in TOWNS AND TOWNSPEOPLE IN
THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY, supra, at 87–106. The crown chose Lynn aldermen for life in the
first instance, but vacancies were filled by common councilors. The common council elected one of the aldermen to serve as mayor each year. From a pool of burgesses, councilors
were chosen at will with full removal power by the mayor and aldermen. Burgesses were
admitted by the closed body. TAIT, supra note 86, at 321.
209. See supra notes 200–03.
210. MILLER & HATCHER, supra note 95, at 365 (grievances against gilds’ price-fixing);
id. at 365–66 (crown prohibited establishment of gilds detrimental to city in late thirteenthcentury charters; gilds placed under city’s supervision in late thirteenth century; gilds and
town bid against each other for royal support and charter); id. at 366 (fourteenth-century
gilds operated for their own profit and to the detriment of the general community); id. at 367
(town complained of defective products); id. at 368–69 (by mid-fourteenth century, gilds
were under town authority and the town approved gild ordinances and gild officers).
In 1437 and 1504, Parliament passed legislation restricting self-interested gilds
from operating to the detriment of the common people. UNWIN, supra note 198, at 160–62,
170 (noting London procured parliamentary legislation to combat wealthy crafts enfran-
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gilds, formed oligarchies in the boroughs, and the governance of most boroughs became closed to select bodies—often to the disadvantage of the rest
of the town.211

chised by crown’s privileges of incorporation). The 1437 act strengthened municipal supervision of gilds. 1437, 15 Hen. 6, c. 6; KRAMER, supra note 117, at 29–37, 47–48 (gilds in
Bristol and other towns presented their bylaws to municipal authorities for approval); id. at
41–59 (gild’s royal charter presented obstacle to municipal control of gilds, resulting in parliamentary legislation); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 372–84 (town’s powers over gilds with
submission of gild bylaws for approval; town’s nomination of gild officials; town’s control
over gild assembly and ordinances); id. at 418–19 (noting that 1437 legislation did not create new conditions but merely addressed variance created by royal charters granted to certain gilds and not to others); see also 2 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 130–31 (relationship between gild oligarchies and town oligarchies); id. at 137–40 (regulation of
merchants to control prices); id. at 142–60 (merchants subordinated to common benefit and
supervision of town; gilds rose from public regulation to seize control of municipality).
The 1504 Act renewed earlier legislation and added a national element that approval
of gild ordinances (ordinances not “unreasonable”) must be received favorably by a combination of the chancellor, treasurer, chief justices of either bench, or royal justices. 1504, 19
Hen. 7, c. 7; KRAMER, supra note 117, at 60–63 (1504 legislation enhanced earlier legislation regulating gilds); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 338–39 (unreasonable ordinances involved price-fixing); id. at 420–21 (contrasting 1504 legislation with 1437 legislation). By
the mid-seventeenth century, courts struck down gild ordinances even though they had been
approved by the authorities under the 1504 act. 3 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 349–50.
211. TAIT, supra note 86, at 302–03, 316, 321, 323, 338; see also FIRST REPORT, supra
note 187, at 17, 18 (exclusion of common freemen from corporation and governance); 2
GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 118–19 (gild oligarchies); id. at 240–46 (town oligarchy taxed arbitrarily, deprived commoners of free trade, and used town finances for personal
use); id. at 247–49 (general town assembly initially was no cure to town oligarchy); id. at
249–53 (town governance remained in few worthy men, sometimes in leading families from
generation to generation); 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 109–10 (oligarchies in boroughs); id.
at 126 (craft oligarchies assisted town oligarchies; “burgess” status frequently restricted to
members of select governing body); REYNOLDS, supra note 114, at 132–38 (discussing factions in medieval towns, noting influences of crafts in town governance, and describing
town division into greater and lesser burgesses); UNWIN, supra note 198, at 217 (oligarchies
of sixteenth-century companies); cf. infra notes 381–84 and accompanying text (describing
restricted political systems in New England).
London’s leading gild companies, the twelve great livery companies, influenced the
governance of English municipalities and overseas merchants. The “livery” denotes a particular piece of clothing or uniform bestowed upon liverymen—a select body of influential
freemen within the greater company of freemen. W.J. ASHLEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ENGLISH ECONOMIC HISTORY AND THEORY, PART II, END OF THE MIDDLE AGES 126, 131 (2d
ed., London, Longmans, Green, & Co. 1893). Senior wardens and a court of assistants governed the livery company. GEORGE UNWIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN THE SIXTEENTH
AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES 41–42 (1904). The court of assistants was itself a select ruling body within the livery and chose liverymen from freemen. ASHLEY, supra, at 131–32;
UNWIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra, at 43. Unwin noted that the livery company’s
oligarchy and the town’s oligarchy shared many similarities. UNWIN, INDUSTRIAL
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Municipal incorporation further reinforced oligarchical forces in English towns.212 During the Middle Ages, there were various types of communities including counties, hundreds, villages, boroughs, gilds, churches,
colleges, and hospitals.213 Some of these communities became formal corporations.214 Incorporation of the English borough was the concept of
forming an entity separate from its burgesses where, when fully realized,
the assets and obligations of the corporation belonged to the community of
burgesses and not to individual citizens.215 In an oligarchical town, the
corporation might refer to a select body of burgesses who incorporated and
owned town property. In these towns, municipal incorporation formalized
the select body at the expense of the original powers held by burgesses.216
Generally, incorporation of a borough was the crown’s formal recognition of preexisting municipal privileges.217 In many cases, before the
borough became recognized as a formal corporation, it had “a natural corporate existence” as all of the features of a corporation were enjoyed by

ORGANIZATION, supra, at 73–74; see also ASHLEY, supra, at 125. The burgess with voting
rights resembled the livery member, the common council resembled the court of assistants,
and the town’s aldermen shared similarities with the livery company’s governing wardens.
UNWIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra, at 73.
212. See generally MARTIN WEINBAUM, THE INCORPORATION OF BOROUGHS (1937).
213. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 98–101 (gild a “communitas” along with villages, counties, hundreds, and others); 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 469 (listing examples); 9 id. at
45–72 (creation, powers, limitations, and dissolution of corporations); 1 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 486, 494, 564, 620.
214. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 495, 534.
215. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 482–89 (discussing realization of corporate personality from individual liability); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 488; TAIT, supra note 86, at 234 (beginning of municipal incorporation).
216. FIRST REPORT, supra note 187, at 17 para. 13 (observing that municipal incorporation took away from community’s power as governing class became independent of greater
community); id. at 34 (ruling class of corporation might abuse its power by monopolizing
privilege of electing borough representatives to Parliament); 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 96
(by Tudor and Stuart period, “corporation” referred to select body); 3 STUBBS, supra note
127, at 606–07 (oligarchic corporations acquired property and town governance to the exclusion of burghers); TAIT, supra note 86, at 240–41 (noting burgesses included in concept
of incorporation but probably not borough-wide concept); id. at 323 (example of incorporation of small body of individuals in name of community (official “burgesses”), reducing rest
of town to mere inhabitants). Conditions in English towns generally remained the same until the nineteenth century. Parliament overhauled borough governance in 1835. Municipal
Corporations Act, 1835, 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76.
217. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 475–79 (describing creation of corporation by
king, Parliament, church, and by implication).
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boroughs.218 Corporations in their full form elect a leader, have a seal,
make bylaws, enjoy the power to sue and be sued, contract, and can own
and transfer property.219 In the fifteenth century, the number of grants of
incorporation to burgesses and other communities began to increase.220
The crown’s grant of incorporation, joined with fiscal, mercantile, and
jurisdictional privileges discussed above—though not always reaching all
borough members—provided a convenient capstone and substitute for the
earlier block of privileges and immunities of free boroughs.221 Before the
close of the Middle Ages, the borough had achieved an independent identity through the collective influences of the gild, firma burgi, and borough
self-governance. While the crown frequently granted privileges and immunities to its boroughs, towns on private estates struggled for freedom.222
Nonetheless, through association and assimilation, gild and community
forces helped liberate the private town from the restrictive forces of the
lord and church.223 The late medieval period provided many examples of
218. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 95; 3 STUBBS, supra note 127, at 596–97, 604–06; TAIT,
supra note 86, at 234–37, 263–64 (features of corporateness in firma burgi, gild, and commune).
219. 1 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 802–03 (7th ed., London, A.
Strahan 1832) (Tit. “By-laws”); 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 482, 487–88; MARTIN
WEINBAUM, BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS 1307–1660, at xxiv (1943) (five points of corporate powers). The 1835 Report of the Commissioners lists admission of members as a right
of the municipal corporation, particularly the Mayor, with or without a requirement for residence or property. FIRST REPORT, supra note 187, at 18–19, 35.
220. 3 STUBBS, supra note 127, at 606. One likely explanation for the increase is the
1391 legislation extending the statute of mortmain to gilds and towns. PLATT, supra note
89, at 143–44. Gilds sought royal incorporation and license to hold in mortmain, but selective incorporation led to petitions requesting that Parliament intervene with legislation regulating crafts in the fifteenth century. BARRON, supra note 203, at 208–10; UNWIN, supra
note 198, at 158–63, 170–72; see also supra note 210 (discussing Parliament’s regulations
of gilds in fifteenth and sixteenth centuries).
221. 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 96–97 (concept of incorporation served as substitute for
variable concept of liber burgus); 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 476–77 (communities
incorporated to receive and protect franchises).
222. See supra note 148 (comparing freer royal towns with private towns).
223. See supra notes 143–50 (association of borough charters to leverage liberties of freer towns). Community forces freed the town from the restrictive forces of the baron and
eventually from the church. In many cases, the gild was a powerful liberating force for boroughs under private lords. 1 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 251–53 (merchants stayed
away from arbitrary baronial boroughs; observing gild’s influence upon private towns); id.
at 286–87, 300 (gild’s influence on towns under churches); id. at 296–98 (efforts by members of gild to free town); id. at 302–03 (summarizing gild as only outlet and identity for
burgesses under mesne lord); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 204–10 (baronial burgesses purchased charter privileges and liberties, converging toward a free or royal borough); id. at
278–79 (gild’s corporate unity felt more in mesne borough struggling for liberty and self-
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the mesne town struggling to free itself from customs, rents, and arbitrary
taxation of the lord. The privileges and immunities of neighboring free
towns served as a leverage point for the task.224
An examination of medieval royal privileges and immunities reveals
dependence on the crown for the basic institutions of government. Before
the Conquest, the church and crown, by royal charter, created privileged
lands superior to other lands in alienability and heritability.225 Throughout
the period under review, the crown granted fiscal, mercantile, and jurisdictional privileges and immunities to lords and entities.226 The crown extended its peace to boroughs, clothed burgesses with rights of governance,
and nurtured urban mercantile associations.227 As a cohesive unit, governmental and administrative privileges and immunities granted to gilds and
boroughs provided a ready model for advancing mercantile activity outside
of the borough walls. These English institutions, transplanted by royal
charter to voyaging merchant associations and explorers, provided the germ
for similar institutions in the American colonies.
III. MERCHANTS, EXPLORATION, AND COLONIZATION: THE BEGINNING OF
THE AMERICAN COLONIES
By the late medieval period, mercantile activity of English towns had
expanded beyond the borough and local market to include a thriving international trade between English merchants and neighboring countries.228

government); MILLER & HATCHER, supra note 95, at 296–98; TAIT, supra note 86, at 228,
234 (gild’s influence in private boroughs); see also supra note 180 (gild might be only formal community in small private borough).
224. 1 GREEN, TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 237–38 (royal privileges developed boroughs, liberated burgesses from pleas outside city, and gave burgesses self-governance
rights and right to farm their own revenue); id. at 246 (noting that liberties of royal towns
served as model for other towns); id. at 251 (merchants disfavored arbitrary taxation in
mesne boroughs); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 206–10; MILLER & HATCHER, supra note 95,
at 317–18 (rise of burghal privileges in private towns); see also supra notes 148, 223 (gild
privileges, common in royal boroughs, provided liberating influence on private boroughs).
The king occasionally granted privileges to private townsmen to the disfavor of a particular
lord. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 208 (gild, market privileges, and a borough court in private town).
225. See supra Part II.A.
226. See supra Part II.B.
227. See supra Part II.C–G.
228. E.M. CARUS-WILSON, MEDIEVAL MERCHANT VENTURERS: COLLECTED STUDIES xv,
xxx–xxxiv, 1 (2d ed. 1967) (noting influence of London and Bristol merchants in overseas
exploration and trade); see also 1 CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 28–52 (Yale Univ. Press 1964) (1934) [hereinafter ANDREWS,
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Charter privileges and immunities to boroughs and gilds provided a template for charters to merchant trading associations engaging in foreign trade
and exploration.229 In many instances, the institutions of these overseas
traders were mere extensions of those of the urban mercantile community.230
Merchants forming a trading association might receive rights to form a
gild-based company.231 Gilds trading beyond England’s natural boundaries
were prevalent throughout the medieval, Tudor, and Stuart periods. A
common type of gild was the regulated gild. The regulated gild, with its
governor and assistants, was a descendant of the craft or gild merchant with
its aldermen, wardens, and assistants.232 In the regulated gild, similar to the
gild merchant, members enjoyed exclusive privileges and traded freely for
their own profit subject to the regulations of the company.233
The crown’s formation of the joint-stock company replaced the regu-

COLONIAL PERIOD] (trading companies and merchant adventurers); infra note 230 (merchants trading overseas).
229. See infra notes 230, 240–42 and accompanying text (merchant associations following municipal and gild governance models); see also 1 GROSS, supra note 142, at 155–57
(discussing gilds and merchant companies, noting contrasting characteristics). The term
“merchant adventurer” came into use late in the fifteenth century and often refers to a formal company. DOUGLAS R. BISSON, THE MERCHANT ADVENTURERS OF ENGLAND: THE
COMPANY AND CROWN 1474–1564, at 2–3 (1993); CARUS-WILSON, supra note 228, at xv–
xvi, 143–45 (defining term “merchant adventurer”). For purposes of this Article, “merchant
association” might refer to generic merchant adventurers, merchant societies and fellowships, or a formal body of incorporated adventurers.
230. CARUS-WILSON, supra note 228, at xxx–iv (York, Bristol, London, and other cities
had merchants trading overseas); id. at 147, 150, 151–56, 163–64 (role of London Mercers);
id. at 175–76 (London’s influence regulating merchants overseas); 1 LIPSON, supra note 71,
at 573 (London Mercers and other merchants formed merchant adventurers company). By
the close of the sixteenth century, several cities had branches of merchant adventurers. 2 id.
at 254–58.
231. GEORGE CAWSTON & A.H. KEANE, THE EARLY CHARTERED COMPANIES (A.D. 1296–
1858), at 9–10, 13 (London, Edward Arnold 1896) (describing features of regulated gild).
232. CECIL T. CARR, SELECT CHARTERS OF TRADING COMPANIES A.D. 1530–1707, at xii
(1913) (noting presence of municipal institutions in merchant charters); 1 SCOTT, supra note
164, at 7 (describing evolution of regulated company from gild merchant); id. at 152 (jointstock and regulated companies share many of same governance features); see also infra
notes 240–42 (describing governance functions shared by gild, regulated company, and
joint-stock company).
233. CARUS-WILSON, supra note 228, at 162–64 (merchant adventurers amalgamated
into regulated gild with members trading individually); CAWSTON & KEANE, supra note 231,
at 10; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 574, 575–76 (merchant associations were regulated companies; restrictions against interlopers); 2 id. at 195–96.
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lated gild.234 In the joint-stock company, subscribers bought and sold subscriptions to the company in exchange for a proportionate share of the
company’s profits.235 As a shareholder of the corporation, the owner had
limited liability and could transfer his shares more freely.236
Whether a regulated gild or a joint-stock company, merchant associations traveling abroad needed privileges and jurisdictional rights as they
left their home ports. Traveling merchants needed protection from interlopers infringing on their trade monopoly and some form of authority from
the king to travel and trade in a foreign land.237 The crown clothed these
entities with privileges in exchange for services.238 Under similar conditions, merchant associations also required and received privileges from the
foreign state.239
In the latter part of the thirteenth century, merchants were traveling
abroad and receiving self-governance privileges similar to those received
by gilds and boroughs.240 Charters allowed merchants to assemble, elect a
234. CARR, supra note 232, at xx–xxi (noting distinction between regulated gild and
joint-stock company); CAWSTON & KEANE, supra note 231, at 9–10, 13 (comparing and contrasting the two types of companies); 2 LIPSON, supra note 71, at lvi–lx (case for and against
regulated companies). The Russia Company (Muscovy) founded in 1553 and chartered in
1555 was the first formal joint-stock company for English merchants. 1 SCOTT, supra note
164, at 17–18. The joint-stock model was thought to be more suitable to adventurers far
from port. 2 id. at 36 (discussing formation of Russia Company modeled on regulated company but with joint-stock rather than individual capital).
235. CAWSTON & KEANE, supra note 231, at 12.
236. Id. (full liability in regulated company but liability limited to amount of shares in
joint-stock company). Joint-stock corporations may have been more difficult to establish,
but succession was easier and transfer of ownership was free of alienation, division, and inheritance issues accompanying a gild company or proprietorship.
237. CARR, supra note 232, at xv (noting royal permission was required to travel, trade
overseas, and take resources out of realm). The crown on occasion forbade merchants from
traveling to certain countries. GEORGE LOUIS BEER, THE ORIGINS OF THE BRITISH COLONIAL
SYSTEM 1578–1660, at 16–17, 43 n.2 (1908) (citing body of law prohibiting English from
traveling without license and noting adventurers’ desire for charter); id. at 328–29 (license
required to migrate to colonies); CARUS-WILSON, supra note 228, at 137, 167.
238. CAWSTON & KEANE, supra note 231, at 2, 10–11; see also CARUS-WILSON, supra
note 228, at xxvi (noting value of foreign merchants to crown); CUNNINGHAM, ALIEN
IMMIGRANTS, supra note 173, at 197–98 (creation of civil status for merchant adventurers in
foreign lands).
239. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 511–12, 525–26, 535–40 (discussing treaty privileges
and reciprocity between foreign hosts and England in trading privileges concerning merchant adventurers); ANNE F. SUTTON & LIVIA VISSER-FUCHS, THE BOOK OF PRIVILEGES OF
THE MERCHANT ADVENTURERS OF ENGLAND 1296–1483, at 1 (2009) (collection of privileges
granted to merchant adventurers from leaders of Low Countries).
240. Characteristics of gild evolved into a form used by other merchant associations. 1
SCOTT, supra note 164, at 7–9; C.P. LUCAS, THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH OVERSEAS
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governor, and exercise jurisdiction over themselves with leave of the host
country.241 Clothed with royal privileges and immunities, the governor and
court of assistants of the merchant association served as a legislative body
with the power to make statutes, ordinances, and customs.242
Whether reviewing domestic or overseas charters, concern for the welfare of the greater body was a frequent theme of the era, and this concern
manifested itself in merchant charters.243 Charters frequently added provisions requiring merchants act “for better government.”244 Many felt that
monopolistic conduct by merchants and gilds was detrimental to the common welfare of Englishmen and violated principles of English law.245 The
crown and Parliament responded with regulations requiring that gild by-

ENTERPRISE: A PRELUDE TO THE EMPIRE 20 (1917) (overseas merchants received privileges
similar to borough privileges); id. at 58, 142–43 (overseas trading company grew from municipal gild); supra note 167.
241. In the late thirteenth century, a foreign host conceded to English merchants privileges to associate, hold courts, and form assemblies. 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 570–71.
Shortly thereafter, overseas merchants received authority to elect a mayor. CARR, supra
note 232, at xi–xii (discussing a group of charters granting governance rights to overseas
merchants at the turn of the fifteenth century); CARUS-WILSON, supra note 228, at xviii; 1
LIPSON, supra note 71, at 571–72 (thirteenth- through fifteenth-century charters to merchants allowing them to organize under mayor or governor). Merchant adventurers trading
in the Low Countries received a charter granting self-governance by common consent in
1407. LUCAS, supra note 240, at 149–51, 184–87 (under charter merchants may freely and
lawfully assemble and elect among themselves fit governors and deputies to govern by
common consent and reasonable statutes with authority over all English merchants in those
parts); see also CARUS-WILSON, supra note 228, at xx; 1 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 571–72;
1 SCOTT, supra note 164, at 8–9. A subsequent 1505 charter placed governance of the merchants in the Low Countries in a fixed body, removing government by common consent.
See infra note 247.
242. See supra note 241.
243. The crown had a watchful eye on municipal and merchant corporations. The crown
often received complaints that membership to the merchant association was restricted and
the company was operating to the disadvantage of the towns or a larger body. 2 GREEN,
TOWN LIFE, supra note 43, at 136–39 (exploitation of poor commoner by merchants); Mary
Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 518–26 (2006)
(describing limitations on gild bylaws).
244. The phrase “for better government” (pro meliori gubernatione) was common in
merchant and municipal charters. CARR, supra note 232, at xi–xii (discussing charters securing better governance for merchant associations traveling abroad). Such a phrase was
included in Richard II’s 1391 charter to the merchants of Prussia. 7 THOMAS RYMER,
FOEDERA, CONVENTIONES, LITERAE 693–94 (1709); 1 SCOTT, supra note 164, at 8–9 (describing king’s grant to Prussian merchants and noting grantee’s expanded authority for
governance of English merchants in jurisdiction but also highlighting restriction that ordinances be “for better government”).
245. See supra notes 210, 243–44 and accompanying text.
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laws serve the common profit of the people and dominant adventurers open
trade to other merchants.246 A charter to merchant adventurers in 1505
provided that no merchant statute, custom, or ordinance “shall be or may be
contrary to us our Crowne, Honor, Dignity Royall or Prerogative or to the
deminution of the Commonweale of our Realme.”247 These charter clauses
for common welfare were representative of later colonial provisions requiring that enacted colonial laws be agreeable and not repugnant to the laws of
England.248
With thriving foreign trade, England expanded its boundaries. The
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were years of exploration as European investors and explorers were looking to new lands for new trade.249 Merchants from Bristol and other ports frequently traded with Iceland and
Greenland among other nations.250 Many voyagers had their sights set on
exploring new waters for better fishing.251 Though uncertain of lands fur246. LUCAS, supra note 240, at 68–70 (discussing late fifteenth-century legislation addressing intergild conflict within merchant adventurers trading overseas); see also supra
note 210 (describing regulations that required gilds submit bylaws to town authorities for
approval).
247. CAWSTON & KEANE, supra note 231, at 253; 1 SCOTT, supra note 164, at 10 (noting
significance of this charter in granting expanded authority to regulate conduct of its members). The 1505 charter placed governance in an elected governor and “Four and Twenty of
the most sadd discreet and honest Persons of divers Fellowships of the said Merchants Adventurers” as assistants to rule for better government. CAWSTON & KEANE, supra note 231,
at 250−51. While merchants’ 1407 charter established governance by common consent, the
1505 charter placed better governance with an elected governor and assistants. LUCAS, supra note 240, at 71−73; see also SUTTON & VISSER-FUCHS, supra note 239, at 178−79,
182−84 (discussing the king’s 1462 confirmation of merchants’ right to elect governors, rule
the fellowship, and make regulations by common assent and for better governance—as long
as such statutes and ordinances were not contrary, rebellious, or disobedient). The grievance that the company had fallen into neglect and disobedience because of non-attendance
at assembly contributed to the change in government from common consent to the elected
body. LUCAS, supra note 240, at 72−73; see also CAWSTON & KEANE, supra note 231, at
249−50, 252.
248. See infra notes 303, 312, 373 (providing examples of authority for colonial promoters to pass laws provided they were agreeable or not repugnant to English laws).
249. DAVID B. QUINN, NORTH AMERICA FROM EARLIEST DISCOVERY TO FIRST
SETTLEMENTS 41−70 (1977) [hereinafter QUINN, NORTH AMERICA].
250. CARUS-WILSON, supra note 228, at 98 (Iceland); CARR, supra note 232, at xxvii
(discussing modification of traditional merchant model to include discovery, conquest, and
colonization of foreign lands); see also infra notes 251−52.
251. QUINN, NORTH AMERICA, supra note 249, at 60−64 (discussing English expansion
overseas for fishing and discovery); see also CARUS-WILSON, supra note 228, at 97 (remarking that Bristol merchants were pioneers of discovery; search for Isle of Brasile in 1480);
JAMES A. WILLIAMSON, THE CABOT VOYAGES AND BRISTOL DISCOVERY UNDER HENRY VII,
at 3 (1962).
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ther west, explorers experimented with long-distance travel in search of resources and treasures.252
Exploring unknown lands was a mutually beneficial relationship between the explorer and the crown. Explorers, at great risk, sought riches in
discovered lands and received extensive privileges modeled on medieval
feudal institutions.253 The crown, in turn, received new lands, increased
trade, and a direct kickback of the profits of the venture.254 In the search
for the New World, Spain claimed first place; Christopher Columbus successfully discovered and documented his discovery of the West Indies in
1492.255 Based in part upon this discovery, Spain attempted to claim exclusive rights to a large portion of the Americas.256
A. 1496 Charter to John Cabot
King Henry the VII was not far behind Spain and Columbus when he
authorized John Cabot to voyage and discover new lands for England.257
Cabot, with the backing of Bristol merchants, received permission for exploration in the 1490s.258 The crown’s March 1496 charter to Cabot and

252. WILLIAMSON, supra note 251, at 3, 19, 29 (commenting on merchants from Bristol
trading with Iceland and extending their voyages westward); see also CARR, supra note 232,
at xxviii (western expansion of traditional merchant routes).
253. CHARLES VERLINDEN, THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN COLONIZATION 167−69,
189−90, 192, 196−97 (1970).
254. VERLINDEN, supra note 253, at 167−69, 189−90; see infra Part III.A–D.
255. QUINN, NORTH AMERICA, supra note 249, at 108−10.
256. Spain sought protection of its right with a papal donation. QUINN, NORTH AMERICA,
supra note 249, at 105; see infra note 258 (English exploration despite papal bull); see also
HARRIS, supra note 37, at 62−64 (discussing doctrine that land which country discovered
belonged to it).
257. Typical of British bureaucracy, exploration, especially exploration involving settlement, required permission from the crown. See QUINN, NORTH AMERICA, supra note 249,
at 104–05; supra note 237.
258. See CARUS-WILSON, supra note 228, at xv (observing that Bristol merchants sponsored Cabot); QUINN, NORTH AMERICA, supra note 249, at 114−15, 121.
Henry VII, in granting the charter to Cabot, minimized the papal bull and the treaty
between Spain and Portugal concerning discovered land. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD,
supra note 228, at 13−15 (England sent explorers despite papal bull); QUINN, NORTH
AMERICA, supra note 249, at 105, 110−11, 127; WILLIAMSON, supra note 251, at 51−52 (setting out for discovery of lands in North America despite Spain’s claim for exclusivity).
England felt the papal bull did not prevent English colonization as colonization was authorized by the law of nations. Following Cabot’s discovery, England claimed possession of
North America. E.G.R. TAYLOR, THE ORIGINAL WRITINGS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF THE
TWO RICHARD HAKLUYTS (1935); id. at 423−24 (Doc. No. 72. Notes of R. Hakluyt); id. at
487, 488 (Doc. No. 84, Richard Hakluyt’s 1603 note discussing right of English to explore
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his sons, with the purpose of discovering land unknown to Christians, gave
permission to travel from England with proper fittings and personnel.259
The Cabots were given license to set up in the towns and cities of discovered lands and to conquer their inhabitants.260 Cabot and his heirs would
hold land as vassals and lieutenants—taking title, dominion, and jurisdiction for the king and paying the king one-fifth the profits gained when they
returned to the port of Bristol and sold their goods.261 On pain of interlopers’ ships and provisions, Cabot, like typical merchant associations, had an
exclusive monopoly of trade in the discovered lands.262
Cabot found land in the New World and returned to England with the
news. Given his success, he planned a second voyage. His second voyage,
however, was unsuccessful, and he lost his life.263 Cabot’s son inherited
his rights and continued exploration under the charter.264 Early explorer
charters like Cabot’s did not provide significant means for internal governance, but subsequent charters addressed the defect and added the ability for
merchants to establish laws for personnel and others.
B.

1501 Charter to Richard Warde and Others

Shortly after Cabot’s voyages, in March 1501, Henry VII granted to
Richard Warde, Thomas Ashehurst, and John Thomas, of Bristol, and to
John Fernandez, Francis Fernandez, and John Gonzales, of Portugal, unrestricted authority to sail with masters, mates, pages, and necessities to find
and discover lands of heathens and infidels and to seize their castles, towns,
and lands for the king.265 Warde and his group were to take and hold possession of the castles and towns, maintaining the lands for the king in perand trade in Indies despite Spain’s presence); id. at 62, 497−99 (Doc. No. 88, Hakluyt advocated for free seas).
259. 1 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 45−47 (1909) (reproducing 1496 Cabot charter).
Several statutes and royal proclamations forbade exporting specified items from England,
but charters to explorers allowed travel with the necessary material and resources for colonization. BEER, supra note 237, at 105−06.
260. The fact that Cabot’s charter granted the right to conquer and subdue infidels reflects the general state of affairs during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. WILLIAMSON,
supra note 251, at 53; 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 12−13 (discussing
fifteenth-century papal authorization to conquer pagan countries).
261. 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 46−47.
262. Id.
263. WILLIAMSON, supra note 251, at 95, 102.
264. Id. at 124, 145.
265. H.P. BIGGAR, THE PRECURSORS OF JACQUES CARTIER 1497–1534, at 50–51 (1911)
(reproducing charter).
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petuity by fidelity alone without any other compensation being rendered
but the dignity, dominion, regality, jurisdiction, and suzerainty of the
crown.266
Warde’s charter had a greater focus on settlement than Cabot’s. In the
discovered land,
all and singular as well men as women of this our kingdom and the rest of
our subjects, wishing and desiring to visit these lands and islands thus newly found, and to inhabit the same, shall be allowed and have power to go
freely and in safety to the same countries, islands, and places with their
ships, men and servants, and all their goods and chattels . . . under the pro267
tection and government of [Warde and others.]

Warde and other voyagers had the ability to set up government and
make laws, statutes, and proclamations for the “good and peaceful rule . . .
of the said men, masters, sailors and other persons.”268 Warde had full
power to appoint deputies for the administration of justice under the rule
and government of the subjects according to the tenor and import of the ordinances, statutes, and customs they adopted.269
As with the patentees of Cabot’s charter, Warde and others were given
a monopoly of trade in discovered lands.270 Subjects traveling to the discovered lands needed leave of Warde and the king.271 Warde and patentees
were given permission to bring whatever was grown or found in discovered
lands back to England to sell and distribute for their own gain notwithstanding any statute, ordinance, or other restriction.272
Warde’s charter specifically named foreign patentees from Portugal.273
266. Id. at 55.
267. Id. at 51. Charters to future American colonies also granted the right for subjects,
and aliens willing to become subjects, to travel to the colonies. 7 THORPE, supra note 259,
at 3786 (1606 Virginia charter, subjects); id. at 3799 (1609 Virginia charter, subjects and
strangers); 3 id. at 1855 (1629 Massachusetts charter, subjects and strangers).
268. BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 51. Early sixteenth-century charters allowed grantees to
exercise the Office of Admiral in the discovered territory with jurisdiction as in England.
WILLIAMSON, supra note 251, at 125. Warde and other patentees had “full power and authority to do, exercise and carry out all and singular the things which pertain to the office of
Admiral, according to the law and the naval custom obtaining in this our realm of England.”
BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 55.
269. BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 55.
270. Id. at 52.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 52−54. Under the patent, Warde and company had a relationship of trade with
other merchants. Merchants could bring imports back to England, paying customs and a
fraction to the patentees. Id.; 1 J.A. DOYLE, ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA: VIRGINIA,
MARYLAND, AND THE CAROLINAS 27 (New York, Henry Holt & Co. 1889).
273. BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 50, 56−57.
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Aliens would not fall under the protection of the crown, and their possessions in foreign lands were vulnerable to pirates and natives.274 By English
law at this time, aliens faced restrictions in ownership and inheritance of
land, use of courts, and trading privileges.275 Only English subjects with
license could carry goods to and from the new land, and aliens attempting
to land without permission could be punished at the discretion of the patentees.276 Addressing these disabilities, Warde’s charter contained a denization clause.277 Henry VII’s Charter granted to
born subjects of the king of Portugal, and to any one of them whomsoever,
that they and any one of them and all their children, as well born as to be
born, are for ever subjects and lieges of us and of our heirs, and in all lawsuits, quarrels, affairs and matters whatsoever are to be considered, treated,
held, esteemed and governed as our true and faithful lieges born within our
realm of England, and not otherwise nor in any other way. And that they
and all their children aforesaid, and any one of them whomsoever, may carry on and bring real, personal and mixed actions in all courts, places and jurisdictions of ours whatsoever in all ways, and may use and benefit by these, and may sue and be sued in the same, answer and be answered to,

274. Without the crown’s protection, patentees and their possessions overseas were liable to be plundered at will by foreigners and others. See infra notes 310−11 and accompanying text (pirates and Gilbert’s charter).
275. CLIVE PARRY, NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND
OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 29−30 (1957) (commenting that aliens faced limitations in
holding and inheriting land, limitations in use of courts, and discrimination in trade); 1
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 459 (discussing alienage in England); see also
NORMAN SCOTT BRIEN GRAS, THE EARLY ENGLISH CUSTOMS SYSTEM 66−77, 79−80, 82−83,
110, 131−32 (1918) (discussing different customs for aliens and denizens); 9 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 173, at 93−94, 98 (examining alienage in England); JAMES H. KETTNER, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 1608−1870, at 5−6, 30−31 (1978) (noting that
alien discriminations first began with hostilities toward other nations; most important element of denization was removal of property disabilities); WILLIAM A. SHAW, LETTERS OF
DENIZATION AND ACTS OF NATURALIZATION FOR ALIENS IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND 1603–
1700, at v–vi (1911) (observing that alien customs were double what natives paid). Restricting alien trade in the colonies was a theme throughout the colonial experience. See generally 4 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228 (discussing England’s commercial policies toward colonies); BEER, supra note 237, at 220−27, 237, 272, 374, 384−400 (following
merchant charters granting exclusive monopoly privileges in specified territories, England
granted monopoly privileges in colonies and excluded or restricted foreigners from trade
with colonies).
276. BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 54 (aliens without leave of patentees could be expelled
or punished at discretion of patentees); 1 DOYLE, supra note 272, at 27.
277. Technically, at least as the rule of law developed, only the crown was authorized to
grant denization. By the seventeenth century, an act of Parliament was needed to naturalize
or give an alien full citizenship. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 173, at 76–77; 1 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 22, at 460.
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defend them and be defended in all things and everywhere as our true and
faithful lieges born within our realm aforesaid. And that they, and any one
of them whosoever, may examine, take, receive, own, hold, possess and inherit for himself, his heirs and assigns, in perpetuity or in any other way
278
whosoever, lands tenements, rents, . . . and other possessions.

In other words, those endenized by the charter and their children
may and can have and possess all things and all other liberties, privileges,
franchises and customs, and may use and enjoy them, and any one of them
may so do, within our said realm of England, our jurisdictions and dominions whatsoever, as freely, quietly, fully and peacefully as the rest of our
lieges, born within our said realm generally hold, use and enjoy them, or
ought and should hold, possess, use and enjoy them; any statute, act, ordi279
nance, or any other cause, affair or matter notwithstanding.

These Portuguese individuals were granted citizenship throughout the
realm and freed from most alien disabilities.280 By charter, the foreign patentees trading with Warde were not to be forced or compelled to pay, give,
or render anything other than the taxes or tallages the faithful lieges born
within the realm pay.281 In line with a custom also present in English municipalities, the crown’s charter further required that the endenized Portuguese pay homage and be lot and scot with other dues and customs payable
in the realm in the same manner as other lieges born in the kingdom.282
The crown, cognizant of revenue needs and abuse by foreign merchants,
often retained limitations in its denization charters. Under the 1501 charter,
the endenized Portuguese had to pay alien customs and other dues on goods
brought into the realm as foreigners would pay.283

278. BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 56−57. Common alien disabilities included restrictions
on the ability to hold lands and limitations on the ability to use the courts for certain actions.
See supra note 275.
279. BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 57.
280. During the late medieval period, the crown often granted group denizations to those
in a particular industry of service to the crown. PARRY, supra note 275, at 37−38.
281. BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 57.
282. Id. at 57−58; see also supra note 169 (discussing lot and scot requirement for
gildsmen in boroughs).
283. BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 57; SHAW, supra note 275, at v−viii (examining early
instances where king’s patent created distinctions between naturalization and denization by
reserving alien customs to punish denizens for cheating the king of customs by entering
goods for non-denizens). Following royal precedents, Parliament provided in 1485 that denizens, despite generic charter language, should pay aliens customs and subsidies unless expressly exempted. 1485, 1 Hen. 7 c. 2; GEORGE HANSARD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
RELATING TO ALIENS, AND DENIZATION AND NATURALIZATION 10−12 (London, V. & R. Stevens & G.S. Norton 1844); KETTNER, supra note 275, at 34; see also infra note 284 (noting
that denizations should contain express rather than generic exemptions).
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After specifying certain rights for foreign patentees, Henry VII’s charter bestowed the liberties, privileges, and customs (within England and the
dominions) as “freely, quietly, fully and peacefully as the rest of our lieges,
born within our said realm.”284 Both clauses appear to be a basic grant of
denization for foreign patentees and their children.285 The patentees were
to be English subjects, specifically with rights to hold and enjoy land and to
use the courts. Independent and conceptually separate from the privileges
and immunities clauses, the crown granted, among other rights, the right to
travel, monopolies in trade, and the right to exercise self-governance in the
newly discovered lands.286
Henry VII’s 1501 Charter to Warde, granting rights to travel, discover,
set up government, and enjoy exclusive trading rights, served as a model
for charters to explorers in the sixteenth century.287 The year following the
issue of the 1501 charter, Henry VII granted a similar charter to mostly the
same patentees with a few material changes, one of which was the removal
of the obligation for the Portuguese patentees to pay alien customs.288
With the loss of Cabot and failed explorations thereafter, England retreated some from pursuits of discovery.289 Henry VII was interested in
discovery but Henry VIII was less interested. During the middle of the sixteenth century, England faced bigger problems and did not fully take ad284. BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 57. Broad denization language should not be presumed
to have removed all alienage disabilities unless the crown expressly provided such exemptions in the charter. In 1540, Parliament expressed its concern over denizens avoiding certain restrictions by claiming generic exemptions. 1540, 32 Hen. 8 c. 16 (denizations removing particular alienage disabilities should contain express rather than generic exemptions).
285. This form of denization follows a form common in the sixteenth century. WILLIAM
PAGE, LETTERS OF DENIZATION AND ACTS OF NATURALIZATION FOR ALIENS IN ENGLAND
1509–1603, at ii−iv (Lymington, Chas. T. King 1893) (including denizens’ right to sue and
be sued; to buy, sell, hold, and enjoy real estate; not to be compelled to pay more taxes, tallages, customs, or subsidies for merchandize exported out of or imported into England; and
to enjoy all liberties, franchises, and privileges as freely and peacefully as other lieges born
in England, any statute to the contrary notwithstanding).
286. See supra notes 262, 268−69, 271−72 and accompanying text.
287. CARR, supra note 232, at xxix−xxx (discussing 1501 and 1502 charters as precursors to 1555 charter to Fellowship of English Merchants for Discovery of New Trades
(Muscovy or Russia Company)). The Russia Company enjoyed similar municipal privileges
as other merchant associations. Id. at xxx−xxxi; see also supra notes 234, 242. Kingsbury
described the Russia Company’s charter as the transition point between the explorer model
and the colonial model. 1 SUSAN MYRA KINGSBURY, THE RECORDS OF THE VIRGINIA
COMPANY OF LONDON 11−16 (1906).
288. BIGGAR, supra note 265, at 81; CARR, supra note 232, at xxix (noting expanded
rights of discovery and conquest in 1502 charter); 1 DOYLE, supra note 272, at 28;
WILLIAMSON, supra note 251, at 132−33 (discussing changes in 1502 charter).
289. QUINN, NORTH AMERICA, supra note 249, at 135.
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vantage of the colonization of the New World.290 Any lapse by the English
was made up by the efforts of other European nations, especially Spain.291
C. 1578 Charter to Sir Humphrey Gilbert
Events in Ireland in the latter half of the sixteenth century reinvigorated England’s colonization efforts.292 Developing a colonization philosophy
in Ireland fueled similar efforts in North America.293 The initial objective
for colonization of the New World was not to create the United States but
rather a means of trade and revenue and restraining the power of the Spanish overseas.294 Many of the figures leading American colonization had a
start in the colonization of Ireland.295
Sir Humphrey Gilbert recognized the value of colonization, and from
his significant experience in Ireland, he devised a scheme for colonization
of America.296 Colonization, like exploration, was mutually beneficial for

290. 1 DOYLE, supra note 272, at 29, 31−32.
291. The early and middle parts of the sixteenth century were filled with other European
successes and failures in exploration and discovery. Spain and other European nations made
major inroads into the exploration of Florida, Mexico, and South America.
292. During this period, England was forced to deal with the Irish, and colonization was
offered as a means of adding stability. NICHOLAS P. CANNY, THE ELIZABETHAN CONQUEST
OF IRELAND: A PATTERN ESTABLISHED 1565–1576, at 49−52 (1976) (English officials installed presidencies in Ireland with the hope of undermining Irish palatinates). This system
had been successful in Wales to reduce the power of the Marcher Lords. Id. at 51, 93,
97−99; J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 59−60 (1987).
293. CANNY, supra note 292, at 92; David B. Quinn, Sir Thomas Smith (1513−1577) and
the Beginnings of English Colonial Theory, 89 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC. 543, 548 n.19, 558
(1945) (noting similarities between Sir Humphrey Gilbert’s efforts in America and his efforts in Ireland).
294. TAYLOR, supra note 258, at 163−64 (letter from Hakluyt the younger discussing
break up of Spain’s power).
295. Howard Mumford Jones, Origins of the Colonial Idea in England, 85 PROC. AM.
PHIL. SOC. 448, 457, 463−65 (1942); see also MARY DEWAR, SIR THOMAS SMITH 158,
169−70 (1964); Hiram Morgan, The Colonial Venture of Sir Thomas Smith in Ulster
1571−1575, 28 HIST. J. 261, 275 (1985).
296. 1 DAVID B. QUINN, THE VOYAGES AND COLONISING ENTERPRISES OF SIR HUMPHREY
GILBERT 9, 12–19 (1940) [hereinafter QUINN, VOYAGES]; see also DEWAR, supra note 295,
at 157 (Gilbert in Ireland). Efforts at colonizing a foreign land were expensive. The crown,
interested in reducing public debt, did not want to pay the cost for colonization. Colonial
promoters willing to put up their own costs wanted something in exchange, and they petitioned for monopolies and privileges to this end. CANNY, supra note 292, at 80–82; id. at 82
(while seeking privileges in Ireland, colonists were looking to retain their rights as Englishmen so they could return at will to England and not be considered banished men); see also
supra notes 253–54 (land and privileges in exchange for discovery and colonization); infra
note 308 (concerns over retaining English allegiance for property and inheritance rights).
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the crown and promoter. Promoters were out for adventure and profit, and
the crown was interested in sharing profits and siphoning the success of
other European nations in foreign trade.297
Following advances by other explorers, in 1578, Queen Elizabeth
granted a charter or letter patent to Gilbert for discovery and colonization
of North America.298 Similar to the charters granted to voyagers before
him, the crown granted Gilbert the right to discover and conquer lands,
countries, and territories not possessed by Christian princes.299 Gilbert’s
charter followed a similar homage and one-fifth payment of discovered ore
in exchange for services as found in Cabot’s charter.300 Expanding upon
earlier charters to Cabot and Warde, Gilbert and his assigns were granted
all rights, royalties, and jurisdictions of discovered lands, castles, and villages.301
Gilbert and assigns, and others so licensed by Gilbert and the crown,
had permission to travel and occupy the discovered lands, other laws prohibiting or limiting the travel of would-be colonists notwithstanding.302
Gilbert enjoyed all royalties and jurisdictions of the soil and was permitted
to settle lands to persons and subjects in allegiance to the crown, with full
power to dispose “in fee simple or otherwise, according to the order of the
laws of England, as near as the same conveniently may be, at his, and their
will and pleasure.”303 Gilbert was given the right to defend his possession
and exclusive rights of controlling settlement, both to the exclusion of British subjects and others within 200 leagues of his location.304 Gilbert had
authority and power to seize vessels and possessions of those infringing
upon his monopoly.305 To promote amity and unity, the Queen declared

297. Jones, supra note 295, at 460 (thwarting Spain’s success motivated American colonization).
298. 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 49 (letter patent to Sir Humfrey Gylberte, June 11,
1578). Sir Humphrey Gilbert had long been interested in seeking out the Northwest Passage. See 1 QUINN, VOYAGES, supra note 296, at 129−64 (Gilbert’s pamphlet on Northwest
Passage). As early as 1567, Gilbert sought privileges to establish an American trading post
and serve as governor. 1 SCOTT, supra note 164, at 71.
299. 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 49 (using the broader language “not actually possessed” as opposed to narrower “unknown” from earlier explorer charters).
300. Id. at 50; 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 6−7.
301. 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 49−50.
302. Royal charters permitted travel notwithstanding several laws restricting English
from traveling. See supra notes 237, 257, 267.
303. 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 50.
304. Id.
305. Id. (discussing monopoly in charter). The seizure power did not apply to subjects
and others in amity lost by shipwreck, etc. Id.
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that the lands and territories discovered by Gilbert and heirs would be in
allegiance with England.306 By the Queen’s charter
wee doe graunt to the sayd sir Humfrey his heires and assignes, and to all
and every of them, and to all and every other person and persons, being of
our allegiance, whose names shall be noted or entred in some of our courts
of Record, within this our Realme of England, and that with the assent of
the said sir Humfrey, his heires or assigns, shall nowe in this journey for
discoverie, or in the second journey for conquest hereafter, travel to such
lands, countries and territories as aforesaid, and to their and every of their
heires: that they and every or any of them being either borne within our
sayd Realmes of England or Ireland, or within any other place with our allegiance, and which hereafter shall be inhabiting within any the lands,
countreys and territories, with such license as aforesayd, shall and may
have, and enjoy all the priveleges of free denizens and persons native of
England and within our allegeaunce [in suche like ample manner and fourme as if they were borne and personally resiaunte within our said realme of
307
England] any law, custome, or usage to the contrary notwithstanding.

This was a guarantee of denization status for Gilbert, his crew, and
any who traveled to the discovered lands, and their heirs, provided they
were in allegiance with the crown.308 This section of Gilbert’s charter
might have been a modification of the denization section in Warde’s charter.309 Warde’s grant seemed to have the objective of granting denization to
the Portuguese for the purpose of residing in England. In addition to the
trading privileges accompanying denization, Gilbert’s charter seemed to
have the intention of safeguarding English citizenship overseas.310 This
306. Id. The Spanish applied the theory of granting conquered natives allegiance (like
Rome to other provinces) to help reduce conflict. VERLINDEN, supra note 253, at 40−41 (assimilation strategies of Spanish conquerors). Conquered Indians were subjects of the crown
and were guaranteed certain freedoms such as travel and protection of goods. Id. at 41.
307. 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 51. Quinn observed that the version used by Thorpe
omitted a few words from the last clause. 1 QUINN, VOYAGES, supra note 296, at 190−91.
308. Inheritance rights of children born overseas historically presented a problem for
English subjects and authorities. KIM, supra note 75, at 103−25; PARRY, supra note 275, at
30−34. Retaining allegiance with England was important for the colonies as a number of
influential colonists owned land in England or expected to inherit land and wanted to retain
English citizenship for inheritance purposes. BEER, supra note 237, at 325−28 (noting disadvantages of independence in early seventeenth century); see also supra note 296 (concerns of English colonists losing Englishmen status in Ireland).
309. See supra Part III.B (Warde’s alien patentees).
310. Following charters securing the privileges and immunities of denizens and English
citizenship to Warde and Gilbert, subsequent royal charters to most of the American colonies contained similar language. The 1606 Virginia Charter included language that subjects,
and children born of such subjects, dwelling in the colonies shall have the “Liberties, Franchises, and Immunities, within any of our other Dominions, to all Intents and Purposes,” as
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might be because Gilbert’s colonization effort was intended to be more
permanent. Also, Gilbert and company probably required heightened protection of English citizenship from the pirates of the era.311
After securing denization privileges, Gilbert’s charter, like charters to
other merchant associations, provided that Gilbert and his company may
establish government and enact laws as necessary for the safety of the men.
Gilbert and company
have full and meere power and authoritie to correct, punish, pardon,
governe and rule by their, and every or any of their good discretions and

if they had been born in England or any of the other dominions. 7 THORPE, supra note 259,
at 3788 (1606 Charter); id. at 3800 (1609 Charter). Massachusetts’s 1629 charter provided
that all “the Subjects of Vs . . . which shall goe to and inhabite within the saide Landes . . .
and every of their Children which shall happen to be borne there, or on the Seas in goeing
thither, or retorning from thence, shall have and enjoy all liberties and Immunities of free
and naturall Subjects within any of the Domynions of Vs.” 3 id. at 1857 (1629 Massachusetts Charter). Similarly, Baltimore’s 1632 Charter, to encourage settlement and protect the
colonists from savages and pirates, granted to Baltimore the ability to allow settlers to travel, form a colony, and build forts to defend themselves. 3 id. at 1681. Those traveling to
Maryland under Baltimore’s charter, and their children, were “Natives and Liege Men of
Us . . . of our Kingdom of England and Ireland; and in all Things shall be held, treated, reputed, and esteemed as the faithful Liege-Men of Us . . . born within our Kingdom of England” and permitted to inherit, buy, possess, sell, use and enjoy lands, tenements, revenues,
and services “within our Kingdom of England, and other our Dominions” and enjoy “all
Privileges, Franchises and Liberties of this our Kingdom of England” as other liege men.
Id. (Baltimore’s 1632 charter). Similar language is found in the New England Council’s
1620 charter. 3 id. at 1839 (stating that subjects going to inhabit the colony, and their children born there, shall have the liberties, franchises, and immunities of free denizens and
natural subjects within any English dominion as if born in England or the dominions).
311. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 25; BEER, supra note 237, at
18−25 (difficulties in colonization effort because of constant threat of foreign attack); 1
SCOTT, supra note 164, at 49, 71–73 (describing frequent plunders and seizures by Spanish
and English privateersmen). Non-English, not in allegiance and treated as aliens, were not
protected as subjects. Gilbert’s charter contained a threat of being cast out of allegiance if
Gilbert abused his charter. 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 52 (“free for all princes and others
to pursue with hostilitie as being not our Subjects, nor by us any way to be advowed, maintained or defended, nor to be holden as any of ours, nor to our protection, dominion or allegiance”). Because the patentees of Gilbert’s voyage were denizens and treated as subjects,
they received protection and were free of alien disabilities. Hakluyt, in his Discourse on
Western Planting, described an attribute of exploration and colonization:
ffynally their shippes, their goodds, and their persons shoulde not be subjecte to
soodden arrestes of straungers as they are in all other trades of Christendome: but
shoulde enjoye as greate freedome, libertie, and securitie as they usually doo in
their native Contrie, the havens, Townes, and villages in those partes being occupied and possessed by their fellowe subjects. Wch freedome and libertie will
greatly incourage them to contynewe constantly in this newe traficque.
TAYLOR, supra note 258, at 273.
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policies, as well in causes capitall or criminal, as civill, both marine and
other, all such our subjects and others, as shall from time to time hereafter
adventure themselves in the sayd journey . . . according to such statutes,
lawes and ordinaces, as shall be by him the said sir Humfrey, his heirs and
assignes, or every, or any of them, devised or established for the better
government of the said people as aforesayd: so always that the sayd statutes, lawes and ordinances may be as neere as conveniently may, agreeable
312
to the forme of the lawes & policy of England.

Gilbert’s first voyage was unsuccessful.313 For his second voyage,
Gilbert and subpatentees planned the colonization effort in more detail.
Gilbert raised funds by selling interests and forming a company of merchant adventurers, the “Merchant Adventurers with Sir Humphrey Gilbert,”
who would receive membership and land for their contributions.314 Under
Gilbert’s scheme, grants varied in privileges ranging from those of a palatinate to those of simple manors depending upon the amount of the contribution.315 Gilbert planned to reward his friends and investors by allowing
them to create subordinate proprietorships with ample jurisdictions but subject to a quit rent payable to Gilbert.316 The colonization scheme also provided instructions for government. Gilbert’s plan included a governor and
council chosen by members.317 Following examples imposed on gilds and
merchant associations, judgments were to follow as near as possible to the
laws of England.318 Gilbert set sail a second time in 1583. After landing in
Newfoundland, Gilbert claimed the lands for the crown and sailed back

312. 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 51.
313. 1 QUINN, VOYAGES, supra note 296, at 40, 44.
314. 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 9−11 (Gilbert’s colonization scheme granting land and
jurisdiction for contributions); see also CARR, supra note 232, at xxxiv−v (discussing Gilbert voyages); 1 QUINN, VOYAGES, supra note 296, at 7−11 (noting early suggestions for
colonizing America and request for extensive privileges in attempt to discover Northwest
Passage); id. at 55−62 (describing commercial uses for Gilbert’s charter privileges).
315. Gilbert and assigns divided out seignories based on the amount of contribution:
100£ and ten men would get 10,000 acres with powers and jurisdictions as large as exist in
England; 50£ and 20 men would receive 1,000 acres with the same privileges; those contributing lesser amounts received rights of court baron and court leet. 1 QUINN, VOYAGES,
supra note 296, at 258−60.
316. 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 10−11; 1 QUINN, VOYAGES, supra note 296, at 59−60,
245−57 (agreements between Gilbert and assigns for land and rights in North America under Gilbert’s patent).
317. 1 QUINN, VOYAGES, supra note 296, at 59 (councilors chosen by members).
318. Id. at 259 (agreements of Gilbert’s subpatentees); see also supra notes 210, 243−48
and accompanying text (concern for better government and welfare of larger body).
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home.319 He lost his life in the return voyage.320
D. 1584 Charter to Sir Walter Raleigh
Sir Walter Raleigh, a one-half brother of Gilbert, inherited Gilbert’s
rights under his charter.321 Raleigh’s 1584 charter authorized him to have,
hold, occupy, and enjoy all prerogatives, commodities, jurisdictions, royalties, privileges, and franchises both by land and sea, “whatsoeuer we by our
letters patents may graunt, and as we or any of our noble progenitors haue
heretofore graunted to any person or persons, bodies politique or corporate.”322 Raleigh sought confirmation of his charter privileges by Parliament. Parliament initially supported the charter, but then drew grievances
concerning granting licenses to convicts to leave the country to settle the
new land.323 Eventually, Parliament dropped consideration of the bill, and
Raleigh and his adventurers were forced to rely solely on the royal prerogative.324
Raleigh landed at Roanoke Island, which he named Virginia in honor
of the Queen.325 The government was to be run like a borough, and those
free of the company could trade with Raleigh’s other settlements free of

319. Gilbert landed in Newfoundland, took possession of the land in the presence of the
other nations, and, having produced his commission, enacted three laws: (1) public exercise
of religion should be according to the Church of England; (2) if anything be done prejudicial
to her Majesty, the offender shall be executed as in a case of high treason, according to the
laws of England; (3) if any person utter words to the dishonor of her Majesty, he should lose
his ears, and his ships and goods should be confiscated. 1 DOYLE, supra note 272, at 50.
After foreigners and English swore obedience, Gilbert granted large tracts of land in Newfoundland in fee farm for a yearly rent. Id. at 50; 1 QUINN, VOYAGES, supra note 296, at 86.
320. 1 DOYLE, supra note 272, at 51–52.
321. CARR, supra note 232, at xxxvi−vii; 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 14; 1 QUINN,
VOYAGES, supra note 296, at 95–96. Raleigh did not receive Gilbert’s monopoly in Newfoundland. Id. at 96.
322. 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 53 (1584 letter patent to Sir Walter Raleigh). Similar
to later grants, Raleigh essentially received privileges as extensive as the privileges granted
to the Bishop of Durham. See supra notes 62–69 (palatinate of Durham); infra Part IV.C
(discussing Durham references in colonial charters to proprietors).
323. David B. Quinn, Preparations for the 1585 Voyage, 6 WM. & MARY Q. 3d 208,
228−32 (1949). Raleigh may have been persuaded to seek parliamentary confirmation
based on the Russia Company’s confirmation, which had the additional effect of discouraging infringement upon Russia Company’s privileges. 2 SCOTT, supra note 164, at 41. Early
rationales for colonial settlement included reducing overcrowding and ridding England of
excess poor and criminals. BEER, supra note 237, at 42 n.2; 1 DOYLE, supra note 272, at 47,
146, 201−02; QUINN, NORTH AMERICA, supra note 249, at 537.
324. Quinn, supra note 323, at 232.
325. 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 15; Quinn, supra note 323, at 232.
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rents, subsidies, duties, and customs.326 Raleigh’s colonization efforts
failed; several attempted to settle under Raleigh’s charter, but settlers either
returned to England or were lost to the Indians.327
IV. COLONIAL AMERICA
Following the exploration and settlement efforts of Gilbert and Raleigh, colonization of America was a permanent fixture of England’s state
policy. By charter, the crown authorized colonial promoters, investors and
proprietors, to organize and establish colonies and bear the risk and reward
of the venture.328 Borrowing from English institutions, the model Tudor
charter to adventurers was the feudum or fief to a proprietor.329 Under the
Stuarts, for a time, colonization took place through the “Governor and
Company” of the trading company before returning to the proprietorship.330
When the colonies became settled, there were three general forms: the proprietary colony, the corporate colony, and the royal colony.331 With few
exceptions, these colonies were managed by the crown or a promoter residing in England.332
A. Virginia and Royal Colonies
Tracing the progress of earlier efforts by Gilbert and Raleigh, several
influential nobles and merchants pooled interest in North America and
326. 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 21.
327. Quinn, supra note 323, at 208.
328. 3 LIPSON, supra note 71, at 167−69 (discussing financing of colonization efforts); 1
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 3−4, 25 (discussing the same). Spain colonized directly; France
and England colonized through companies. QUINN, NORTH AMERICA, supra note 249, at
105−06.
329. BEER, supra note 237, at 299−300 (listing several colonial proprietorships); 1
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 3−4; see also infra Part IV.C (return to proprietorship).
330. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 3–4 (discussing temporary use of trading companies as
promoters). For a detailed account of joint-stock companies in English trade and colonization, see SCOTT, supra note 164; 1 id. at 150−51 (noting standard “governor and company”
nomenclature of joint-stock company).
331. Some historians categorize the colonies into two classes, the provincial and corporate—the province consisting of royal colonies and proprietorships. ALPHEUS H. SNOW, THE
ADMINISTRATION OF DEPENDENCIES 96 (1902).
332. The mother corporation or body of investors provided resources and instructions for
the management of colonial affairs. 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 141; see also 1 ANDREWS,
COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 390 (pointing out that Massachusetts was an exception
to the class of trading corporations resident in England). Governance over companies and
proprietors residing in England was easier because of the proximity to English authority.
See 3 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 25.
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formed a company for trade and colonization.333 In 1606, King James I
granted the investors a charter.334 The location of the venture focused primarily on the middle route of Raleigh’s Roanoke settlement, but there was
also interest in the northern route for fishing (New England).335
Under the 1606 charter, investors colonizing Virginia formed two
companies, the London and Plymouth Divisions.336 These divisions were
under the control of a dual council system: a superior council in England
and a local council residing in each of the divisions.337 Because of harsh
conditions, minimal colonization, factionalism, and the fact that grants of
additional land required additional charters, the dual council system eventually failed.338 In 1609, the planters and adventurers of Virginia, influenced by and obtaining investment from London companies, received a second charter incorporating as a joint-stock company, the “Treasurer and

333. QUINN, NORTH AMERICA, supra note 249, at 403 (discussing Virginia Company’s
formation by those interested in North America); WESLEY FRANK CRAVEN, DISSOLUTION OF
THE VIRGINIA COMPANY: THE FAILURE OF A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT 25−26 (1964) [hereinafter CRAVEN, DISSOLUTION] (commenting on Virginian adventurers’ ties to London merchants and other merchant associations). For documents on planting in Virginia, see
ALEXANDER BROWN, THE GENESIS OF THE UNITED STATES (Boston, Houghton Mifflin & Co.
1890).
334. The Virginia charter followed closely on the success of the Governor and Company
of Merchants of London trading in the East Indies (East India Company). 2 SCOTT, supra
note 164, at 91−93. The East India Company was formed by London merchants as an incorporated joint-stock company in 1600. Id.
335. The London division was interested in the South, and the Plymouth division was
interested in the North. QUINN, NORTH AMERICA, supra note 249, at 403.
336. The two divisions were forbidden to settle next to each other but were to share fishing privileges within each other’s limits. 7 THORPE, supra note 259, at 3785 (100 mile buffer between divisions); 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 98; see also supra note 335. The Plymouth adventure faced setbacks and did not successfully plant a colony under the charter. 1
ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 90−94.
337. BROWN, supra note 333, at 66−67 (1606 instructions discussing council system under charter); 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 28. The supreme council consisted of royal nominees with a great deal of authority over the colony. Local councils retained some control
over internal affairs, but the king gave directions on how those powers should be implemented. In a sense, the 1606 charter formed a mixed type of government: part proprietary
through company, part royal through instructions. 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 28−29. For
more detail on Virginia’s initial settlement, see the instructions accompanying the 1606
charter. BROWN, supra note 333, at 64−75.
338. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 100−03 (harsh conditions, factionalism, and mismanagement prompted 1609 charter); 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 26
(under 1606 charter the company could not grant land, instead king granted lands through
additional grants); id. at 56 (defects under 1606 charter); 2 SCOTT, supra note 164, at 249
(explaining that lack of colonization results provided reason for 1609 charter of incorporation as joint-stock company).
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Company of Adventurers and Plantations of the City of London, for the
First Colony in Virginia.”339 The 1609 charter helped some, but the colony
still faced problems. A follow up charter in 1612 granted more selfgovernance to the Virginia Company, which met in periodic courts
throughout the year.340
Despite these modifications, the company’s existing scheme was no
longer adequate.341 Redefining its governance, the Virginia Company added to the colony’s local administration and established uniform government
throughout the territory.342 Under its new government, Virginia’s local assembly consisted of the governor, a council, and a representative assembly
of burgesses chosen by the planters of the towns, cities, hundreds, and plantations.343 In 1619, the first Virginian assembly met pursuant to instructions from the Company.344
The many changes made to the Virginia Company in its early years
were ultimately unsuccessful. Following general mismanagement and conflict with the Indians, in 1623 the Privy Council recommended the king resume Virginia’s charter privileges, and thereafter the crown brought quo

339. 7 THORPE, supra note 259, at 3795; see also 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 57−59
(full incorporation as joint-stock company with power to grant lands); SNOW, supra note
331, at 54−55 (discussing 1609 charter and influence of London companies in incorporated
company).
340. 7 THORPE, supra note 259, at 3802, 3805. The Treasurer met with a small number
of the Council and generality once a week or more often as needed to handle routine affairs.
The Company met in four great general courts throughout the year to handle major affairs.
Id.; see also 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 103−04, 107, 116−17 (noting 1612 charter placed governance in general company whereas 1609 charter left governance with treasurer and council); 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 57−58 (discussing charter).
341. MICHAEL KAMMEN, DEPUTYES & LIBERTYES: THE ORIGINS OF REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT IN COLONIAL AMERICA 14 (1969) [hereinafter KAMMEN, DEPUTYES &
LIBERTYES] (commenting on changes motivating representative government).
342. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 181−84 (examining authorization for changes to Virginia’s local government); CRAVEN, DISSOLUTION, supra note 333, at
61−65, 117−18 (private plantations made internal organization difficult and lack of uniformity prompted change to restrict private plantations’ powers in colony-wide matters); 1
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 91−93 (parties in control of mother corporation desired more uniform control over colony); SNOW, supra note 331, at 58−60.
343. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 180–84 (describing changes in
colony and Sandys’s influence in obtaining representative government); 1 OSGOOD, supra
note 68, at 90−92 (discussing addition of burgesses to General Assembly).
344. KAMMEN, DEPUTYES & LIBERTYES, supra note 341, at 13−19 (growth of representative government in Virginia and Bermuda); id. at 90−92 (reproducing 1621 ordinance concerning changes in Virginia’s local government).
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warranto proceedings against the corporation.345 As a result of the proceedings, the crown resumed Virginia’s privileges and thereby transformed the
colony into a royal colony.346 A step in converting the Virginia Company
to a royal colony was the substitution of royal officials for elected or appointed officials of the promoter.347 As a royal colony, the governor and
council received commissions and instructions from the crown for the administration of the colony.348 Virginia remained a royal colony until the
American Revolution.
B. New England and the Corporate Colonies
In addition to proprietorships and royal colonies, there was also the
corporate colony. The colonies of New England were unique; corporate
colonies were not like proprietorships run by an individual holding all land
and government and were not run like a royal colony under the instructions
and governance of the crown. The corporate colony was managed like a
corporation or gild, and if that corporation was residing in the colony itself,
there was little royal influence or control over internal affairs.349 In early
colonial history, corporate colonies enjoyed more local government given
the lack of effective control by the crown.350 In contrast to the proprietor-

345. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 165−179; 1 DOYLE, supra note
272, at 176−81 (discussing litigation against colony and noting colonists supported company
and did not feel there was mismanagement); infra notes 362, 471−73 (quo warranto and
scire facias proceedings against colonies); see also supra note 121 (Edward I’s quo warranto
proceedings).
346. 3 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 47−49, 51. Following the quo warranto proceedings,
colonists requested to keep their assembly. 3 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 50. But the assembly was not called for several years. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at
198−200; 3 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 87−88.
347. 3 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 22−23, 72. A royal commission was established to run
Virginia. BEER, supra note 237, at 307−13 (1623 and 1631 commissions); LEONARD W.
LABAREE, ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA: A STUDY OF THE BRITISH COLONIAL SYSTEM
BEFORE 1783, at 37, 121−24, 134−35 (1930) (royal governor with commission, instructions,
and royal colonial council appointed by king); see also infra note 470 (British commissions
managed colonial affairs for the crown).
348. See generally LEONARD W. LABAREE, ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH COLONIAL
GOVERNORS, 1670-1776 (1935).
349. SNOW, supra note 331, at 66 (commenting on gild features of Massachusetts’s 1629
charter); see also supra note 332 (crown’s control over mother corporation residing in England); supra notes 167, 211, 232, 241−42 (describing briefly governance of gilds and regulated companies with governors, aldermen, wardens, and bodies of assistants of various titles).
350. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 436 (explaining distance from England as factor in
New England’s self-governance); 3 id. at 8, 25 (noting the same).
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ship and royal colony, the officers, assistants, and freemen of the corporate
colony held their own political power secured by incorporation and charter.351 For these reasons, the corporate colony enjoyed a degree of independence not present in the other colonies.352
Grantees of the Plymouth Division of the Virginia Company set out to
form a colony in the North, the Popham Colony, but those efforts failed.353
Scattered grantees reassembled, and in 1620, James I formed the Plymouth
Council of New England (New England Council).354 The New England
Council was a holding entity for distributing lands.355 Under the design of
the Council, land would be settled in the form of counties, baronies, hundreds, manors, and incorporated towns similar to settlement in England.356
In 1635, facing quo warranto proceedings, the New England Council surrendered its charter.357
During its short existence, the New England Council granted land to
many New England colonial promoters.358 The Council, for example,
granted land in 1628 to the settlers of the “New England Company” (Mas-

351. Compare infra notes 381−82 and accompanying text (governance of corporate colony), with infra notes 390−99 and accompanying text (proprietorship and royal colony).
352. The corporate colony was more democratic than other types of colonies. 2
ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 111−13, 142−43 (clarifying popular theories of New England democracy by emphasizing restricted powers of voting members and
limitations on eligibility itself); 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 425.
353. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 90−94; 1 OSGOOD, supra note
68, at 98.
354. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 320−27, 405 (discussing efforts
by grantees of Plymouth Division to obtain new charter as corporation of proprietors); 1
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 102−03.
355. 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 123; SNOW, supra note 331, at 63 (describing New
England Council as impotent to do anything but grant land).
356. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 326 (divisions into counties,
hundreds, and baronies with court baron and court leet); 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 104,
126 (identifying schemes which authorized populating New England with feudalism and
other English institutions); see also infra Part IV.E (aspects of tenure clauses in charters);
infra note 434 (settlement mimicked settlement in England).
357. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 417; 1 ROBERT NOXON TOPPAN,
EDWARD RANDOLPH 16−17 (Boston, John Wilson & Son 1898).
358. Many settlements received land from the New England Council. See, e.g., 1
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 123−24 (proprietorships of Maine and New Hampshire); see also
infra note 359 (grant to Massachusetts Bay Colony). Lacking authorization from the king,
land grants from the New England Council did not grant full governance powers. See 1
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 126, 130; cf. infra note 412 (Duke of York, without authorization, could not grant governance rights to New Jersey proprietors).
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sachusetts).359 In 1629, Charles I confirmed the Council’s land grant and
further granted the colony a royal charter of incorporation with governance
rights similar to other English corporations.360 Borrowing from municipalities and merchant associations, “The Governor and Company of the Mattachusetts Bay in Newe-England” had a governor, deputy governor, and
eighteen assistants.361 In the specific language of the charter, however,
there was no provision requiring that the corporation remain in England,
and the corporation removed itself to New England to become both the local and parent body of the corporate colony.362
The independence of the corporate colony was an essential characteristic for many New England immigrants. A significant number of New
England settlers were interested not in trade but rather ideological freedom.363 Given the religious turmoil in England, many pilgrims and puritans fled England to New England. Arriving in New England, immigrants
had to interface with existing colonies on many levels. Several New England settlements began as a body of self-assembled squatters branching out
from other colonies without any authority from England or other patent
holders but later receiving such authority or a royal charter.364

359. 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 130; see also 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra
note 228, at 359−62 (New England Company receiving land from Council did not have ability to appoint governor absent royal authorization).
360. 3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1852 (incorporation rights for grantees of Massachusetts’s 1629 charter: perpetual succession; sue and be sued; buy, hold, enjoy, and sell property); see also 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 365−66; 1 OSGOOD, supra
note 68, at 131, 142 (Massachusetts’s government modeled on Virginia’s charter).
361. 3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1852; see also 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 131, 142,
162 (describing Massachusetts’s governance; noting similarity to London division of Virginia Company; governor did not have veto power, nor power to adjourn or dissolve, and
governor cast vote for tie).
362. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 390−93; 1 OSGOOD, supra note
68, at 142−50. Massachusetts’s removal to the colony caused royal rebuke and a quo warranto proceeding. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 420−23 (failure to enforce quo warranto); SNOW, supra note 331, at 67−68 (noting charter-revocation powers of
king’s commission in light of Massachusetts’s obstinacy).
363. 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, 107, 145, 200−01, 290, 321−22 (discussing migration and
motivation of New England religious groups).
364. Id. at 105, 108−09, 290−91 (Plymouth, without royal charter, settled outside of original grant from Virginia Company); id. at 301−02, 309−13, 321−22, 327−28 (settlers migrating from Massachusetts formed Connecticut without charter); id. at 332−34, 354−57,
369−70 (settlers banished from Massachusetts formed plantations that eventually became
Rhode Island); id. at 438 (settlers branched out from Massachusetts, formed quasicorporations, and distributed their land to form villages). Eventually Rhode Island and
Connecticut received formal charters. 1 id. at 327−28 (Connecticut); id. at 332, 369−70
(Rhode Island).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2011

63

BURRELL.DOCX

1/9/12 12:00 PM

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3

70

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:7

C. Return to the Proprietorship
Following a few colonization efforts by trading corporations, the
crown returned to the feudum and several of the original thirteen colonies
were settled as proprietorships.365 Royal privileges and immunities to proprietors such as Gilbert and Raleigh gave broad powers to establish government.366 Similar to early proprietors’ privileges, Charles I granted a
charter to Lord Baltimore to hold Maryland as a palatine fief.367 By charter, Baltimore held his land “with . . . ample Rights, Jurisdictions, Privileges, Prerogatives, Royalties, Liberties, Immunities, and royal Rights, and
temporal Franchises whatsoever . . . to be had, exercised, used, and enjoyed, as any Bishop of Durham.”368
Under royal charters, proprietors to a greater or lesser degree were authorized to create courts; to hear all pleas; to appoint officials and commissions in their name; to pardon; to establish cities, towns, corporations, and
boroughs with privileges and immunities; to grant fairs or markets; and to
coin money.369 Lord Baltimore had full executive power to raise armies,
declare war, and institute martial law.370 To further the trading interests of
the proprietorship, proprietors had the right to form monopolies and exclude trespassers.371 Proprietors had full executive authority and permis-

365. See infra note 375.
366. See supra Part III.C–D.
367. 3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1679. Lord Baltimore, George Calvert, received the
Avalon charter in 1623 for settling in Newfoundland but later moved to Virginia and received a second charter to settle Maryland. See 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note
228, at 275−82; Bernard C. Steiner, The Maryland Charter and the Early Explorations of
that Province, 16 SEWANEE REVIEW 148, 150−52 (1908) (discussing Avalon charter). Calvert died and his son inherited his title and Maryland.
368. 3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1679; see also 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 12−13
(noting differences between American proprietorships and other colonies); id. at 59, 76
(proprietors’ powers and relationship with local assemblies); supra notes 62−69 and accompanying text (discussing palatine lordships in England); infra note 375 (palatinate references
in other proprietorships).
369. See, e.g., 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 45−47 (1496 Cabot grant); id. at 49−52
(1578 Gilbert grant); 3 id. at 1677−1686 (1632 Baltimore grant). Later proprietors often
delegated powers to a governor and council. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 61, 65−68 (commenting that proprietor’s council might function like Privy Council); see also 2 ANDREWS,
COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 299−300, 329 (Baltimore’s administration).
370. 3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1682; see also CARR, supra note 232, at lxxxvii−viii
(observing that 1632 charter left indictments, process, and appointments with Baltimore); 2
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 10 (Baltimore was clothed with, among other things, authority to
establish courts, appoint officers, and bestow titles).
371. See BEER, supra note 237, at 220−28 (discussing colonial monopolies and charter
privileges excluding foreigners); id. at 227−28 (Baltimore did not have monopoly rights in
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sion of the proprietor was necessary for holding land and exercising political power.372 Proprietors were able to make any ordinance or bylaw needed for good government as long as such provisions were not repugnant to
the laws of England.373 This last clause was one of the few restrictions
found in the proprietor’s charter. In a proprietorship, there might be an assembly of freemen joining the proprietor’s governor and council, but the
proprietor held control of the colony’s main powers notwithstanding.374
Following Baltimore’s charter, proprietorships arose in Maine, New Hampshire, New York, Carolina, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Georgia.375
D. Colonial Governance
Having introduced the different types of colonies, we can move on to
discuss aspects of colonial governance. Because the history and organization of English towns, corporations, and gilds provided ready precedents
for colonial affairs, American colonial government shared many similarities with English local government.376 Both English towns and colonies often suppressed widespread participation in local government. Many colonies, for example, restricted political privileges based on property

Maryland); supra Part III.A–C (exclusive monopolies in charters to Cabot, Warde, and Gilbert).
372. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 12−13 (origin of power placed in proprietorship; proprietor was considered miniature king).
373. See, e.g., 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 51 (1578 Gilbert); 7 id. at 3801 (1609 charter to Virginia); 3 id. at 1680−81 (1632 charter to Baltimore); see also JER. DUMMER, A
DEFENCE OF THE NEW-ENGLAND CHARTERS 65−71 (London, J. Almon 1765) (1721) (describing examples of colonial laws repugnant or not repugnant to laws of England). For
similar restrictions on merchants, see supra notes 210, 242−48 and accompanying text (gild
and merchant association charters and parliamentary statutes limiting governance to serve
common weal and “better governance”).
374. See infra notes 390−97 and accompanying text.
375. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 4−5; 1 id. at 123. Maine and Carolina proprietorships
were similar to Maryland with slight variation. Maryland and Carolina had the privileges of
the Bishop of Durham at any time, but Maine’s proprietor held as the Bishop of Durham in
the seventeenth century. 3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1627; 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 5
n.1; cf. 3 id. at 248−50 (powers of Northern Neck proprietors). Penn’s charter did not refer
specifically to the Bishop of Durham. Henry VIII abolished many of the regalities of the
palatinate. 1536, 27 Hen. 8 c. 24; see also supra note 68 (Henry VIII’s legislation removing
special jurisdictions).
376. 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 105 n.1 (detailing similarities
between local government in England and local government in New England colonies); see
also KAMMEN, DEPUTYES & LIBERTYES, supra note 341, at 52−54 (summarizing influence of
trading corporations on assemblies and representative government in colonies).
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qualifications, similar to laws in England.377 Governance of English municipalities was influenced by gilds and restricted to probi homines.378 A
large portion of English boroughs eventually became oligarchies closed to
common townsmen.379 Likewise, participation in several colonial governments was limited to desirable inhabitants.380 In other colonies, political
power resided in or was otherwise influenced by church membership.381
Massachusetts, for example, was designed to be an open corporation with
participation by freemen and ruled by popular vote to some degree, but for

377. At times, as was the law in England, suffrage in the colonies was restricted to
freemen holding land valued at a set figure. See generally 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD,
supra note 228, at 115 n.1; ALBERT E. MCKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE FRANCHISE IN THE
THIRTEEN ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA (1905).
378. See supra note 194 (probi homines); supra notes 179−90, 198, 200−03 (gild influence).
379. See supra notes 208–11 (town oligarchies).
380. The selection of freemen and “admitted inhabitants” in the New England colony
resembled the wise, discrete, and honest probi homines of medieval borough councils. 2
ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 104–06 & nn.3–4 (noting selection in early
Connecticut of freemen from admitted inhabitants excluded certain offensive and unworthy
classes); id. at 115–16 (inhabitants became “admitted” by criteria which might filter wanton
dalliance, fornication, lying, drunkenness, blasphemy, criminal activity, etc.).
381. In the New Haven settlement, the governing body voted to select free burgesses
from church members. One man objected that free planters should retain power of election,
but government officials replied in analogy that many English entities limit burgess membership. 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at 525; 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228,
at 157–58, 194; 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 313–15 (Church political power in River Town
and effort by crown to open government); id. at 322–23 (Church political power in New
Haven); id. at 464 (restrictions on becoming free of town). Other New England colonies
(Plymouth, early Connecticut, and Rhode Island), did not require official church membership. Early Connecticut, for example, extended some political power to admitted inhabitants without regard to formal church membership, though religion might play a role in official recognition as “admitted.” 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 78, 89–
91, 101, 104–08, 117; see also supra note 380 (selection of admitted inhabitants in early
Connecticut).
Though it did not require church membership, early Connecticut limited participation in civil affairs. The General Court, as opposed to the general population, approved
freemanship. Freemen had greater power and constituted the body of eligible officers. 2
ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 104–05 (distinguishing between admitted
inhabitants and freemen; freemen selected from admitted inhabitants by General Court or
group of magistrates; freemen eligible to become deputies or magistrates; freemanship required to attend election assembly to vote for major candidates); id. at 107–08 (gulf between
freemen and people at large); id. at 108, 111, 115–17 (qualified freemen elect magistrates;
admitted inhabitants could elect deputies (from freemen) to cure neglect of government if
summoned by freemen); David H. Flower, Connecticut’s Freemen: The First Forty Years,
15 WM. & MARY Q. 3d 312, 314–15 (1958). Over the course of the next several decades,
Connecticut relaxed restrictions on political rights.
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a long time, the colony restricted power to the church.382 Shortly after receiving its charter, Massachusetts made a law that no man would be admitted as a freeman, and thus would be without a significant voice in military
and civil elections, holding office, or serving on juries, unless he was certified by the church after having become a member and taken the prescribed
oath.383 Restrictions on political rights in Massachusetts presented a struggle for the colony throughout a large portion of the seventeenth century.384
As part of the British Empire, colonial governance, like borough governance, depended on and was governed by royal privileges and immunities.385 Beyond the charter, colonial promoters further regulated administration of the colonies. English boroughs were generally under royal or
private lordship; colonies were royal, proprietary, or corporate.386 As with
borough governance under different lords, different types of colonial promoters translated to different characteristics of colonial governance.387 But
most colonies shared one essential feature, the colonial assembly—an insti-

382. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 435–37 (freemanship limited to
church members). After some experimentation limiting government and the General Court
to a select body of assistants and officers, freemen gained greater rights in government. Id.
at 433–34, 438 (1630 oligarchy); id. at 440 (by 1632, general election of officers by freemen
with church membership; governor selected from court of assistants); id. at 441–43 (powers
of General Court; charges of arbitrariness resulted in freemen from towns receiving privilege to elect deputies to attend General Court and authorize taxes). By 1634, the General
Court had the power to admit freemen, make laws, raise money, and grant lands. 1
ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 441–43; 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 153–
56. For a discussion of Massachusetts’s General Court and its officers, assistants, and freemen, see Herbert L. Osgood, The Corporation as a Form of Colonial Government, Part II,
11 POL. SCI. Q. 502 (1896). One of the grievances motivating change in Massachusetts’s
governance was taxation by a body of assistants without the consent of the freemen. 1
ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 439–40, 442–43. Andrews estimated that a
couple hundred freemen ruled the colony of 20,000 inhabitants. Id. at 443.
383. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 435–37, 459 (freemen, one of
four categories of Massachusetts inhabitants, was limited to church members under local
oath); 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 211–13 (freemanship restrictions in Massachusetts); B.
Katherine Brown, Freemanship in Puritan Massachusetts, 59 AM. HIST. REV. 865 (1954)
(discussing freemanship in Massachusetts).
384. Brown, supra note 383, at 869–77, 879 (Massachusetts reduced restrictions on political rights in 1647 and again in 1664); see also 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note
228, at 459, 460 (same).
385. Parliament, too, could legislate for the colonies. See infra notes 461, 466.
386. See supra Parts II.C, IV.A–C.
387. See supra notes 86, 148, 223–24 and accompanying text (conditions under different
governments varied; royal boroughs were freer).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2011

67

BURRELL.DOCX

1/9/12 12:00 PM

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3

74

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:7

tution tracing back to medieval borough councils and gild assemblies.388
Following Virginia’s 1619 representative assembly and changes in
England, colonial assemblies took root in most colonies.389 The charterbased right for colonists to have an assembly of freemen was a significant
limitation on proprietors.390 Proprietors like Baltimore frequently fought
with the assembly or lower house.391 The proprietor’s assembly differed
from the assemblies or courts of other colonies.392 The assembly in the
proprietorship, at least initially, was weak. Freemen under Baltimore’s
charter participated in the legislative process, but the proprietor retained
control and could pass reasonable ordinances absent the freemen.393 The
proprietor generally had the ability, through its agents, to summon and prorogue the meeting of the assembly.394 Even initiation of legislation was
typically reserved for the proprietor.395 Maryland under Baltimore also had
388. See supra Part II.G. The institutions and privileges of Parliament also influenced
the colonial assembly, though the borough council and gild assemblies were likely closer
relatives.
389. Not all colonies had assemblies. New York colonists and the Duke of York, or
James II as King, fought over the right to have full assembly privileges. 2 OSGOOD, supra
note 68, at 160–62 (New York colonists wanted privileges of other colonies including election and tax-granting assembly); see also infra notes 408–29 (struggle for full assembly
rights under Duke’s rule). The Duke’s charters did not mention an assembly for the colonists. Nonetheless, New York enjoyed an assembly for a brief period. But when the Duke
became James II, he gave instructions omitting the local assembly. Id.
390. See, e.g., 3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1679 (1632 charter to proprietor of Maryland); 3 id. at 1628 (1639 charter to proprietor of Maine); 5 id. at 2745 (1663 charter to proprietors of Carolina); 5 id. at 3037 (1681 charter to Penn). In 1681, Charles II granted to
William Penn a large proprietorship with extensive privileges similar to Baltimore’s charter.
Unlike other colonies, Penn, from the start, was a strong advocate for representative government. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 256 (Frames of Government and Charter of Privileges established government in Pennsylvania); id. at 257 (Frames submitted to the settlers for
approval; elected council as opposed to appointees); cf. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 167, 273–74 (detailing Penn’s work in 1670s as West New Jersey proprietor ensuring representative government with ample legal and individual rights).
391. See infra notes 418–28, 432, and 493.
392. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 58–59, 75 (contrasting power in corporate colony with
power and assembly in proprietorship).
393. A proprietor had the ability to pass emergency ordinances, but those emergency ordinances could not deprive any person of member, life, freehold, goods, or chattels. 3
THORPE, supra note 259, at 1680–81 (Baltimore’s emergency ordinance provision); 5 id. at
3038 (Penn’s emergency legislation provision).
394. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 13 (governmental authority in proprietor); id. at 59,
75–77, 80 (proprietor and governor summon, prorogue, and dissolve assembly and initiate
and veto legislation); see also 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 334–35.
395. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 80. As in other colonies, Penn and the assembly
fought over initiation power. Penn worried the assembly’s legislation would go beyond the
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a governor and council.396 If the governor and council approved the legislation, the proprietor could then veto the legislation.397
Despite the assembly’s initial weakness under proprietors, settlers
wanted assemblies for greater self-government. Proprietors distributed
land to settlers and made agreements concerning governance through “concessions” or “conditions of plantation.”398 These agreements, if covering
governance as well as land, served as miniature constitutions between the
proprietor and settler.399 In 1663, Charles II granted Carolina to a board of
eight proprietors composed of London merchants, nobles, and other influential men.400 Promoters and London merchants with ties to Barbados and
New England were interested in settling Carolina but wanted to retain corporate freedoms and government by consent.401 The bargain between the
two resulted in the proprietors’ adoption of the Concessions and Agreements of 1665.402 The 1665 Concessions granted various freedoms, procharter, upset the crown, and cause a forfeiture of Penn’s charter. KAMMEN, DEPUTYES &
LIBERTYES, supra note 341, at 41–42, 64 (discussing shift in initiation power in Pennsylvania); 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 260; cf. LABAREE, supra note 347, at 219–23, 429 (initiation in royal colonies given to assembly).
396. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 61 (commission for governor and council); id. at 74–75
(assembly of deputies).
397. Id. at 62, 76. By the turn of the eighteenth century, the crown also had power to
disallow colonial legislation in several colonies. E.B. GREENE, PROVINCIAL AMERICA 1690–
1740, at 49–50 (1905) [hereinafter GREENE, PROVINCIAL AMERICA] (Virginia, New York,
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Maryland, and New Jersey). See generally
ELMER BEECHER RUSSELL, THE REVIEW OF AMERICAN COLONIAL LEGISLATION BY THE KING
IN COUNCIL (1915).
398. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 20–29 (describing contracts between settlers and proprietors); id. at 60 (concessions for government); see also 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD,
supra note 228, at 293 (“conditions of plantations” in Maryland); 3 id. at 167 (Penn’s 1677
Concessions for West New Jersey).
399. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 20 (Baltimore’s land agreements for settlers); id. at 60,
205 (most proprietors issued these agreements, but Maryland’s agreements limited to land
and not to rights of government); id. at 211 (agreements served as constitutions).
400. 5 THORPE, supra note 259, at 2743. The grant to Carolina followed liberal charters
to Connecticut and Rhode Island. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 182–
83, 186 (influence of London merchants and nobles in securing charter).
401. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 192–93 (groups of adventurers
from New England and Barbados interested in settling Carolina); id. at 194–95 & n.3 (investors sought to secure commercial privileges, free trade, liberty of conscience, and representative assembly); 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 202–05.
402. Investors desired the Concessions be modeled on the corporate freedoms of certain
English towns, but proprietors followed their own plan. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD,
supra note 228, at 143, 192–96 (noting Barbadians’ influence in drafting document);
WESLEY F. CRAVEN, THE COLONIES IN TRANSITION 1660–1713, at 89 (1968) [hereinafter
CRAVEN, COLONIES IN TRANSITION]; 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 205, 210–12 (concessions
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tected liberty of conscience, and provided ample assembly privileges with
execution of local assembly legislation rather than executive initiation
common in other proprietorships.403 The generosity of the 1665 Concessions, however, was short lived. Facing problems with the liberal agreements, proprietors reversed course and followed a feudal scheme beginning
with the Fundamental Constitutions of 1669.404 With these efforts to avoid
democracy, Carolina proprietors returned the colony to a palatine lordship
with initiation power in the proprietors and reduced assembly rights.405
The settlers never fully adopted the change, and the Carolinas ended up in
the crown’s hands in the first half of the eighteenth century.406
With the help of representative assemblies, local government, though
meandering at times through feudal or royal control, gravitated back to the
people paying taxes and participating in commerce. The more community
features a locality obtained, the more independence it sought. Communal
gild and corporate forces, for example, helped liberate the townsmen of the
private borough under a lord or church.407 Similar community and commercial features motivated colonial autonomy and eventually reduced proprietary and royal control in the colonies—often by analogy to English institutions or assimilation of a neighboring colony’s privileges.408
in colonies); Richard Waterhouse, England, the Caribbean, and the Settlement of Carolina,
9 J. AM. STUDIES 259, 264–65 (1975) (settlers from Barbados and agreements of settlement).
403. 5 THORPE, supra note 259, at 2756, 2757–58; 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra
note 228, at 196.
404. 3 ANDREWS, supra note 228, at 212–13 (feudal nature of 1663 charter clothed proprietors with powers of palatinate of Durham); id. at 213–14 (promoters distributed land
among classes to ensure balance between aristocracy and democracy); id. at 215–16 (governance under proprietors); CRAVEN, COLONIES IN TRANSITION, supra note 402, at 99–101; 2
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 208–09.
405. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 205, 208–10, 212–13. Similar characteristics occurred
in the boroughs where participation was limited to probi homines and eventually closed off
to a select body to avoid undesirable aspects of democracy. See supra Part II.G.
406. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 266–67 (South Carolina followed by North Carolina); HARRIS, supra note 37, at 135–36 (discussing rebellion and strife
in Carolinas; noting conflict between feudalism and representative institutions in colonies).
407. See supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 401–02 (London merchants and corporate freedoms of other colonies influenced colonization under Carolina charter as would-be settlers in Carolina wanted
to retain their corporate freedoms); infra note 412 (noting influence of Carolina Concessions
on New Jersey Concessions); infra note 423 (Duke of York’s grant of privileges of neighboring colonies); infra note 498 (observing convergence toward citizenship status of freer
societies through charter association directly or by claims for generalized free customs, liberties, privileges, and immunities of freer entity); see also 4 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD,
supra note 228, at 423 n.1 (commenting in reflection that colonies might not be seeking
“democracy” in its strictest definition but were constantly seeking to free themselves of ex-
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The history of seventeenth-century New York illustrates these dynamics and provides an example of a colony struggling for self-government,
initially under a proprietorship and later under the crown. In the early part
of the seventeenth century, the Dutch formed the colony of New Netherland in northeastern North America—a colony that eventually became
home to both Dutch and English local settlements.409 At the Restoration,
the Dutch and English were temporarily at peace but that would soon
change as England initiated plans to retaliate against the Dutch for various
injuries.410
On the eve of England’s conquest of New Netherland, in March 1664,
Charles II granted the territory of New York (still New Netherland under
the Dutch) to his brother, the Duke of York.411 A few months later, the
Duke conveyed a portion of his grant, New Jersey, to loyal friends.412
Meanwhile, Colonel Richard Nicolls, the Duke’s future appointee for Governor of New York who did not know of the grant to New Jersey proprietors, presided over a commission to hear grievances and restore order in the
territory in anticipation of the conflict.413 As part of his commission,
Nicolls appeased English settlers by promising them some degree of selfgovernment and the privileges of English subjects.414 Specifically, Nicolls
promised settlers and Long Island promoters equal privileges as those enjoyed in other New England colonies.415

ternal proprietary, royal, and parliamentary control); Herbert L. Osgood, The Proprietary
Province as a Form of Colonial Government, Part I, 2 AM. HIST. REV. 644, 652–54 (1897)
(comparing democratic forces in proprietary colonies with similar democratic forces in medieval England).
409. 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 153–54, 157; see also infra note 420.
410. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 56.
411. Id. at 57.
412. CRAVEN, COLONIES IN TRANSITION, supra note 402, at 83–84. The Duke’s conveyance of New Jersey did not authorize governance rights because the Duke was not authorized to grant such authority. The absence of formal authority for governance plagued New
Jersey proprietors. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 142, 145 & n.1.
Nonetheless, New Jersey grantees, also Carolina proprietors, adopted almost verbatim the
Carolina Concessions for their Concessions. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note
228, at 140, 143, 196; CRAVEN, COLONIES IN TRANSITION, supra note 402, at 88–89; 2
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 169–70, 173–74 (1665 agreements granted broad rights).
413. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 56, 59, 63.
414. See infra note 415.
415. AARON LEAMING & JACOB SPICER, GRANTS, CONCESSIONS, AND ORIGINAL
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW JERSEY 661–63, 671–73 (2d ed., Philadelphia, W.
Bradford 1881) (Monmouth and Elizabethtown grants); 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 159; cf.
3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 320 (similar promise in Penn’s 1701
charter of liberties).
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Overwhelmed by English forces, leaders of New Netherland surrendered to the English and New Netherland became New York.416 Assisted
by Nicolls’s leadership, the Duke established his laws for New York in early March 1665.417 The Duke’s law was a vast code of provisions assembled from various sources.418 Under the Duke’s rule, however, New York
colonists were not participating in essential components of the legislative
process, and they grieved for full privileges of representative government.419 When the Duke’s laws reached the English on Long Island, a
community long accustomed to self-government,420 they petitioned the king
Nicolls promised settlers and local promoters (including those in the Duke’s grant
of New Jersey) “equal freedom, immunities and privileges with any of his majesties’ subjects in any of his colonies in America.” LEAMING & SPICER, supra, at 663, 672. Under the
authority of Nicolls’s grant, assembled settlers enacted laws and established courts to try
minor causes. Nicolls, however, did not have authority under the commission to grant a full
legislative assembly for authorizing taxes. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228,
at 141–42, 145 (Nicolls’s grants of liberal, but limited self-government to towns and promoters in area of New York and New Jersey); id. at 144–45 (settlers under grants held town
meetings, enacted laws, formed courts and held trials; enjoyed exemption from taxation for
seven years; settlers promised privileges of neighboring colonies); CRAVEN, COLONIES IN
TRANSITION, supra note 402, at 80, 84–85.
The rule of law under New York and New Jersey proprietors eventually conflicted
with Nicolls’s earlier grants of self-government, or perceptions thereof, and Nicolls’s grants
would prove problematic for the proprietors throughout the latter half of the seventeenth
century. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 144–50, 155–56 (assemblies in
New Jersey towns met under two authorities: one more autonomous under Nicolls’s grant,
the other under New Jersey proprietors’ rule); id. at 156–57 (contrast between freer selfgovernance in New England and Long Island and governance under proprietary government; proprietors viewed Nicolls’s patents as illegitimate).
416. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 60–63.
417. 1 CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK FROM THE YEAR 1664
TO THE REVOLUTION 6 (Albany, James. B. Lyon 1894) [hereinafter LINCOLN, THE COLONIAL
LAWS OF NEW YORK]. Lincoln has the date as March 1, 1664 instead of March 1, 1665.
418. Albert E. McKinley, The Transition From Dutch to English Rule in New York: A
Study in Political Imitation, 6 AM. HIST. REV. 693, 704–05 (1901).
419. CRAVEN, COLONIES IN TRANSITION, supra note 402, at 74; MICHAEL KAMMEN,
COLONIAL NEW YORK—A HISTORY 77–78 (1975) [hereinafter KAMMEN, COLONIAL NEW
YORK] (English on Long Island took issue with absence of full assembly rights in Duke’s
laws); 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 160–61.
420. English on Long Island had a long history of advocacy for representative government. Before the English Conquest of New Netherland, the English in the Dutch territory
advocated for greater self-governance. KAMMEN, COLONIAL NEW YORK, supra note 419, at
39–40 (English migrating to New Netherland brought town meetings, churches, and concept
of communal land); id. at 49, 52–54 (English demands for political participation under the
Dutch); id. at 54–55 (Dutch leadership resisted calls for autonomy, appointed town leaders,
and created upper and lower town citizens). The English-influenced plea for participation in
the 1653 Petition of the Commonalty of New Netherland declared:
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for the right to participate in taxation and enjoy corporate privileges.421
Similar disputes for full assembly privileges continued throughout the
Duke’s rule. By the early 1680s, New York merchants, refusing to pay
customs, claimed that if they were taxed without consent, it would be a violation of the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, and other fundamental
laws.422 The Duke, to quell the dispute and collect revenue, reluctantly
granted the inhabitants an assembly and the privileges and immunities enjoyed by other colonies.423 When the new assembly met, it crafted the
1683 Charter of Liberties,424 a broad grant of liberties that received some
tis contrary to the first intentions and genuine principles of every well regulated
government, that one or more men should arrogate to themselves the exclusive
power to dispose, at will, of the life and property of any individual, and this, by
virtue or under pretense of a law or order he, or they, might enact, without the
consent, knowledge or election of the whole Body, or its agents or representatives.
Hence the enactment, except as aforesaid, of new Laws or orders affecting the
Commonalty, or the Inhabitants, their lives or property, is contrary and opposed to
the granted Freedoms of the Dutch Government, and odious to every freeborn
man, and principally so to those whom God has placed in a free state on newly
settled lands, which might require new laws and orders, not transcending, but resembling as near as possible, those of Netherland. We humbly submit that tis one
of our privileges that our consent or that of our representatives is necessarily required in the enactment of such laws and orders.
1 E.B. O’CALLAGHAN, DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK 550, 551 (1856) (Resolution 4, Petition of the Commonalty of New Netherland);
see also 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 154–57 (English in New Netherland); supra note 415
(discussing Nicolls’s grant of equal privileges and immunities to settlers and Long Island
promoters in territory of New York and New Jersey).
421. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 109–12 (discontented English
claimed Duke’s rule violated liberty of Englishmen); id. at 106–07, 109 (chief complaint
was taxation without popular participation); DAVID S. LOVEJOY, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION
IN AMERICA 108–09 (1972) (English on Long Island upset with heavy taxes and no representation). The Duke dismissed the assemblies of New Jersey and New England as unnecessary for New York colonists. In his view, assemblies were dangerous and destructive to
the peace of the colony. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 112–13.
422. 3 JOHN R. BRODHEAD, DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK 289 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1853) (bill against William Dyer
for collecting customs); LOVEJOY, supra note 421, at 110–12; 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at
162–63 (merchants refused to pay customs; treated payments as violations of fundamental
laws, e.g., Magna Carta, Petition of Right, and other statutes).
423. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 110–11 n.2, 113–14 (Duke
granted equal liberties and an assembly, which Englishmen and fellow plantations enjoy); 2
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 164–65.
424. A copy of the 1683 legislation can be found in 1 CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 95–107 (1906) (1683 legislation provided for trial
by jury, due process, consent in legislation and taxation, individual liberties, religious toleration, parliamentary privileges, and triennial meetings). See also 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at
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support but later did not receive confirmation by James II and the Lords of
Trade.425 The 1683 legislation was perceived as harmful because it granted
liberal freedoms and recognized the “people” as the source of power.426
After the death of Charles II, the Duke became King James II, and with an
eye for consolidation of all of the New England colonies,427 he disallowed
the 1683 charter and the assembly altogether, placing the power to legislate
with the governor and council.428 Following the Glorious Revolution and
James II’s abdication, New York regained its assembly.429
As a vehicle for change in New York and other colonies, assemblies
were instrumental in mobilizing settlers and curbing royal and proprietary
government.430 With the House of Commons’ long history of struggling to

166–68; David S. Lovejoy, Equality and Empire: The New York Charter of Libertyes, 1683,
21 WM. & MARY Q. 3d 493, 504–05 (1964).
425. The Lords of Trade and Plantations was a crown body designated to oversee the
colonies. See infra note 470.
426. Lovejoy, supra note 424, at 512–15 (belief of Lords of Trade that charter granted
privileges beyond those of any colony; governed directly by English laws; lodged government in governor, council, and “people”; and imposed burdensome obligation of requiring
frequent meetings); see also 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 117 n.2
(discussing use of “people” in various documents); 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 166–68.
427. During the mid-1680s, the crown challenged and voided the charters of New England colonies to form the Dominion of New England. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra
note 228, at 68 (summarizing policy to consolidate the corporate and proprietary colonies);
id. at 118 (noting Duke’s goal to consolidate colonies); infra note 475 (briefly discussing
lawsuits voiding charters in order to consolidate colonies into Dominion of New England);
VIOLA F. BARNES, THE DOMINION OF NEW ENGLAND 29 (F. Ungar Pub. Co. 1960) (1923).
428. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 122–23 (loss of local assembly
especially poignant to English towns in New England); 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 168; 3
id. at 358–59 (omission of assembly in New York’s instructions); Lovejoy, supra note 424,
at 513–15. New England under the Dominion, which included New York as of 1688, also
lacked a local assembly. BARNES, supra note 427, at 40–41 (suggesting James II was responsible for removal of assembly from first draft of Dominion’s commission and instructions); id. at 41–42 (noting criticisms of assemblies as disruptive and entrenching theocracy
in Massachusetts); see also infra note 495; cf. supra note 207 (criticisms against the commonalty in English towns).
429. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 137; 3 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at
508.
430. LABAREE, supra note 347, at 35–36 (assemblies stronger in eighteenth century; parliamentary sovereignty in England not transferable to colonies under crown); id. at 172–74
(conflict between colonial assembly and crown); id. at 215–17, 267–68 (contest between
royal prerogative, parliamentary privileges, and local assemblies); id. at 227–28 (weakening
of crown’s control led to greater efforts to control assembly); id. at 426–28 (as colonial assemblies grew in strength, they ignored royal instructions and brought about transformation
from royal prerogative to government by consent); LOVEJOY, supra note 421, at 78 (efforts
by Maryland’s assembly to combat proprietor’s power); 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 80–94

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss1/3

74

BURRELL.DOCX

1/9/12 12:00 PM

Burrell: A Story of Privileges and Immunities: From Medieval Concept to th

2011]

A STORY OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

81

obtain privileges, colonists had a wealth of perceived precedents to throw
at the crown or proprietor. Wielding de jure or de facto revenue authority,
colonial assemblies mimicked Parliament in taxation and parliamentary
privileges.431 By the eighteenth century, American colonies had assemblies, but these assemblies to a large degree existed or functioned at the
will of the crown or proprietor.432
E. Tenure Clauses in Colonial Charters
The discussion to this point has focused on charter privileges and immunities concerning the colonies’ formation and other aspects of colonial
governance. Royal privileges and immunities also regulated tenure in the
colonies. Merchants eyeing North America in the sixteenth century did not
envision a thriving colony but rather a trading post with temporary citizens
serving trading interests.433 Subsequent royal charters focusing more on

(describing ascent of Maryland’s assembly to state of greater independence); see supra
notes 408–29 (struggle of assembly in New York proprietorship); see also KAMMEN,
DEPUTYES & LIBERTYES supra note 341, at 56–68 (describing evolution of colonial assembly
and its influence in curbing arbitrary government).
431. 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 301, 336–37, 338, 341–42 (assembly under Baltimore claimed parliamentary privileges based on House of Commons’
privileges); 3 id. at 304 (parliamentary privileges served as a model for Penn’s assembly);
LOVEJOY, supra note 421, at 75–78, 89–92 (assembly’s advocacy for parliamentary privileges in Maryland); see also MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES IN THE
AMERICAN COLONIES (1943); LABAREE, supra note 347, at 174–75, 272, 308 (commenting
that most colonies, under rights of Englishmen, enjoyed revenue authority, excepting Dominion of England and New York in late 1680s); id. at 215–16 (parliamentary privileges
and local assemblies); id. at 274–75 (colonial assemblies wanted same powers as House of
Commons over revenue); id. at 284, 296–97, 299 (lower assembly refused to pass revenue
law, objected to upper council’s amendments of money bills); id. at 428–30 (assembly emulated House of Commons; although prerogative was limited in England after Glorious Revolution, crown wanted to keep royal prerogative strong in colonies; colonial assembly responded with argument that crown cannot do anything in colonies that it cannot do in
England). By the time Parliament exercised its authority in taxation, the colonial assembly
had already asserted its dominance. LABAREE, supra note 347, at 430–31.
432. 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 339–41 (Baltimore reduced assembly membership and invoked property requirement to restrict voting eligibility); 3 id. at
114 (Duke of York briefly conceded liberal assembly rights to New York, but governor retained power to consent to laws and to summon, adjourn, and dissolve assembly for cause);
id. at 137 (same arrangement for crown after Glorious Revolution); LABAREE, supra note
347, at 177–78, 179, 190, 214–15, 218, 297–98 (noting that crown frequently reminded royal colonies that assemblies existed by grace and permission of crown); id. at 207–15 (observing that crown was reluctant to clothe assemblies with same privileges as Parliament).
433. See supra Part III (expansion of merchant associations overseas; transformation
from trading model to colonization model).
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settlement added clauses concerning tenure. Promoters desired to settle the
American wilderness in a similar fashion to the settlements of England, often mimicking the county, hundred, manor, and borough system in nomenclature if nothing else.434
1. Socage Tenure
An essential part of the colonization effort was granting and managing
lands.435 Throughout the colonial period, colonizing agencies rewarded
colonists with land for bringing additional settlers.436 The colonizing agency and the crown wanted land settled to help provide a stable and safe environment for trade.437 Englishmen wanted land and were willing to face a
dangerous frontier in exchange for large tracts of land.438
Most royal charters to colonial promoters contained a variation of the
tenure clause that provided for holding land in free and common socage,
“as of our Manor of East Greenwich,” in the County of Kent, not in capite,

434. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 510–11 (land system in New
England followed that of England); 2 id. at 293–98 (manorial outline of Maryland); 3 id. at
219 (describing manors in Carolina as large plantations without true manorial features); 1
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 12 (Gilbert’s plans mimic English institutions); id. at 21, 85–86,
92–93 (private plantations in early Virginia); id. at 90–91 (discussing development of boroughs, manors, corporations, and cities in Virginia); id. at 425–26 (agricultural aspect of
New England town resembled English hamlet and village); 2 id. at 25–26, 33 (manors with
manorial privileges in Maryland and Carolina); id. at 30 (manors in New Netherland); id. at
50 (village system in New England and New Netherland).
435. HARRIS, supra note 37, at 147–48 (noting that immigration required easy tenures);
McPherson, supra note 39, at 48 (observing importance of transferring land in colonies).
436. HARRIS, supra note 37, at 194 (head right system rewarded individuals for transporting settlers); 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 87 (discussing Virginia’s head right system);
2 id. at 20–29 (land for settlers); see also supra notes 314–16 and accompanying text (Gilbert’s scheme of land for contributions); infra note 458 (Baltimore granted land in exchange
for money and settlers).
437. HARRIS, supra note 37, at 255–60, 362–63 (grants to military officers to set up military posts for stability).
438. Creating border palatinates with regal privileges was common on the frontiers of
England. Some argue England’s palatine earls were clothed with higher privileges and jurisdictions in exchange for their service as a barrier to the more conflict-prone borders. This
rationale has been applied to colonial frontiers. 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note
228, at 197 (warlike America during colonial period resembled an earlier period in England); HARRIS, supra note 37, at 255–56 (noting similarities between English palatinates
near Wales and Scotland and grants to military figures in colonial America). But see
LAPSLEY, supra note 62, at 12–13 (noting absence of evidence to support theory that English
palatinates were created to serve as buffers).
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and not in knight’s service.439 The Manor of East Greenwich in the County
of Kent, by the mid-sixteenth century, was a royal manor held of the
king.440 By the reign of James I, granting crown lands as of the Manor of
East Greenwich in the County of Kent was mostly generic charter formula.441 References to the royal Manor of East Greenwich and similar tenure
clauses were deemed necessary to avoid any presumption that the land was
held in any tenure other than socage tenure, free of knight’s service, and
not in capite.442
Other more burdensome tenures would not work. The tenant in
capite, for example, was required to receive a license from the crown to
permit alienation, and if a license had not been obtained prior to the transfer, the grantor had to pay a fine.443 Because settling and transferring land
would be a necessary component of colonization, colonial promoters endeavored to secure language in their charter that the land would not be held
in capite.444
As discussed above, the common attribute of socage tenure, like burgage tenure, was rent in exchange for most feudal obligations, especially
military and wardship and marriage burdens.445 Socage tenure was more
439. Edward P. Cheyney, The Manor of East Greenwich in the County of Kent, 11 AM.
HIST. REV. 29, 29 (1905) (listing charters that used phrase or a variation of phrase); see also
2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 139 n.2; McPherson, supra note 39, at
35–56 (detailing attributes of Manor of East Greenwich formula); infra note 442 (discussing
tenure in capite and by knight’s service). In 1732, Georgia was held in free socage, not in
capite, as of the manor of Hampton Court in Middlesex—not significantly different from
East Greenwich. 2 THORPE, supra note 259, at 771; see also Cheyney, supra, at 29.
440. C.T. Carr, Our Manor of East Greenwich, 29 L. Q. REV. 349, 351 (1913).
441. Cheyney, supra note 439, at 32 (commenting that East Greenwich manor was a
common reference manor in royal charters).
442. Id. at 29–30 (describing late seventeenth-century survey of Manor of East Greenwich listing customs of manor). Tenure in capite meant holding of the king directly as tenant in chief. Land held of the king was presumably in capite unless specified otherwise.
See McPherson, supra note 39, at 42, 43–44, 45–46 (colonial grants avoided burdens of
knight’s service and alienation fees accompanying lands held in capite); supra note 40 (discussing tenure in capite and alienation of land held of king). Tenants in knight’s service
owed military services; military tenure was common in England after the Conquest. See
supra note 33.
443. McPherson, supra note 39, at 44, 45 (noting emergence of reasonable fines for unlicensed alienation of land held in capite; discussing “not in capite” disclaimer and reference
to holding of manor); see also supra note 40.
444. 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 282 (change in tenure from in
capite to socage and not in capite in Maryland’s charters).
445. Settlers wanted land free of common feudal obligations. William R. Vance, The
Quest for Tenure in the United States, 33 YALE L.J. 248, 254 (1924) (describing common
feudal incidents such as escheat for felony or failure of heirs; distress for failure of services;
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freely alienable and deviseable, and this was a key requirement for a colony
abroad.446 In many of the original colonies, grants to settlers, whether by
royal governors or proprietors, were made in free and common socage, often reserving a quit rent to the promoter.447 Colonists perceived the quit
rent as a form of land tax to the proprietorship or crown.448 Other than the
facial grant of socage tenure and the fiction of holding of a manor, the particular reference to holding as of the Manor of East Greenwich was not

fines, scutages, reliefs, aids, wardship and marriage, and primer seisin); 3 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 33, at 51–54 (aspects of socage tenure and exemption from military services and
wardship and marriage incidents); MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES (1641), reprinted in
THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 35 (photo. reprint 1995) (Boston, Rockwell &
Churchill 1889) (land free from all fines and licenses upon alienation and free from heriots,
wardships, reliefs, and escheats upon death of ancestor); see also supra note 37 (listing feudal incidents). Holders of socage tenure owed fealty, escheat, and some form of quit rent.
Vance, supra note 445, at 255–56 (describing conditions after Charles II’s 1660 tenure act).
Socage tenure or socagium meant in the service of soke. WILLIAM SOMNER &
WHITE KENNETT, A TREATISE OF GAVELKIND 134–39, 141 (2d ed., London, F. Gyles 1726).
As discussed above, soke meant “seeking” and was used in a variety of ways in Domesday
records—frequently as part of the immunity process supplementing unwritten custom by
expressly authorizing the immunized grantee the privilege to collect the profits of justice
and customs running on the land. See supra notes 50–57 and accompanying text (discussing
royal grants of sake and soke). As times and conditions changed, many sokemen’s services
were commuted for rents, a central characteristic of socage tenure. See VINOGRADOFF,
ENGLISH SOCIETY, supra note 25, 124–28 (describing soke, sokemen, and socage tenure); id.
at 235 (socage tenure distinguished from military tenure); supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (commutation of services). Initially, socage tenure was not considered free, but
later socage tenure became mingled with fee farm tenure. Charles M. Andrews, Introduction to BEVERLEY W. BOND, JR., THE QUIT RENT SYSTEM IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 14,
25–27 (1919); 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 52–53 (merger of fee farm and socage tenures).
446. McPherson, supra note 39, at 40.
447. Id. at 39–45 (describing common colonial tenure clauses). The Tenure Abolition
Act of 1660 converted existing tenures into socage tenure. 1660, 12 Car. 2, c. 24, § 4.
New Netherland was lost to England in the latter half of the seventeenth century,
and Charles II granted large tracts of land to his brother, the Duke of York. When the
Duke’s appointees took over New Netherland, in line with the socage-tenure theme of other
colonies and the new law in England, most feudal obligations were waived. 1 LINCOLN, THE
COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK, supra note 417, at 44 (freedom to alienate, freedom from
heriots, wardships, escheats, and forfeitures); see also HARRIS, supra note 37, at 213; 2
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 40–42.
448. Vance, supra note 445, at 259. Quit rents were a controversial topic in colonial affairs—successfully collected in some colonies but almost non-existent in New England’s
corporate colonies. BOND, supra note 445, at 32–33 (detailing collection efforts in various
colonies); id. at 35 (discussing colonies free of quit rents).
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considered significant to the colonies.449
2. Proprietorships and Quia Emptores Terrarum
Though common in colonial charters, socage tenure was not required
for all lands. As described above, the crown granted to proprietors all
rights, privileges, and jurisdictions of the land.450 Under typical charter
language, proprietors themselves may have held land of the king in socage
tenure with compensation and homage or fealty in exchange for services.451
If the statute of Quia Emptores Terrarum did not apply, promoters had the
ability to create tenures.452 Quia Emptores Terrarum allowed alienation
but required the grantee hold the same tenure as the grantor.453 This prevented the alienation and subinfeudation problems in which estates of high
lords were being reduced in quality and status by intermediary lords creating new tenures or subinfeudating the land with incidents and customs conflicting with those owed to the original high lord.454 When an intermediary
lord alienated land under the statute, the grantee held as the grantor, thus
preserving the tenure and services owed to the high lord.455
A number of colonial charters to proprietors suspended the application
of Quia Emptores Terrarum, and these proprietors were allowed to subin-

449. Cheyney, supra note 439, at 34–35. Leadership in early Massachusetts was of the
opinion that the charter’s reference to holding land as of the Manor of East Greenwich
meant that, since those of the Manor were influenced by Parliament’s law, the colonists
must be under Parliament’s law. 1 TOPPAN, supra note 357, at 21 n.48; see also KETTNER,
supra note 275, at 58 n.35 (at one point, faction argued that tenure clause “holding of the
Manor of East Greenwich” authorized Parliament’s authority in colony).
450. See supra Part IV.C (powers of proprietors; listing proprietorships of American colonies).
451. See supra Part IV.E.1 (promoters and tenure). Baltimore’s charter stated:
To Hold of Us, our Heirs and Successors, Kings of England, as of our Castle of
Windsor, in our County of Berks, in free and common Soccage, by Fealty only for
all Services, and not in Capite, nor by Knight’s Service, Yielding therefore unto
Us, our Heirs and Successors Two Indian Arrows of these Parts, to be delivered at
the said Castle of Windsor, every Year, on Tuesday in Easter Week: And also the
fifth Part of all Gold and Silver Ore, which shall happen from Time to Time, to be
found within the aforesaid Limits.
3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1679.
452. Quia Emptores Terrarum, 1290, 18 Edw. 1, c. 1; McPherson, supra note 39, at 50–
54 (describing aspects of Quia Emptores Terrarum in colonies).
453. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
454. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
455. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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feudate.456 The feudum to Maryland, for example, was held by Baltimore
in socage tenure as of the Castle of Windsor in the County of Berkshire, not
in capite, not in knight’s service, with fealty in exchange for all services.457
The statute of Quia Emptores Terrarum was expressly excluded, and Baltimore could subinfeudate and mimic English feudal institutions.458 At a
later date, several decades after the charter to Baltimore, William Penn received his proprietorship.459 With several exceptions, Penn’s charter was
modeled after Baltimore’s charter. In Penn’s grant, the statute of Quia
Emptores Terrarum not only did not apply to Penn and his heirs but also
did not apply to their immediate grantees, who could also subinfeudate,
erect manors, and create subdivisions.460
F. Conflict with the Crown
As noted throughout, whether reviewing colonial assemblies or colonial tenure, English institutions directly or indirectly influenced the colonies. The institutions of proprietorships and corporate colonies were charter-based rights as the crown granted privileges and immunities to the
colony.461 The charter was as important to the promoter and colonist as it
456. See, e.g., 3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1632–33 (1639 charter to Gorges of Maine);
5 id. at 2750 (1663 charter to proprietors of Carolina); 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 19; see
also infra notes 457–60 (proprietorships of Penn and Baltimore).
457. 3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1679. Baltimore and Penn both held their grant as of
the Castle of Windsor in the County of Berkshire. Cheyney, supra note 439, at 29 (listing
variations of more common Manor of East Greenwich formula). The crown’s charter specifying that the land was to be held of the Castle of Windsor avoided the presumption that the
land would be held in capite. See supra notes 442–44.
458. 3 THORPE, supra note 259, at 1684–85 (suspension of Quia Emptores Terrarum in
Maryland’s charter; ability to create manors with court baron and view of frankpledge); see
also 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 8–9. Those who brought settlers to Maryland received
large tracts of land as manors with rights of court baron and view of frankpledge, paying
various quit rents to Baltimore. 1 DOYLE, supra note 272, at 285–86. Smaller land holders
were also rewarded for bringing additional settlers. Maryland had about sixty manors averaging about 3,000 acres. 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 293–98 (comparing Baltimore’s manors with English tenures); 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 25.
459. Penn received his charter in 1681. 5 THORPE, supra note 259, at 3035–36.
460. Id. at 3042–43 (Quia Emptores Terrarum suspended in Penn’s grant). The creation
of manors in Penn’s charter was extended one step, i.e., Penn and his immediate grantees
could create tenures but no further grantees of grantees were so authorized. McPherson,
supra note 39, at 52–53 (Penn’s charter and Quia Emptores Terrarum); see also HARRIS,
supra note 37, at 237–41 (land distribution in Pennsylvania).
461. Parliament also passed legislation affecting the colonies. Where Parliament expressly claimed that legislation covered the colonies, there was little debate. The application of preexisting statutes to the colonies gave parties more trouble. 1 GEORGE CHALMERS,
OPINIONS OF EMINENT LAWYERS ON VARIOUS POINTS OF ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 194–225
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was to the borough, gild, and corporation in English municipal history.462
The charter gave permission, among other things, to travel, inhabit discovered lands, and form a colony.463 The charter held the colony’s powers and
gave direction for internal administration.464 Charter-based privileges regulated or granted the right to incorporate, enjoy assembly privileges, retain
English citizenship, and hold and dispose of land.465 Excepting the period
of the English Civil War and the Commonwealth, there were only a few
examples of parliamentary legislation concerning the American colonies
before the turn of eighteenth century.466
As the colonies became populated with English subjects, and to some
degree with modified English institutions, conflicts arose between settlers,
colonial governments, and the crown. The crown struggled to regulate and
maintain control of corporations and proprietors.467 As the colonies ma(London, Reed & Hunter 1814) (legal opinions on the force of English law in colonies); St.
George Leakin Sioussat, The Theory of the Extension of English Statutes to the Plantations,
in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 416–30 (1907); see also DANIEL
J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD 1664–1830, at 68–69 (2005) (describing research around effect of Parliament in colony); KETTNER, supra note 275, at 135–36 (discussing theories of discovery and conquest and respective implications on force of English law
in colonies); 2 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 436, 438 (force of English statutes considered not
binding and ignored).
For a discussion on the effect of English law in the colonies, see Paul Samuel Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 367–415 (1907) and 1 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE
COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA (2008). When colonists indicated they had the right
to English common law, they might not mean the idea of common law to a lawyer but rather
a generic ideal to enjoy the rights Englishmen enjoyed in England. Julius Goebel, Jr., The
Courts and the Law in Colonial New York, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN
LAW 245, 269–70 (David H. Flaherty ed., 1969).
462. LABAREE, supra note 347, at 7 (high ranking of royal charter in scheme of colonial
authority); see also supra Part II.D (borough charters).
463. See supra notes 259–60, 267 and accompanying text.
464. See supra notes 268–69, 312 and accompanying text.
465. See supra Parts III–IV.E (charters to merchant associations and explorers traveling
overseas and eventually planting colonies).
466. Most of Parliament’s acts expressly affecting the colonies in the seventeenth century involved commerce and trade. 3 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 513; see also BEER, supra
note 237, at 341–42 (Long Parliament and Civil War increased Parliament’s role in colonial
affairs); id. at 343 (during the English Civil War, Parliament took over all legislative and
executive aspects of the Empire).
467. CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 16–25 (1931); GREENE, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 397, at 67–69 (noting increase in assembly’s influence in proprietary and royal governments after Glorious
Revolution and loss of prerogative in England).
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tured, ironically the charter’s greatest use was protection from royal interference.468 Throughout the colonial period, the charter was a safeguard for
the colonist or promoter and an obstacle to the crown’s control.469 Nonetheless, as a colony of the Empire, the crown retained control in a variety of
ways.470 Because the charter was a royal grant, it was subject to repurchase
or revocation for abuse.471 When it was displeased with the colony, in the
same manner as it would with a corporation or municipality, the crown
would bring quo warranto472 or scire facias proceedings against the colony
and its charter.473 Some colonies chose to fight the legal proceedings; oth468. See, e.g., 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 445–46 n.3; 2 JOHN
WINTHROP’S JOURNAL, HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND 314–15 (J.K. Hosmer ed., 1908) (deflecting several royal grievances by appealing to privileges and immunities of charter);
LABAREE, supra note 347, at 95 (discussing crown’s commission as central authority for
royal governor except in case of Massachusetts with its 1691 charter to which colonists
could appeal); cf. 2 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 346 (crown’s charter
privileges as liberties and rights against arbitrary proprietor).
469. 4 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 371–72, 389–91, 402–03 (noting
crown’s animosity toward private colonies in light of commercial goals).
470. LOUISE P. KELLOGG, THE AMERICAN COLONIAL CHARTER 207–10, 256–61, 267–68,
272–73 (1904) (commissions, veto power, appellate review, and appointment powers).
When the colonies grew in number and local complexity, the crown delegated royal power
to a council, commission, or board to handle colonial affairs. CHARLES M. ANDREWS,
BRITISH COMMITTEES, COMMISSIONS AND COUNCILS OF TRADE AND PLANTATIONS 1622–
1675, at 9–23 (1908) [hereinafter ANDREWS, BRITISH COMMITTEES] (describing commissions
and committees of the Privy Council from 1622–1675). In 1634, the crown established a
formal royal commission for trade and plantations. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra
note 228, at 412. With royal assent, the commission had power to make laws, ordinances,
and constitutions concerning public, ecclesiastic, and private affairs in the colonies. The
commission and its successors had full power to enforce the laws, review colonial executive
action, appoint officers, serve as a royal court of appeal, and issue charters for new colonies.
ANDREWS, BRITISH COMMITTEES, supra, at 16–17; SNOW, supra note 331, at 69–72.
Throughout the colonial period, a similar body handled colonial affairs. It was natural for
these committees to treat all the colonies as one entity to maximize England’s interests, even
if those interests conflicted with the welfare of the colony. ANDREWS, BRITISH COMMITTEES,
supra, at 25.
471. See supra notes 30, 120–21 (remarking that royal charters to lords and entities could
be revoked for abuse or abandonment).
472. The king pursued an action of quo warranto against a franchise holder to resume
charter privileges of those who usurped authority beyond the privileges granted or who exercised privileges without a charter. See supra note 121.
473. The king pursued an action of scire facias to repeal a charter granted by deceit or
against the liberty of the subject. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 173, at 66–67 (explaining quo
warranto was appropriate for de facto franchise holders who operated without authority and
scire facias was appropriate for de jure holder who abused authority); Philip S. Haffenden,
The Crown and the Colonial Charters, 1675–1688: Part I, 15 WM. & MARY Q. 3d 297, 302
n.12 (1958). Toward the end of the seventeenth century, the crown initiated legal proceed-
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ers surrendered their charter and became royal colonies to avoid litigation
costs.474 The crown took advantage of its ability to revoke charters on several occasions, notably toward the end of the seventeenth century, before
the Glorious Revolution, when it made efforts to consolidate the colonies
into the Dominion of New England.475
V. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF ENGLISHMEN AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION
Up to this point, this Article has focused on rights and liberties granted
by charter. Charters clothed subjects and entities with a variety of privileges and immunities.476 The seventeenth century produced a different kind of
liberty, the liberty of the Englishmen—a step removed from, and often hostile to, the crown’s charter.477

ings against proprietors and corporate colonies. Philip S. Haffenden, The Crown and the
Colonial Charters, 1675–1688: Part II, 15 WM. & MARY Q. 3d 452, 453–56 (1958); cf.
JENNIFER LEVIN, THE CHARTER CONTROVERSY IN THE CITY OF LONDON 1660–1688, AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES 12–16 (1969) (discussing initiation of quo warranto proceedings against
English cities in latter half of seventeenth century). Frequent violations of the navigation
act renewed efforts against the colonies. CRAVEN, COLONIES IN TRANSITION, supra note 402,
at 258–61. In addition to litigation, on several occasions authorities tried to push bills
through Parliament to abolish crown charters and consolidate the colonies under royal control. See KELLOGG, supra note 470, at 284–91, 298–305, 308–10 (bills were introduced in
Parliament against colonial charters in 1701, 1706, and 1715); see also ANDREWS, BRITISH
COMMITTEES, supra note 470, at 21–22.
474. KELLOGG, supra note 470, at 197, 201–06, 236–37; see also 4 ANDREWS, COLONIAL
PERIOD, supra note 228, at 394–95, 401–02 (discussing the status of the colonies following
royal litigation, noting specifically that Maryland, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania ultimately survived royalization efforts while Massachusetts remained in class of itself); DUMMER, supra note 373, at 6–11.
475. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 118–19 (indicating that the
Duke of York’s motivation for the Dominion of New England was a reason for backing
away from the 1683 Charter of Liberties; within months of reaching throne, the Duke of
York authorized quo warranto proceedings against the charter colonies); BARNES, supra
note 427, at 29–30 (explaining that the Dominion was favored over several independent
royal colonies because of the expense of having separate royal officials in each colony); 3
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 378 (revocation of Massachusetts’s charter); id. at 381–82, 393,
395–400 (efforts to revoke Rhode Island and Connecticut charters); id. at 383 (royal commission for government of New England); id. at 387, 402–04 (complaints that the commission for New England did not contain assembly and thus abridged privileges of Englishmen).
476. For example, many charters gave permission to travel, discover lands, and form
colonies. See supra notes 259–60, 267 and accompanying text.
477. See generally CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION 1603–1714 (1961)
(providing an account of how the years between 1603 and 1714 shaped modern English so-
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A. Monopolies and the Liberty of the Subject
Royal privileges and immunities to merchants and entities historically
included an element of exclusivity. One of the main benefits of membership to the gild or regulated company was its monopolistic trading privileges.478 Many merchant associations enjoyed monopoly privileges, and the
latter part of the sixteenth century saw a variety of royal monopolies. Toward the end of Queen Elizabeth’s reign, representatives in Parliament invoked the right to free trade and free use of labor against the crown’s monopolies and its prerogative.479 In 1602, one subject affected by a
monopoly on playing cards questioned the validity of the royal patent, a
dispute which resulted in the famous Case of Monopolies.480 The court
ruled against the crown’s patent.481

ciety). Seventeenth-century grievances focused on the king’s arbitrary taxation and the royal prerogative generally. J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 58, 60–61, 70, 80–86 (1955) (discussing the rise of the House of Commons against
the king in the first half of the seventeenth century); STEPHEN D. WHITE, SIR EDWARD COKE
AND “THE GRIEVANCES OF THE COMMONWEALTH,” 1621–1628, at 27–274 (1979) (describing
the parliamentary career of Sir Edward Coke and the common grievances of the commonwealth voiced during the first half of the seventeenth century); see also infra notes 479–83
and accompanying text (free subjects and liberty of Englishmen in debates on crown’s monopolies).
Seventeenth-century advocacy was replete with references to ancient statutes, such
as the Magna Carta, but contained little discussion or concern for the ancient context of
those statutes. 1 J.W. ALLEN, ENGLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT 1603–1660, at 28–29 (1938);
GOUGH, supra, at 66; HULSEBOSCH, supra note 461, at 28–35 (describing the rise of “fundamental law” in the first half of the seventeenth century); 3 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 11–
12 (noting colonists’ reliance on birthright privileges of Englishmen which were supposedly
secured by the Magna Carta, common law, and several fundamental statutes); POCOCK, supra note 292, at 47–48 (discussing use of ancient statutes out of context); see also infra note
503 (identifying several fundamental ancient statutes).
478. See supra notes 164–65, 175, 233, 262 and accompanying text.
479. THEODORE K. RABB, JACOBEAN GENTLEMAN: SIR EDWIN SANDYS 1561–1629, at 89–
96, 236–40 (1998) (discussing the Magna Carta, free trade, property, and free use of labor in
Commons debates against monopolies); 1 SCOTT, supra note 164, at 119–24 (commenting
on legislation initiated by merchants advocating for free trade); Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1329–32 (2005)
(noting that Queen Elizabeth acquiesced to criticisms by revoking some of her monopolies).
Similar to the reaction to mortmain legislation, see sources cited supra note 220, merchants
sought incorporation in the seventeenth century to avoid emerging restrictions on royal monopolies. UNWIN, supra note 198, at 301–03, 317–19 (noting that parliamentary legislation
regulating royal monopolies contained exemptions for certain corporations).
480. Darcy v. Allen, (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.); 11 Co. Rep. 84b; see also Nachbar, supra note 479, at 1328 (analyzing the case).
481. Nachbar, supra note 479, at 1327.
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An outcome of the litigation and debates on monopolies was the plea
for the “liberty of the subject.”482 Sir Edwin Sandys, an early figure in
American history and an opponent of monopolies, especially charter privileges to large trading companies, argued in 1604 that
All free Subjects are born inheritable, as to their Land, so also to the free
Exercise of their Industry, in those Trades whereto they apply themselves,
and whereby they are to live. Merchandize being the chief and richest of all
other, and of greater Extent and Importance than all the rest, it is against the
natural Right; and Liberty of the Subjects of England to restrain it into the
Hands of some few, as now it is; for although there may be now some Five
or Six Thousand Persons, counting Children and Prentices, free of the several Companies of the Merchants, in the whole; yet apparent it is, that the
Governors of these Companies, by their monopolizing Orders, have so
handled the Matter, as that the Mass of the whole Trade of all the Realm is
in the Hands of some Two Hundred Persons at the most, the rest serving for
483
a Shew only, and reaping small Benefit.

Once such a grand concept of “liberty of subject” was introduced, advocates in Parliament, echoed by pamphleteers throughout the colonial period, carried the “Englishmen” torch far and wide to serve various needs.
Advocacy was initially directed against royal privileges, though it became
more general by the parliamentary debates over the Petition of Right.484
These grievances came together in Leveller writings of the 1640s.485 In

482. Darcy, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1262–63 (describing the monopoly as “against the common
law, and the benefit and liberty of the subject”); Nachbar, supra note 479, at 1333–36 (analyzing Coke’s report on Darcy). Lipson cited the 1497 merchant adventurer statute, 12 Hen.
7 c. 6, as the first instance of merchants claiming “Englishmen’s liberty.” 1 LIPSON, supra
note 71, at 575; see also CARUS-WILSON, supra note 228, at 172–75; supra note 246 and
accompanying text.
483. 1 H.C. JOURN. (1604) 214–15 (U.K.), available at http://www.britishhistory.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=8252#sec3293; see also RABB, supra note 479, at 93–94.
484. WHITE, supra note 477 at 219–74 (explaining that, by the late 1620s, the Commons’
view on liberty and rights of subjects had expanded beyond monopolies to include arbitrary
acts by the crown, imprisonments without cause, forced loans, and martial law); see also
FRANCES HELEN RELF, THE PETITION OF RIGHT 19, 27–29 (1917) (describing the debates
leading up to the Petition of Right).
485. Early Leveller writings include, e.g., JOHN LILBURNE, ENGLAND’S BIRTH RIGHT
JUSTIFIED (1645); JOHN LILBURNE, LONDON’S LIBERTY IN CHAINS DISCOVERED (1646); JOHN
LILBURNE, FOUNDATIONS OF FREEDOM; OR AN AGREEMENT OF THE PEOPLE: PROPOSED AS A
RULE FOR FUTURE GOVERNMENT IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FIRM AND LASTING PEACE
(1647). For background on the Leveller writings, see Rachel Foxley, John Lilburne and the
Citizenship of ‘Free-Born Englishmen,’ 47 HIST. J. 849, 853, 856–861 (2004) and DON M.
WOLFE, LEVELLER MANIFESTOES OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION (1944). The House of
Commons provided additional support for claims invoking the privileges, rights, and liberties of Englishmen during its advocacy concerning monopolies, the privileges of Parliament,
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opposition to royal, parliamentary, or monopolistic forces, Leveller writings of the mid-seventeenth century championed the birthright liberties,
privileges, and immunities of the freeborn Englishmen.486
B. Englishmen in the Colonies
Across the Atlantic, pleas for the “privileges and immunities of Englishmen” were of great importance to colonists and colonial governance.
As noted above, colonial charters to explorers and colonists contained a
denization clause preserving English citizenship, removing alienage disabilities, and granting colonists the privileges and immunities of Englishmen
as if they were born in England.487 With the language of colonial charters,
reinforced by parliamentary advocacy and popular pamphlets, pleas for the
liberties, privileges, and immunities of Englishmen became a part of the
lexicon of the American colonist. A few years after Baltimore’s 1632 charter, Maryland’s assembly proposed “[a]n Act for the Liberties of the People”:
Be it Enacted By the Lord Proprietarie of this Province of and with the ad-

and the Petition of Right. KAMMEN, DEPUTYES & LIBERTYES, supra note 341, at 71–85; see
supra note 484.
486. Leveller advocacy for greater coverage of ancient charter privileges and immunities, such as London’s, might have contributed to the absorption of privileges and immunities language associated with the rights of freeborn Englishmen. See, e.g., LILBURNE,
LONDON’S LIBERTY IN CHAINS DISCOVERED, supra note 485 (relying on London’s ancient
charter privileges and immunities to support free elections and greater participation in London’s government).
Part II discussed a variety of borough franchises, privileges, and immunities from
crown to recipient. While other individuals and entities also received privileges, the privileges and liberties of major towns, especially London, became not only a benchmark for
other towns but also a standard for the privileges and liberties of the common subject.
The larger communities, the city and the nation, began to assert their rights
over the partial interests of family or trade or class, and to demand that these
should cast off the devices of feudal faction and subordinate their differences to
the rule of a common authority.
In this object the city, as was natural, succeeded in advance of the nation. The
struggle of factions in London was a kind of rehearsal on a small scale of that
larger conflict in which the feudal privileges of the nobility were to batter themselves to pieces on the fields of Towton and Bosworth.
UNWIN, supra note 198, at 155–56; see also NORTON, supra note 33, at 51 (explaining that
burgage tenure and mercantile liberties helped free towns and noting that once boroughs
participated in Parliament, burghal liberty eventually spread similar liberties throughout
whole nation); id. at 52–53, 66–69 (remarking that liberties of London were sacred and that
London and the crown had symbiotic relationship).
487. See supra Parts III.B, III.C (describing the charters to Warde and Gilbert).
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vice and approbation of the freemen of the same that all the Inhabitants of
this Province being Christians (Slaves excepted[)] Shall have and enjoy all
such rights liberties immunities priviledges and free customs within this
Province as any naturall born subjects of England hath or ought to have or
enjoy in the realm of England by force or vertue of the common law or
State Law of England (saveing in such Cases as the same are or may be al488
tered or changed by the Laws and ordinances of this Province).

Not long after Maryland’s legislation, in 1646, Dr. Robert Child and
fellow petitioners challenged Massachusetts’s political restrictions that limited freemanship to church members.489 Child argued that Massachusetts
failed to settle according to the laws of England and that colonists were denied the liberties of freeborn Englishmen.490 Child, as memorialized by his
brother, claimed there must be a “comfortable enjoyment of our Lives, Liberties and Estates, according to our due Naturall rights, as Free-born subjects of the English nation.”491
Several additional examples fill colonial record books. Following the
English Civil War, loyal Virginians surrendering to the commissioners of
the Commonwealth of England claimed the rights of freeborn Englishmen,
including freedom from taxation without consent and the right to the same
privileges as enjoyed in other colonies.492 After the Restoration, colonists

488. An Act for the Liberties of the People (1638), in 1 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND,
PROCEEDINGS AND ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND, JANUARY 1637/8SEPTEMBER 1664, at 41 (William Hand Browne ed., Baltimore, Maryland Historical Society
1883); see also 2 JOHN LEEDS BOZMAN, HISTORY OF MARYLAND 115 (Baltimore, James Lucas & E.K. Deaver 1837) (discussing the Act); David S. Bogen, The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 794, 804–05, n.35 (1987).
489. 1 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 489–91 (discussing Child’s petition and noting that it helped liberalize restrictions on non-freemen); GEORGE L. KITTREDGE,
DOCTOR ROBERT CHILD THE REMONSTRANT 1–146 (1919) (providing a detailed discussion
of Dr. Robert Child’s life from birth to death).
490. See generally JOHN CHILDE, NEW ENGLAND’S JONAS CAST UP AT ENGLAND (Boston,
Wm. Parsons Lunt 1647) (providing a description of Dr. Child’s petition).
491. Id. at 9; 1 OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 257–63 (providing an account of Dr. Robert
Child’s petition). Dr. Child’s actions and remonstrance may have been influenced by
Coke’s publications, Leveller pamphlets, or the not-too-distant debates concerning the Petition of Right. See supra notes 479–85.
492. 1 WILLIAM W. HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE 363–65 (Richmond, Geo. Cochran
1823) (including Virginia’s articles of capitulation). In these articles, Virginians made the
following claims: their surrender was voluntary and not a conquest; they should enjoy the
privileges and freedoms of the people that belong to England; their land tenure system
should be retained; they should suffer no taxation without the assembly’s consent; they
should have equivalent commercial rights toward foreign nations as other English-born subjects; and generally, that they should enjoy the same privileges enjoyed in other jurisdictions. Id.; 1 DOYLE, supra note 272, at 221–24; cf. GREENE, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra
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in Maryland’s lower house, seeking to curb Baltimore’s veto power and arbitrary taxation, grieved unsuccessfully in the “publick grievances of 1669”
for the privileges of Englishmen.493 Toward the end of the seventeenth
century, colonists in New York, having been treated less favorably than
other colonists in neighboring colonies or Englishmen generally and having
been promised such privileges, fought with the Duke of York for full assembly rights.494 After briefly receiving such rights, subsequent loss of the
local assembly in New York and other colonies forming the Dominion of
New England likewise evoked claims of violations of Englishmen’s
rights.495 Similar efforts were employed by colonists in Carolina at the turn
of the eighteenth century.496 By the end of the seventeenth century, advocacy for colonial self-government and participation in taxation, long considered privileges of Englishmen, was commonplace.497

note 397, at 70–72 (discussing the rights and liberties demanded by Virginians after the Glorious Revolution).
In the latter half of the seventeenth century, following struggles with Northern Neck
proprietors and suffering English taxation, Virginians wanted a charter to incorporate and
protect their rights—in particular, protection from taxation without consent. LOVEJOY, supra note 421, at 35–40. Under the proposal, no taxes would be raised except by the common consent of the governor, council, and burgesses. Id. at 38. Virginians claimed taxation
by consent was a privilege of Englishmen and had been the custom of the colony for fifty
years. Id. at 39, 78; 1 DOYLE, supra note 272, at 218–19 (describing the principle of participation in taxation as a “colonial liberty”).
493. LOVEJOY, supra note 421, at 74–78.
494. The Duke, to appease colonists, allowed an assembly and assured colonists that they
would receive privileges and immunities equal to those of settlers in other colonies. See supra notes 408–29 and accompanying text.
495. BARNES, supra note 427, at 50, 87–90 (noting claim that taxation without representation violated the rights of Englishmen and specifying ancient statutes securing such
rights); CRAVEN, COLONIES IN TRANSITION, supra note 402, at 219–20 (colonists challenged
the Dominion’s authority over taxation, among other issues); LOVEJOY, supra note 421, at
180–86 (taxation without representation in Dominion violated rights of Englishmen); 3
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 387, 393, 402–04; see also supra note 475 (describing the Dominion of New England’s formation).
496. 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 235 & n.2 (deputies of assembly
fought for the rights and liberties of Englishmen).
497. See generally HENRY CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES OR THE FREE-BORN SUBJECT’S
INHERITANCE (John Carter 1774) (1680) (citing the Magna Carta, the Habeas Corpus Act,
other important statutes, and the powers of Parliament); WILLIAM PENN, THE EXCELLENT
PRIVILEDGE OF LIBERTY & PROPERTY BEING THE BIRTH-RIGHT OF FREE-BORN SUBJECTS OF
ENGLAND (n.p. 1687) (discussing the Magna Carta, the Confirmation of the Charters of Liberties of England, De Tallagio Non Concedendo, the patent granted by the King to William
Penn, and the Charter of Liberties granted by William Penn to the freemen and inhabitants
of Pennsylvania); see also supra notes 487–96. For additional reading, consult the materials

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss1/3

88

BURRELL.DOCX

1/9/12 12:00 PM

Burrell: A Story of Privileges and Immunities: From Medieval Concept to th

2011]

A STORY OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

95

Legal import aside, colonists’ pleas for the “privileges and immunities
of English subjects” had the political effect of leveraging desirable aspects
of English law in force in England or soliciting the rights of freer neighboring colonies.498 In this sense, use of the language functioned like the “liber
burgus,” “liberum burgagium,” and charter-association language of the
twelfth- and thirteenth-century borough charter, converging boroughs to the
freedoms of a free or common mother town.499 The goal of the mesne borough was to gain borough status, a court, burgage tenure, or otherwise free
itself of a lord and obtain the liberties of a free borough. The objective of
American colonists was to obtain or protect its assembly and associated
privileges copied from the House of Commons, typically from a proprietor
but also, to a lesser degree, from the crown.500 Arbitrary taxation by the
crown and feudal authorities was a grievance throughout both periods and,
when joined by parliamentary taxation in the eighteenth century, ultimately
contributed to the American Revolution.501
C. American Revolution
As the discussion above demonstrates, the patriots of the American
Revolution inherited privileges and immunities language from various
sources, and when they felt they were denied rights enjoyed by neighbors
or fellow Englishmen, the claim for equal privileges and immunities was a

cited in 3 ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD, supra note 228, at 304–05 & n.3 (listing pamphlets
and treatises discussing the rights of Englishmen).
498. GREENE, PROVINCIAL AMERICA, supra note 397, at 67–77, 80 (noting that especially
after Glorious Revolution, colonial assemblies were identifying events in England to claim
benefits of Englishmen); see also supra notes 487–97 (explaining that colonists, especially
those under proprietorships, leveraged “privileges and immunities” of others for gain). For
a discussion on English law in the colonies, see supra notes 461, 466.
499. See supra Part II.D (discussing borough charters and association with mother towns
and free boroughs); supra notes 143–50 (references to common mother towns with desired
liberties, typically royal towns); supra notes 223–24 (describing the liberating influence of
gild and collective forces in medieval municipality).
500. See supra note 431 (discussing parliamentary privileges and participation in taxation and legislation).
501. See supra note 69 (Parliament’s taxation of palatinate without approval of bishop’s
assembly); supra note 206 (greater borough community fought for participation in borough
assessments); supra note 382 (taxation by select body of assistants in Massachusetts
prompted change in which freemen elected deputies to attend General Court); supra notes
419–29 (New York colonists, taxed without representation, fought for consent in taxation);
supra note 492 (Virginians and taxation); infra note 506 (English taxation of colonies and
American Revolution).
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natural response.502 Grieved colonists often argued that such language
meant that they too enjoyed the benefit of binding English common and
statutory law such as the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, and other fundamental statutes securing, for example, trial by jury and taxation by consent or representation.503
The various strands of privileges and immunities language (charter
privileges and immunities, denization or membership privileges and immunities, and birthright privileges and immunities of freeborn Englishmen)
came together briefly in the pre-Revolution grievances of the colonies.504
502. See, e.g., RICHARD BLAND, THE COLONEL DISMOUNTED (1764), reprinted in 1
PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750–1776, at 301, 320–21 (Bernard Bailyn ed.,
1965) (arguing that colonists, born free, were entitled to all the “liberties and privileges of
English subjects,” including the right to be free of legislation by English Parliament reaching into the internal governance of the colonies); THOMAS FITCH, REASONS WHY THE
BRITISH COLONIES, IN AMERICA, SHOULD NOT BE CHARGED WITH INTERNAL TAXES (1764),
reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra, at 386–407 (liberty and
privilege of being taxed only with consent; birthright to enjoy English law; colonists have
“the same general and essential privileges of the British constitution” (quotation at 388)).
503. GOUGH, supra note 477, at 61–63 (1628 House committee finding liberty of subject
safeguarded by the Magna Carta and several fundamental statutes in force in England); 3
OSGOOD, supra note 68, at 11–12 (noting colonists’ reliance on birthright privileges of Englishmen secured by the Magna Carta, common law, and several fundamental statutes); see
also supra note 477 and accompanying text (rise of fundamental law in early seventeenth
century); supra notes 488–502 and accompanying text (colonial use of birthright privileges);
infra notes 504–09 and accompanying text (grievances of American Revolution).
504. See October 14, 1774 Declarations and Resolves, in 1 JOURNALS, supra note 14, at
63–73. Similar privileges and immunities language can be found in colonists’ responses to
the Stamp Act:
That His Majesty’s Liege Subjects in these Colonies, are entitled to all the inherent Rights and Liberties of his Natural born Subjects, within the Kingdom of
Great-Britain. . . . That it is inseparably essential to the Freedom of a People, and
the undoubted Right of Englishmen, that no Taxes be imposed on them, but with
their own Consent, given personally, or by their Representatives. . . . That the
People of these Colonies are not, and from their local Circumstances cannot be,
Represented in the House of Commons in Great-Britain. . . . That the only Representatives of the People of these Colonies, are Persons chosen therein by themselves, and that no Taxes ever have been, or can be Constitutionally imposed on
them, but by their respective Legislature.
Resolutions of the Stamp Act, Cont. Cong., (October 7–24, 1765), at paras. II–V, reprinted
in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT CRISIS, 1764–
1766, at 62–63 (Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1959) [hereinafter PROLOGUE]. Likewise, the Virginia colonists stated
[t]hat the first Adventurers and Settlers of . . . Virginia brought with them . . . all
the Liberties, Privileges, Franchises, and Immunities, that have at any Time been
held, enjoyed, and possessed, by the people of Great Britain. . . . That by two royal Charters, granted by King James the First, the Colonists . . . are . . . entitled to
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Just prior to Independence, in one of the colonists’ formal grievances, the
October 14, 1774 Declaration and Resolves, members of the Continental
Congress described the controversies facing the colonists.505 Taxation
without representation or consent, this time by Parliament, was one of the
foremost complaints and directly or indirectly pervaded most of the colonists’ grievances.506 In Resolution 2 of the Declarations and Resolves, colonists urged that “our ancestors, who first settled these colonies, were at the
time of their emigration from the mother country, entitled to all the rights,
liberties, and immunities of free and natural-born subjects, within the realm
of England.”507 Resolution 3 followed with a declaration indicating that
subjects did not lose these rights by emigrating from England to the colonies but that they “and their descendants now are . . . entitled to the exercise and enjoyment of all such of them, as their local and other circumstances enable them to exercise and enjoy.”508 Subsequent resolutions
specifically claimed the benefit of English common and statutory law. After declaring the general benefit of English law as modified by local circumstances, colonists grieved in Resolution 7 that they were “likewise entitled to all the immunities and privileges granted and confirmed to them by
royal charters, or secured by their several codes of provincial laws.”509

all Liberties, Privileges, and Immunities of Denizens and natural Subjects, to all
Intents and Purposes, as if they had been abiding and born within the Realm of
England. . . . That his Majesty’s liege People . . . have . . . enjoyed the inestimable
Right of being governed by such Laws, respecting their internal Polity and Taxation, as are derived from their own Consent, with the Approbation of their Sovereign . . . .
Virginia Resolves of May 1765, reprinted in PROLOGUE, supra, at 47–48. Pennsylvania also
responded to the Stamp Act by stating
[t]hat the inhabitants of the Province are entitled to all the Liberties, Rights and
Privileges of his Majesty’s Subjects in Great-Britain, or elsewhere, and that the
Constitution of Government in this Province is founded on the natural Rights of
Mankind, and the noble Principles of English Liberty, and therefore is, or ought to
be, perfectly free. . . . That it is the inherent Birth-right, and indubitable Privilege,
of every British Subject, to be taxed only by his own Consent, or that of his legal
Representatives, in Conjunction with his Majesty, or his Substitutes.
Resolves of the Pennsylvania Assembly on the Stamp Act, September 21, 1765, reprinted in
PROLOGUE, supra, at 51.
505. See October 14, 1774 Declarations and Resolves, in 1 JOURNALS, supra note 14, at
63–73.
506. See id. at 63–64, 68–69.
507. Id. at 68 (Resolution 2).
508. Id. (Resolution 3).
509. Id. at 69 (Resolution 7). Additional complaints included admiralty courts, lack of
trial by jury, dependent judges, quartering troops, suspending assemblies, ignoring petitions
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Colonial grievances were ultimately unsuccessful, and in 1776, the
American colonies declared Independence and entered into war with England.
D. Privileges and Immunities Language in the Articles of Confederation
and Article IV of the U.S. Constitution
After declaring Independence, the former colonies no longer needed to
reference the privileges and immunities of freeborn English subjects.510
States were in the process of adopting their own constitutions, and they
confederated under the Articles of Confederation to enjoy a harmonious relationship amongst themselves.511 Citizenship concerns—especially concerning intercolonial discriminations in trade, travel, and commerce—
remained an important issue, and a residue of privileges and immunities
language ultimately made it into the text of the Articles of Confederation
and the U.S. Constitution.512
Prior to Independence, colonists depended upon the benefits of English citizenship, and the former colonies struggled to fill the void left by
this parental relationship in post-Independence governance. Anticipating
interstate conflict, the July 12, 1776 draft of the Articles of Confederation
provided:
Art VI. The Inhabitants of each Colony shall henceforth always have the
same Rights, Liberties, Privileges, Immunities and Advantages, in the other
Colonies, which the said Inhabitants now have, in all Cases whatever, except in those provided for by the next following Article.
Art VII. The Inhabitants of each Colony shall enjoy all the Rights, Liberties, Privileges, Immunities, and Advantages, in Trade, Navigation, and
Commerce, in any other Colony, and in going to and from the same[,] from
and to any Part of the World, which the Natives of such Colony or any
from local assemblies, trying colonists in England, closing the port of Boston, standing armies, and the right to assemble and petition the king. Id. at 63–73.
510. Indeed, Chalmers points out this would have been hypocritical. 2 CHALMERS, supra
note 461, at 412 (noting that Americans who had renounced their English citizenship could
not argue for the privileges and immunities of Englishmen); see also KETTNER, supra note
275, at 183–209 (indicating that questions of allegiance remained despite separation).
511. For the colonies’ state constitutions adopted in 1776 or shortly thereafter, see the
state’s listing in 1 THORPE, supra note 259, at iii–xiv (including Delaware (1776), Maryland
(1776), Massachusetts (1780), New Hampshire (1776), New Jersey (1776), North Carolina
(1776), Pennsylvania (1776), South Carolina (1776), Virginia (1776), Georgia (1777), New
York (1777) and Vermont 1777)). See also May 10, 1776 Declarations and Resolves, in 4
JOURNALS, supra note 14, at 341–42 (John Adam’s proposal for states to form their own
governments).
512. See infra notes 523, 527.
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Commercial Society, established by its Authority shall enjoy.
Art VIII. Each Colony may assess or lay such Imposts or Duties as it thinks
proper, on Importations or Exportations, provided such Imposts or Duties
do not interfere with any Stipulations in Treaties hereafter entered into by
the United States assembled, with the King or Kingdom of Great Britain, or
513
any foreign Prince or State.

Reviewing the proposed language, one sees a division between the
more general sixth and the more specific seventh and eighth articles. The
fact that the proposed sixth article links the seventh with “said Inhabitants
now have . . . except in those provided for by the next following Article”
suggests that the sixth article was a broad declaration of principle for the
status quo except for the more specific concerns addressed in the next articles. The sixth article, proposed within days of Independence, seems to be
an effort to replace or convert the claim to the status of natural-born Englishmen, prominent in the years leading up to the Revolution, into an Article of governance for the Confederation.514 Before Independence, Englishmen status served various functions in the colonies.515 Drafters did not
want fellow colonists to be aliens in the other colonies. In other words, as a
starting point, colonists, post-Independence, retained all the rights, liberties,
privileges, immunities, and advantages of natural-born Englishmen in the
other colonies without the natural-born Englishmen language.516 As a dec-

513. July 12, 1776 Declarations and Resolves, in 5 JOURNALS, supra note 14, at 546–48
(strikethrough in original), see also Bogen, supra note 488, at 817–22 (discussing the proposed articles). In its July 1776 Plan of Treaties with Louis the Sixteenth, the Continental
Congress discussed similar anti-discrimination concepts:
Art. I: The Subjects of the most Christian King shall pay no other Duties or Imposts in the Ports, Havens, Roads, Countries, Islands, Cities, or Towns of the said
united States, or any of them, than the Natives thereof, or any Commercial Companies established by them or any of them, shall pay, but shall enjoy all other the
Rights, Liberties, Priviledges, Immunities, and Exemptions in Trade, Navigation
and Commerce in passing from one Part thereof to another, and in going to and
from the same, from and to any Part of the World, which the said Natives or
Companies enjoy.
July 18, 1776 Declarations and Resolves, in 5 JOURNALS, supra note 14, at 576–77, 768.
514. See supra notes 504–09 and accompanying text.
515. KETTNER, supra note 275, at 69, 91–93, 117–21 (noting that those traveling to the
colonies sought English naturalization beforehand to avoid restrictions in trade, travel, and
land ownership in colonies); id. at 74–75 (discussing Parliament’s 1740 act naturalizing aliens residing in colonies); id. at 93–96 (emphasizing that status as an Englishmen was important to avoid disabilities under navigation acts and that colonial naturalization was not a
substitute for Englishmen status); id. at 98–99 (observing that colonial naturals under local
naturalization acts without English citizenship faced the threat of forfeiture).
516. For example, the Continental Congress stated

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2011

93

BURRELL.DOCX

1/9/12 12:00 PM

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3

100

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:7

laration of principle, the proposed sixth article led to the real object: prevention of local restrictions and discriminations in trade, navigation, and
commerce. The proposed seventh and eighth articles addressed the substance of the drafters’ initial interstate concerns and replaced English regulations by placing inhabitants of each colony or state on the same basis as
natives with respect to rights in trade, navigation, and commerce.
Both the proposed sixth and seventh articles were omitted from the second draft.517 On November 11, 1777, the committee formed to consider
new articles reintroduced both the general and substantive antidiscrimination privileges and immunities language.518 In the reintroduction, the more general clause (albeit with residency language) again introduced the more specific clauses. For the general sentence, drafters even
throw in “natural born free citizens” as further evidence confirming its replacement of the former “natural-born” or “freeborn” Englishmen concept.519 Following the general statement, the rest of the proposed third
draft, like the proposed seventh and eighth articles of the first draft, addressed substantive restrictions concerning anticipated discriminations in
travel, imposts, and duties:
And for the more certain preservation of friendship and mutual intercourse
between the people of the different States in this Union, the Citizens of every State, going to reside in another State, Shall be entitled to all the rights
and privileges of the natural born free Citizens of the State to which they go
to reside; and the people of each State Shall have free egress and regress for
their persons and property to and from every other State, without hinderance, molestation or imposition of any kind. Provided, that if Merchandize
of any sort be imported for purposes of traffick within any State, that the
person So importing Shall be liable to the Same imposts and duties as the
people of the State are by law liable to where Such importations are made,
and none other. And provided also that the benefit of this Article Shall ex-

(2) That our ancestors, who first settled these colonies, were at the time of their
emigration from the mother country, entitled to all the rights, liberties, and immunities of free and natural-born subjects, within the realm of England . . . .
(3) That by such emigration they by no means forfeited, surrendered, or lost any
of those rights, but that they were, and their descendants now are, entitled to the
exercise and enjoyment of all such of them, as their local and other circumstances
enable them to exercise and enjoy.
October 14, 1774 Declarations and Resolves, in 1 JOURNALS, supra note 14, at 68; see also
supra note 504 and accompanying text.
517. See August 20, 1776 Declarations and Resolves, in 5 JOURNALS, supra note 14, at
672, 676.
518. See November 11, 1777 Declarations and Resolves, in 9 JOURNALS, supra note 14,
at 885, 888.
519. Id.
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tend to the property of the United States, and of any particular State, in the
520
Same manner as to the property of an Individual in any State.

The edits to this draft produced a version similar to the final version:
And the better to secure and perpetuate mutual Friendship and Intercourse
between the People of the different States in this Union, Agreed “that, The
free Inhabitants of each of these States, Paupers Vagabonds and fugitives
excepted, shall be entitled to all Priviledges and Immunities of free Citizens
in all and every of said the respective States (saveing to the Inhabitants of
the respective States the Admission of their own Inhabitants and the Sole
Management of their own municipal Affairs). And the People of each
States, shall have free Ingress and Egress for their Persons and Property to
and from every other State, to trade and traffick, without any Hindrance or
Imposition of any Kind whatsoever, provided that if any Merchandise or
Commodity be imported into any State for the purpose of Traffick therein,
the Person so importing shall be liable to the same Imposts and Duties as
the People of the State are by Law liable to where such Importations are
made and none other, provided also that the Benefit of this Article shall Extend to the property of the United States and of any particular State in the
521
same Manner as to the property of an Individual.

In this intermediate draft, drafters retained the general-specific dichotomy and removed the residency language. The next draft adds back the
residency language but retains the general-specific division.522 Making ad-

520. Id. (footnotes omitted). The contemplated use of “natural born free citizens” and
proposals for the same import customs as natives pay suggest that the drafters were consulting denization charters and naturalization acts which typically removed alien customs for
covered parties importing merchandize into a state. See supra note 285 and accompanying
text.
521. November 11, 1777 Declarations and Resolves, in 9 JOURNALS, supra note 14, at
888 (strikethrough in original) (footnotes omitted).
522. The proposed revisions read:
And the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse between
the people of the different States in this Union, the Inhabitants of every State[,]
Paupers Vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted[,] going to reside in another State shall be entitled to all the rights and priviledges of the natural born free
Citizens of the State to which they go to reside: And the people of each State
shall have free Ingress and Egress for their persons and property to and from every
other state without hinderance, or imposition of any kind, Provided that if Merchandise be imported into any State for purpose of traffick therein, the person so
importing shall be liable to the same imposts and duties as the people of the State
are by law liable to where such importations are made, and none other, And provided also that the benefit of this article shall extend to the property of the United
States, and of any particular State, in the same manner as to the property of an Individual.
Id. at 889 (footnotes omitted).
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ditional revisions, the final draft of Article IV of the Articles of Confederation provided:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse
among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants
of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in
the several States; and the people of each State shall free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges
of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State, to any other State, of which the owner is an
inhabitant; provided also, that no imposition, duties or restriction shall be
523
laid by any State, on the property of the United States, or either of them.

Tracing the progress from earlier drafts to the final draft, one sees the
drafters struggling with awkward language prohibiting interstate discriminations in trade and commerce as the former colonies replaced the role of
English citizenship and English trade restrictions in the confederated colonies.524 The final draft of Article IV of the Articles maintained the specific
attributes with respect to non-discrimination in trade, commerce, duties,
and imposts but also contained general language securing free inhabitants
all the “privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States.”525
Government under the Articles suffered many defects. Within ten
years, the Framers met to forge the United States Constitution. Unlike the
Articles, the Constitution created a union of states with greater national
powers in raising revenue and regulating commerce among the states and
foreign entities.526 In the transformation from Article IV of the Articles to
the Constitution, the Framers retained only a variation of the broader language: “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”527 Other specific and sub523. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1.
524. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison) (noting potential embarrassing problems
with privileges and immunities language present in Article IV of Articles where a free inhabitant in their domiciled state can compel citizenship rights in the domicile state by receiving citizenship rights in another state, which the domicile state must recognize under
Article IV of the Articles).
525. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1.
526. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 30 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 42
(James Madison). Many other grievances of the American Revolution were addressed in the
text of the Constitution. See generally U.S. CONST. (taxation powers, naturalization, regulation of interstate commerce, habeas corpus, separation of powers, trial by jury, etc.).
527. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see also ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art.
IV, para. 1 (“[F]ree inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives
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stantive anti-discrimination concerns formerly found in Article IV of the
Articles were swept into the Constitution’s structural modifications as the
states granted Congress greater authority in regulating, among other national issues, interstate commerce.528 In this light, the residual language
may be viewed as serving a citizenship function nominally related to the
former “privileges and immunities of Englishmen” concept, leaving more
specific substantive concerns to the structural modifications of Article I of
the U.S. Constitution. This explains, perhaps, why the Framers adopted the
residual sentence with almost no debate while Article I’s provisions dealing
with interstate harmony and commerce received significant debate.529
The interpretation of the remaining language of Article IV of the Constitution, separated from its more specific attributes in Article I, has been
troubled.530 Attempting to reconcile the confusion, some commentators
and courts have argued that privileges and immunities language of Article
IV protects natural law.531 Others have argued that the language confers
specific rights such as the right to travel532 or fundamental law in genfrom justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the
several States.”).
528. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting congressional power to impose uniform
imposts and duties; to regulate commerce among the states; to provide uniform naturalization and bankruptcy laws; to enact necessary and proper laws); id. § 9 (prohibition on taxing
exports from states; prohibition against giving preferences to ports; prohibition on requiring
ships to land and pay duties in states); id. § 10 (prohibition on state taxation of imports and
exports beyond inspection fees unless approved by Congress; prohibition on tonnage duties
unless approved by Congress).
529. Compare, e.g., JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 394, 545 (A. Koch ed., 1966) (passage of Privileges and Immunities Clause with
almost no debate), with id. at 31, 43–45, 143–45, 302–05, 466–69, 498–508, 532–33, 543–
45, 547–52, 568–69 (significant debate over interstate concerns and general balance between federal and state powers when discussing enhanced congressional powers under proposed Constitution).
530. DAVID S. BOGEN, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 21–44 (2003) (discussing cases and interpretation of Article IV before enactment of Fourteenth Amendment).
531. See, e.g., Chester James Antieau, Paul’s Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 1, 5, 7–8
(1967) (emphasizing point that founders believed in natural rights as context for “true” interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Kenyon D. Bunch, The Original Understanding of the Privileges and Immunities Clause: Michael Perry’s Justification for Judicial Activism or Robert Bork’s Constitutional Inkblot?, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 321,
323–25, 342–49 (2000) (discussing different camps of scholarship on meaning of clause,
ranging from “all rights” to “fundamental rights”); see also Ward v. Maryland 79 U.S. (12
Wall.) 418, 430 (1871).
532. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501, 503 (1999) (finding a right to travel in
privileges and immunities language).
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eral.533
Particular questions on the meaning and intent of the privileges and
immunities language of Article IV of the Constitution remain unanswered.
But it is clear that the several structural changes expanding the role of the
national legislature and limiting the states, perhaps combined to some degree with the remaining privileges and immunities language, carved from
the states’ broad powers a national citizenship for citizens to enjoy the
Constitution and federal law regulating naturalization, taxation, interstate
commerce, and other national affairs.534
E. Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges and immunities language was also used in post-Civil War
documents.535 The Thirteenth Amendment ended slavery, but former
slaves lacked civil status. To grant citizenship rights to recently freed
slaves and negate the slave codes, the Reconstruction Congress adopted the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 (CRA).536 The CRA provided
533. See, e.g., Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No.
3,230) (describing privileges and immunities as “fundamental” and difficult to enumerate,
but which include protection by government and enjoyment of life, liberty, property, happiness, and safety subject to necessary governmental restraints); Douglass v. Stephens, 1 Del.
Ch. 465, 470–74 (1821) (holding clause includes all basic natural rights for welfare and
good required by person in society including right to contract, sue, and enjoy and defend
life, liberty, and property); Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 554 (Md. 1797) (opinion
of Chase, J.) (Judge Jeremiah T. Chase arguing “privileges and immunities” includes the
right to own and enjoy property as well as personal rights). Justice Stephen Field also
struggled with the language in a case arising under Article IV. Field described the clause as
guaranteeing freedom from alienage disabilities before going on to describe the clause as
prohibiting discriminatory legislation, securing equal protection, ensuring freedom to travel,
and protecting free enjoyment of property and pursuit of happiness in the other states. Paul
v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869). But see Antieau, supra note 531, at 22 (criticizing Field’s interpretation as too narrow and limited to laws of a reference state as opposed to natural law in general). See generally Richard L. Aynes, Ink Blot or Not: The
Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1295 (2009) (advocating
several categories of rights protected under privileges and immunities language)
534. See generally supra notes 511–33 and accompanying text.
535. For literature on antebellum use of privileges and immunities language, see Kurt T.
Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges and Immunities” as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241 (2010). For a discussion on citizenship language in documents concerning territories acquired after the Revolution, see generally Matthew J. Hegreness, An Organic Law Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: The
Northwest Ordinance as the Source of Rights, Privileges, and Immunities, 120 YALE L.J.
1820 (2011).
536. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 (2006)).
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[t]hat all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of
the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard
to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States,
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and
to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to
like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute,
537
ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary not withstanding.

Concerns over the constitutionality of the CRA motivated Congress to
include privileges or immunities language in Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment to constitutionalize the civil rights legislation.538 Section One
provides that
[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
539
the laws.

537. Id.
538. Thomas H. Burrell, Justice Stephen Field’s Expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment: From the Safeguards of Federalism to a State of Judicial Hegemony, 43 GONZ. L.
REV. 77, 88–99 (2007) (citing legislative history supporting the position that the amendment
was intended to constitutionalize the civil rights bill).
539. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the amendment accents the Citizenship Clause the same way “citizenship rights” accents “citizenship”
in the phrase “newly freed slaves enjoyed citizenship and citizenship rights” under Reconstruction legislation. Comparing the CRA of 1866 and Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment side by side, the “privileges or immunities” language in Section One matches
“shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property” in the CRA. See supra note 537; infra note 544.
The same comparison can be made with the Equal Protection Clause and corresponding language in the CRA.
Earlier drafts of CRA language protected newly freed slaves from all discrimination
in civil rights and immunities. Sen. Trumbull, the principal author of the CRA, defined
“civil rights” in the early draft as “the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue and be
sued, and to give evidence, to inherit, purchase, sell, lease, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit to all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866) (statement of Sen.
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With the ratification of the amendment, former slaves, now citizens,
enjoyed the privileges and immunities of state and national citizenship.
Under Section Five of the amendment, Congress was authorized to enforce
citizenship rights through enforcement legislation.540
Citizenship language, whether enumerated in the CRA or referred to
generically in privileges and immunities language, followed a general
recognition theme from disability to membership status. Aspects of citizenship rights granted to former slaves in the CRA had strong similarities
to the English denization privileges granted to aliens541 and the incorporation rights granted to a community.542 The transition involved a move from
a non-recognized, disabled person or entity to a member or citizen privileged with rights to sue and be sued, as well as rights to buy, sell, inherit,
and enjoy property.
F. Judicial Interpretation versus Legislative Enforcement
When debating the language of the CRA or Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, some congressmen discussed earlier court precedents
interpreting privileges and immunities language of Article IV; others discussed broad definitions by commentators such as Sir William Blackstone.543 Many in the 39th Congress equated the privileges and immunities

Trumbull); id. at 476 (similar list of “fundamental” rights to define “rights of citizens”); see
also infra note 541 (noting strong similarity between CRA clause and denization language
removing alienage disabilities and granting rights to own property and to sue and be sued).
540. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
541. The clause from the CRA, as noted above, is remarkably similar to the specific alienage disabilities removed in denization and naturalization provisions. And for those charters that did not enumerate removed alienage disabilities, the citizenship grant might substitute generic privileges and immunities language for citizenship rights. Compare supra notes
273–85 (denization removed common alienage disabilities and allowed endenized to enjoy
franchises, liberties, and privileges as other Englishmen enjoy—to sue and be sued as other
lieges, and to buy, sell, hold, and enjoy land), with notes 306–11 (more generic language
securing denization status).
542. See supra Part II.G (observing that borough incorporation resulted in corporate
rights to sue and be sued, contract, buy and sell land, make bylaws, and elect leaders).
543. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (noting Article IV as source of “privileges and immunities” in early draft of amendment); id. at
1117–18 (statement of Rep. Wilson) (discussing, in reference to CRA, Article IV, Blackstone, and Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (describing “privileges and immunities” as fundamental and difficult to enumerate)); id. at
1122 (statement of Rep. Rogers) (citing Corfield in discussion of meaning of privileges and
immunities); id. at 2765 (statement of Sen. Howard) (discussing Corfield when introducing
final draft of amendment to Senate for vote); see also BOGEN, supra note 530, at 44–53. See
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language of Section One to corresponding language of the CRA.544
Given the absence of direct intent or instruction for judicial use of the
phrase, courts have struggled with its implementation. As a result, the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has remained dormant for much of its life.545 Following the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the scope of the Second Amendment’s Right to Bear Arms
in District of Columbia v. Heller,546 commentators have argued that courts
should judicially resuscitate the Privileges or Immunities Clause to incorporate the Second Amendment as a fundamental right protected against
state infringement.547 In light of the broader history of privileges and immunities discussed above, one questions the merit of substantive, selfexecuting constructions of the language. Such constructions of broad language essentially leave the judiciary free to “interpret” the privileges and
immunities of American citizens in lieu of express enforcement legislation.
Colonial history produced distinct but related sources of privileges and
immunities language: direct charter privileges and immunities, charter denization language, and reference language to leverage the perceived rights of
freeborn Englishmen. To the extent the latter two sources differ (though it
is unlikely colonists at the Revolution perceived such a distinction) most
colonial advocacy for fundamental law fell under the reference concept as
colonists sought to enjoy the benefits of several English statutes in the colonies.548 If these fundamental statutes are taken as representative of colonists’ claims, the underlying rights sought by colonists were mostly creations of the state, whether royal privileges and immunities or ancient
generally John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385 (1992).
544. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 575–77 (1871) (statement of Sen.
Trumbull) (emphasizing amendment’s first section was a “copy of the civil rights act”); see
also supra note 539 (noting structural similarities between CRA and Section One and comparing privileges and immunities language with CRA language protecting rights to sue, be
sued, contract, and enjoy property). Bingham frequently defined privileges and immunities
language and Section One by referring to the Bill of Rights. See infra note 556.
545. See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (interpreting Privileges or
Immunities Clause narrowly); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503 (1999) (discussing
Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section One).
546. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
547. See briefs cited supra note 1.
548. See supra notes 503–09 (advocates felt that the phrase “privileges and immunities
of Englishmen” meant several English laws applied in the colonies). Once Independence
became likely, colonists and pamphleteers may have substituted the “inalienable rights of
man” or elements of natural law in place of rights of Englishmen. See BAILYN, supra note
502, at 50–51 (commenting on pamphlets discussing natural, inalienable rights of man derived from common law decisions, statute law, and colonial charters).
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statutory law enacted or confirmed by Parliament.549 In either case, in
drafting the United States Constitution, the Framers replaced Parliament
and the crown and incorporated perceived fundamental law into the express
language of the written document itself.
After declaring independence from England, states crafted their own
constitutions to replace either the crown’s instructions or charter privileges
and immunities, whichever was applicable based on the form of the colony.550 As discussed above, the Articles of Confederation and Articles I and
IV of the Constitution solidified the relationship between broad state powers and emerging federal power. The relationship ultimately culminated in
a surrender of a segment of inherent state authority, that in which the individual states were not competent, to the federal government.551 With the
transformation, states retained autonomy within their respective spheres but
conceded enhanced federal power to regulate national concerns and interstate commerce among other things.
Reconstruction legislation and the three post-Civil War amendments
to the Constitution also addressed the balance of federal and state powers—
though this time over slavery and not commerce.552 As noted above, the
39th Congress proposed Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment in part
to constitutionalize the CRA. The final version included privileges and
immunities language based in large part on the language of Article IV.553
In the incorporation argument, advocates argue that privileges or immunities language of Section One protects fundamental law and that certain
protections in the Bill of Rights are fundamental and thus protected under
the Privileges or Immunities Clause itself.554 There are two main obstacles
to this argument. First, a majority of the Reconstruction congressmen, after
debates and revisions, supported a limited Fourteenth Amendment, and it is
not clear that a constitution-amending majority would have supported the
federal intrusion that incorporation might impose. Second, accepting arguendo the shared intent to protect some quantum of fundamental rights
549. Throughout most of the colonial period, the crown regulated colonial affairs
through charter privileges and immunities. Retaining English citizenship in the colonies did
not necessarily mean English law applied in the colonies. See supra note 461 (literature discussing effect of English law in colonies).
550. See supra note 511 (following Independence, states adopted their own constitutions).
551. See supra Part V.D.
552. See supra Part V.E (referring to adoption of civil rights legislation and Fourteenth
Amendment).
553. See supra note 543 (noting Article IV’s influence on Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
554. See briefs cited supra note 1.
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and the Bill of Rights, the debates do not indicate any support for judicial
enforcement of Section One outside of Section Five’s enforcement authority.
The 39th Congress, the body primarily responsible for the Reconstruction legislation at issue, generally supported reform but varied significantly
on the scope of reform and the extent that Congress would be permitted to
invade the states to achieve that reform.555 Following John Bingham, a Republican congressman from Ohio and the principal author of the language
ultimately becoming Section One, a handful of members of the 39th Congress advocated, to a greater or lesser degree, that the protections of the Bill
of Rights should be secured against state infringement.556 Initial drafts of
legislation called for congressional enforcement of life, liberty, and property and equal privileges and immunities.557 Revisions, however, scaled back
the scope of the amendment to give Congress a supervisory enforcement
role.558 Reconstruction congressmen generally supported some degree of
civil rights for newly freed slaves but fractured sharply over coverage of
political rights, for example, voting and jury service, and over social rights,
for example, interracial marriage and public desegregation.559
It is not necessary, however, to solve the exact degree and scope of the
39th Congress’s intentions for Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Even if one places the protection of the Bill of Rights within the intended
scope of Section One, there is little evidence that the 39th Congress intend-

555. See infra note 559.
556. Bingham introduced the amendment with the desire to protect the Bill of Rights
against state infringement. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034, 1089–92 (1866)
(statements of Rep. Bingham). Throughout the debates, Bingham maintained his aim to
protect the Bill of Rights against state infringement and was followed by others in that general goal. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Howard) (claiming several rights listed in Bill of Rights are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment). See generally Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, Part II: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO.
L.J. 329 (2011) (examining the legislative history of Section One).
557. Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29–56 (1955) (analyzing original language and revisions).
558. Id. The 39th Congress also made similar revisions to the CRA.
559. For example, Sen. Trumbull stated:
The bill is applicable exclusively to civil rights. It does not propose to regulate
the political rights of individuals; it has nothing to do with the right of suffrage, or
any other political right; but is simply intended to carry out a constitutional provision, and guaranty to every person of every color the same civil rights.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599–600 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull). See
generally Burrell, supra note 538, at 83–124 (discussing civil-political rights dichotomy in
39th Congress).
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ed for the judiciary to achieve this change absent congressional enforcement legislation. The legislative history of the amendment is replete with
references to congressional enforcement. The absence of any role for the
judiciary in implementing Section One is compelling.560
Bingham began his effort to secure passage of the amendment by discussing Congress’s power, the Supremacy Clause, and congressional enforcement.561 One of the earlier drafts of what would become Section One
proposed that
Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities
of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States
562
equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.

As noted above, the final provision provides
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws . . . .
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
563
provisions of this article.

The argument supporting judicial enforcement of Section One is that
by changing the language from the initial draft to the form “no State shall,”
drafters intended to create an absolute prohibition on the states, one the
courts could enforce outside of Section Five.564 In support of this theory,
commentators cite to debates recommending Bingham create an absolute
ban on discrimination against any class of citizens, one beyond congressional control. In February 1866, Giles Hotchkiss noted Bingham’s initial
draft was too conservative and suggested that protection should extend beyond the caprice of Congress.565 Hotchkiss was worried that a faction of
rebels and their northern sympathizers would gain control of future Congresses, undo legislative advances, and, by the amendment as initially pro-

560. See Burrell, supra note 538, at 101–05 (arguing Section One was not intended to be
self-executing).
561. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034, 1088–90 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Bingham).
562. Id. at 1034.
563. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
564. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
YALE L.J. 1193, 1218–19 (1992) (arguing in support of incorporation in part by the use of
“no State shall” language); Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights and the States: An Overview From One Perspective, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 14–15, 30–33 (2009).
565. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss).
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posed, establish uniform laws for life, liberty, and property. Hotchkiss
commented that Bingham’s initial draft language
provides that Congress may pass laws to enforce these rights. Why not
provide by an amendment to the Constitution that no State shall discriminate against any class of its citizens; and let that amendment stand as part
of the organic law of the land, subject only to be defeated by another con566
stitutional amendment . . . [?]

The language ultimately becoming Section One was in the form “no
State shall” and thus resembled Hotchkiss’s suggestion to remove congressional enforcement.567 But when viewing the amendment as a whole, the
final language discounts his general suggestion by retaining congressional
enforcement of the amendment. The final text and the clear balance of debates—including the shared understanding after the revisions—weigh
against such an absolutist interpretation and in favor of congressional enforcement of Section One.568 A better interpretation of the change in Bing-

566. Id.
567. Lash, Part II, supra note 556, at 396 (suggesting a connection between second draft
of amendment and Hotchkiss’s earlier prompting for an amendment beyond congressional
enforcement).
568. In the first draft, Bingham’s proposed language expressly advanced congressional
enforcement. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (statement of Rep. Bingham) (arguing that the amendment would “enable the whole people of every State, by congressional
enactment, to enforce obedience to these requirements”); id. at 1090 (statement of Rep.
Bingham) (arguing that, through the amendment, “Congress is . . . vested with power to hold
[the states] to answer before the bar of the national courts for the violation of their oaths and
of the rights of their fellow-men”). Rep. Woodbridge argued:
What is the object of the proposed amendment? It merely gives the power to
Congress to enact those laws which will give to a citizen of the United States the
natural rights which pertain to citizenship. It is intended to enable Congress by its
enactments when necessary to give to a citizen of the United States, in whatever
State he may be, those privileges and immunities which are guarantied to him under the Constitution of the United States. It is intended to enable Congress to give
to all citizens the inalienable rights of life and liberty . . . and property.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866); id. at 1094 (statement of Rep. Hale) (asking Bingham whether the proposed amendment conferred “upon Congress a general power
of legislation for the purpose of securing to all persons in the several States protection of
life, liberty, and property”—to which Bingham answered in the affirmative).
After the revision into the “no State shall” form, Bingham and others continued to
emphasize the role of congressional enforcement of Section One. CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (statement of Rep. Stevens) (“This amendment supplies that defect,
and allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States”); id. at 2542 (statement
of Rep. Bingham) (stating that the amendment will provide the power “by congressional
enactment . . . to protect by national law the privileges and immunities of all citizens”); id.
at 2765–66 (statement of Sen. Howard) (following an argument similar to Bingham’s); see
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ham’s second draft is an effort to address the 39th Congress’s concerns
over giving Congress plenary power to enact uniform laws in life, liberty,
and property. Drafters wanted this general power to remain with the states,
provided those states did not abuse their authority. Shortly after Bingham
introduced the initial language, Representative Hale challenged the draft in
the form “Congress shall” and expressed concern for states’ general civil
and criminal legislation.569 He stated:
What is the effect of the amendment which the committee on reconstruction propose[s] for the sanction of this House and the States of the Union?
I submit that it is in effect a provision under which all State legislation, in
its codes of civil and criminal jurisprudence and procedure, affecting the
individual citizen, may be overridden, may be repealed or abolished, and
the law of Congress established instead. I maintain that in this respect it is
an utter departure from every principle ever dreamed of by the men who
framed our Constitution. . . .
[I]t is a grant of the fullest and most ample power to Congress to make
all laws ‘necessary and proper to secure to all persons in the several States
570
protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property[.]’

Hale also objected to the effect of the amendment on non-rebellion states.
He continued
[I]f we confer upon the Federal Congress powers, in such vague and general language as this amendment contains, to legislate upon all matters pertaining to the life, liberty, and property of all the inhabitants of the several
States, I put it to the gentleman, whom I know sometimes at least to be disposed to criticise this habit of liberal construction, to state where he apprehends that Congress and the courts will stop in the powers they may arro571
gate to themselves under this proposed amendment.

Hale sympathized with the goals of Reconstruction legislation but felt the
proposed language was dangerous to existing federalism principles:
[T]here are other liberties as important as the liberties of the individual citizen, and those are the liberties and rights of the States. I believe that whatever most clearly distinguishes our Government from other Governments in
the extent of individual freedom and the protection of personal rights we
owe to our decentralized system, to the fact that the functions of governalso infra notes 575–84 and accompanying text (citing and quoting Bingham’s postratification understanding of congressional enforcement of Section One).
569. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hale) (commenting on an early version of amendment and states’ rights).
570. Id. (statement of Rep. Hale).
571. Id. at 1065 (statement of Rep. Hale). Hale went on to point out the breadth of the
courts’ interpretation of “necessary and proper” language found in both the Constitution and
the proposed draft.
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ment with which the citizen has immediate relation are brought home to
him, that he operates immediately upon them and they immediately upon
him, instead of there being that long chain of communication which in a
centralized government must extend from the fountain of power, whether
572
despotic or republican, whether executive or legislative, to the citizen.

While Hotchkiss proposed to remove the caprice of Congress, others
proposed to alter the amendment to conform to Hale’s criticisms above by
removing congressional power to legislate for life, liberty, and property in
the first instance and substituting supervisory congressional enforcement.573
Representative Delano summarized this suggestion as follows:
I said in the outset that I wanted to see the provisions of this bill adopted
or enforced upon the South, and it was with this thought before me that I
introduced, at an early day of the session, an amendment to the Constitution
requiring each State to provide for the security of life, liberty, and property,
and the rightful pursuit of happiness, and giving to Congress power to enforce these rights where the States withheld them. That, in my estimation,
is a better theory of proceeding on this subject than the one introduced by
my colleague, which proposes to vest that power in Congress at once; because I want Congress to exercise no more power over the local legislation
of the States than is absolutely necessary, and I would not allow it to go in
the first instance to secure these rights, but allow it to go only when the
States refuse to apply and give such security under the fundamental law of
the nation. . . .
[I]f we do anything upon this subject at all, we had better do it by taking
up the amendment to the Constitution offered by my colleague, [Mr. Bingham,] now postponed till April, modifying it in the form I have suggested,
and making it the fundamental law, and then proceeding to secure the rights
of these persons in a way in which we shall not be trampling down or en574
dangering the fundament law of the land.

The final draft follows a form in line with Delano’s suggestion.
After the Fourteenth Amendment’s passage, Bingham concurred with
those who felt Section One protected the Bill of Rights but emphasized

572. Id. at 1088 (statement of Rep. Woodbridge) (assuring other members of limited
reach of amendment and protection for state sovereignty). When discussing the scope of
Section One, Bingham also maintained the importance of states laws and local government.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84–85 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
573. See infra note 574.
574. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 158–59 (statement of Rep. Delano during debates on CRA) (taking issue with Bingham’s initial version and suggesting an approach similar to the final version wherein Congress was authorized to exercise remedial
powers).
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Congress would play this enforcement role.575 During the debate, Bingham
was asked why he changed the language from “Congress shall” in the initial draft to “no State shall.” Bingham answered that the amendment as
adopted was more complete and comprehensive than the initial draft.
Quoting Sections One and Five, Bingham responded “[t]hat is the grant of
power. It is full and complete.”576 Bingham continued
There is not a line or a letter in the fourteenth amendment that looks to the
protection of the rights of [affected citizens] . . . but the provisions of the
first and fifth sections . . . . The power to enforce this provision by law is
as full as any other grant of power to Congress. It is, ‘the Congress shall
have power, by appropriate legislation’ to enforce this and every other pro577
vision of this article.

Bingham further explained that he changed the language to “no State
shall” to aid in the enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states.578
Bingham repeated his belief that Section One was defined by the first eight
amendments and that the language “‘no State shall make or enforce any
575. Bingham summarized his view of Section One:
The question as presented here and now may be stated thus: is it competent for
Congress to provide by law for the better enforcement of the Constitution and
laws of the United States and the better security of the life, liberty, and property of
the citizens of the United States in the several States of the Union? The Constitution is not self-executing, therefore laws must be enacted by Congress for the due
execution of all the powers vested by the Constitution in the Government . . . or
any officer thereof.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 81; id. at 83 (“The powers of the States have
been limited and the powers of Congress extended by the last three amendments of the Constitution. These last amendments . . . do, in my judgment, vest in Congress a power to protect the rights of citizens against States, and individuals in States, never before granted.”).
576. Id. at 83.
577. Id.
578. Incorporation theory frequently makes use of the 39th Congress’s discussion of
Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), in which the
Court held that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. The argument states that the
amendment in the “no State shall” form overturned the federalism limitation in Barron and
thus authorized courts to apply the Bill of Rights against the states. Some members of the
39th Congress certainly intended to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states and felt that
Section One accomplished this task. But the 39th Congress’s discussion of Barron and the
inability to apply the Bill of Rights against the states does not mean that the “no State shall”
form as adopted in the final draft was a grant of judicial power to effect this goal through
incorporation. Bingham discussed Barron in a similar manner when the draft under consideration was in the form “Congress shall.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089–90
(1866). Barron was simply a symbol of antebellum federalism that some members of the
39th Congress wanted to alter with additional congressional powers to enforce the Bill of
Rights against the states. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (Bingham discussing Barron in a post-amendment debate).
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law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States’ [creates] an express prohibition upon every State of the Union, which may be enforced under existing laws of Congress, and such other laws for their better enforcement as Congress may make.”579
Under the text of the final draft of the amendment, as reinforced by
Bingham’s understanding, Congress was to enforce the privileges or immunities language through Section Five.580 Bingham believed that the
states had not adequately enforced the Constitution and federal law in their
own tribunals. The amendment remedied the problem but also protected
state laws.581 Bingham resolved the ambiguity in the form change from
“Congress shall” to “no State shall” by explaining that the language of the
Reconstruction amendments was both negative and positive, that it restricted the states with the negative but affirmatively gave Congress the power
to enforce the negative restriction:
Let gentlemen consider the last three amendments and the new limitations
thereby imposed upon the power of the States, and the new powers thereby
vested in Congress. The first of these (the thirteenth) provides that involuntary servitude, or slavery, shall not exist in the United States. That is
negative. Then we have the further provision that Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, this amendment. That is affirmative. Do gentlemen undertake to say to-day that this does not impose
a new limitation upon the power of the States, and grant a new power to
Congress? . . .
I rather think not. Let any State try the experiment of again enslaving
men, and we will see, whether it is not competent for the Congress of the
United States to make it a felony punishable by death to reduce any man,
white or black, under color of State law, to a system of enforced human
servitude or slavery. . . .
Will gentlemen undertake to tell the country that we cannot enforce by
582
positive enactment that negative provision, the thirteenth article . . . ?

Summarizing his answer to the question about the form change to “no
State shall,” Bingham declared
[B]y virtue of these amendments, it is competent for Congress to-day to
provide by law that no man shall be held to answer in the tribunals of any

579. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84.
580. Id. at 84 (“[T]his House may safely follow the example of the makers of the Constitution and the builders of the Republic, by passing laws for enforcing all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, as guarantied by the amended Constitution and
expressly enumerated in the Constitution.”).
581. Id. at 84–85 (Bingham noting importance of local government and federalism).
582. Id. at 85.
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State in this Union for any act made criminal by the laws of that State
without a fair and impartial trial by jury. Congress never before has had
the power to do it. It is also competent for Congress to provide that no citizen in any State shall be deprived of his property by State law or the judgment of a State court without just compensation therefor. Congress never
before had the power so to declare. It is competent for the Congress of the
United States to-day to declare that no State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble together and petition for redress
of grievances, for these are of the rights of citizens of the United States defined in the Constitution and guarantied by the fourteenth amendment, and
583
to enforce which Congress is thereby expressly empowered.

Bingham’s post-ratification understanding was shared by his contemporaries in the 39th Congress. Senator Howard, whose speech before the
Senate is frequently cited by proponents of incorporation, also described
the scope of the final form of Section One in terms of the Bill of Rights.584
Like Bingham and the 39th Congress, Howard emphasized that additional
congressional power was necessary for the enforcement of the guarantees
of Section One:
The great object of the first section of this amendment is, therefore, to restrain the power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these
great fundamental guarantees. How will it be done under the present
amendment? As I have remarked, they are not powers granted to Congress,
and therefore it is necessary, if they are to be effectuated and enforced, as
they assuredly ought to be, that additional power should be given to Congress to that end. This is done by the fifth section of this amendment,
which declares that ‘the Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation the provisions of this article.’ Here is a direct affirmative
delegation of power to Congress to carry out all the principles of all these
585
guarantees, a power not found in the Constitution.

Under the final draft and understanding of the amendment, Congress
managed Reconstruction through enforcement legislation. The text and
debates discussing congressional enforcement make sense. The alternate
theory for judicial enforcement is at odds with the amendment’s context.
Because the 39th Congress was bitterly divided over post-slavery issues
and the rights of citizens, it is highly unlikely they would have cast aside
their differences and provided for a self-executing ban on state “discrimination,” leaving it to the courts to determine the details and definitions—
details and definitions over which even they could not presently agree.
583. Id.
584. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765–66 (1866).
585. Id. at 2766.
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As noted above, the Articles of Confederation failed at creating a
harmonious relationship among the states. The states met to forge a
stronger but limited federal government. In so doing, the Framers banned
the states, in absolute terms, from many activities. In Article I, Section 10,
Clause 1, Framers employed the “no state shall” form to create direct prohibitions on the states entering treaties, granting letters of marque and reprisal, coining money, emitting bills of credit, and passing bills of attainder,
among other things.586 Unlike Framers’ intentions concerning a more easily executable provision barring states from entering treaties and coining
money, the 39th Congress did not have a consensus on Reconstruction
goals, and Hotchkiss’s proposal for an absolute ban declaring that “no State
shall discriminate against any class of its citizens”587 —independent of congressional development—would have been meaningless to an amending
majority internally conflicted on post-slavery issues and the scope of desired reform. To the contrary, the overwhelming evidence confirms that
the drafters had no vision for the courts independently enforcing Section
One. While the text of the Fourteenth Amendment called for congressional
enforcement and Congress initially pursued enforcement legislation, within
a few decades of the amendment’s ratification the courts had taken over the
role of enforcing Section One.588
Courts have struggled with interpreting privileges and immunities language precisely because the language is legislative language not selfexecuting language.589 One can speak about the importance of individual
rights and label those rights fundamental. Fundamental law was important
throughout English and colonial history, and the Framers had the oppor-

586. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1. Framers rejected the request to provide direct prohibitions on import and export duties and imposts (Art. 1, § 10 cl. 2) beyond congressional
oversight and potential regional biases. MADISON, supra note 529, at 394, 543–44 (Madison
unsuccessfully proposing to transfer language providing “no state shall . . . lay imposts or
duties on imports” from the proposed Article XIII (Art. 1, § 10 cl. 2), where Congress could
license such duties and imposts, into Article XII (Art 1, § 10, cl. 1), similar “no state shall”
language without authorization for congressional approval). In a post-amendment debate on
Section One, Bingham confusingly analogized to the direct state limitations found in Art. I,
§ 10, cl. 1 (no state shall enter into treaties, emit bills of credit, pass bills of attainder, ex
post facto laws, etc.). This discussion, taken in itself, might suggest a self-executing ban on
the states, but Bingham clarified that, unlike § 10, cl. 1, the amendment provided an affirmative role in Section Five for Congress to enforce the provisions of the amendment, including
Section One. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 83–84 (1871).
587. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866).
588. Burrell, supra note 538, at 128–57 (discussing early dissenting ideology and tracing
its capture of majority opinion by 1880s).
589. See supra Parts II–IV (discussing concept of royal privileges and immunities and
tracing influence of crown’s charter on colonies).
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tunity to expressly provide for fundamental law in the written Constitution.
Further, one can distill a goal to protect fundamental rights in the Reconstruction debates leading up to the adoption of Section One. But as conceived, the protection of the amendment’s perceived fundamental rights intended by one, a few, or a majority of the 39th or later Congresses was to
be articulated, defined, limited, or not adopted through the congressional
enforcement provision, Section Five of the amendment. In giving privileges and immunities language independent life to protect “fundamental” law,
modern commentators advocating for substantive interpretations of the language seem to be guilty of conflating a reference to a body of laws with the
law-making authority itself.
VI. CONCLUSION
This story of privileges and immunities presented the medieval concept behind the language and traced the concept’s influence on the colonies. Royal privileges and immunities, through a kaleidoscope view, represent the background of the privileges and immunities language of Article
IV and the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Article began by discussing several medieval English institutions.
During the medieval period, burdens and obligations accompanied the occupancy of land. From these burdens, the king granted immunities and
privileges. With the Norman Conquest, feudal tenure swept across England; feudal tenure involved a reciprocal relationship between lord and tenant. The crown granted franchises to lords in exchange for greater financing and a hand in running government. Enfranchised lords stood in the
king’s place with respect to granted immunities.
Anglo-Norman England was an agricultural society. Both the king
and lord held manors. Next to the manor, boroughs protected by the king’s
peace were centers of administration catering to merchants and trade. As
an institution for trade, the borough fostered gilds and mercantile communities. For this reason, among others, the crown frequently granted privileges and immunities to boroughs. The privileged borough grew as a
community with freedoms of self-governance and financial independence.
When overseas trade developed, voyaging merchants received charter
privileges and immunities regulating international trade and permitting
self-governance overseas. Charters to merchant associations often borrowed from borough and gild institutions.
With the allure of far western lands, explorers began voyaging great
distances for new trade and riches. Prior to this time, most foreign settlement involved a trading post to service the trade. After the discovery of the
New World, merchant voyagers received charters granting extensive feudal
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jurisdictions and monopolies in discovered lands. Colonization soon followed.
The European colonization of the New World grew rapidly during the
sixteenth century. After conceptualizing colonization in Ireland, several
early proprietors such as Gilbert and Raleigh received charters to conquer
and colonize North America. Colonies served the crown; adventurers in
turn received land, governance, and trading rights protected by the crown
and the English flag.
Royal charters controlled most colonial development. Throughout the
colonial period, to a greater or lesser degree, the right to travel, right to discover and inhabit foreign lands, right to governance, right to incorporate,
and the right to trade were examples of charter-based privileges from the
crown to colonists and promoters. Supported by charter clauses, settlers
migrating to the colonies were to remain Englishmen and enjoy the privileges and immunities of Englishmen as if they were born in England.590
After initial failures, settlement efforts in North America found success. In the first few decades of the seventeenth century, several colonies
were planted along the East Coast. Colonial institutions mimicked English
institutions. To facilitate land use, the crown granted to colonizing agencies easy tenure clauses holding land in free and common socage, not in
capite, as of the Manor of East Greenwich in the County of Kent. Socage
tenure was a system of tenure very similar to burgage tenure of English
boroughs.
The American colonies were managed locally with supervision by the
crown and promoter in England. Given the shared governance across the
seas, events in England typically affected the colonies—especially those
concerning the crown. Challenging royal monopolies and other regal acts,
seventeenth-century pamphleteers and advocates in Parliament advanced
the rights and liberties of Englishmen through debates and popular writings. Similar language and advocacy permeated the colonies and influenced colonists’ relations with the crown and proprietors. The colonial assembly, armed with the plea for the privileges and immunities of
Englishmen, was an essential vehicle in the transformation of the colonial
subject. The phrase had the political effect of leveraging English law or the
privileges of other colonies.591 With the language serving as a meme for a
body of fundamental law, colonists converged around free principles and
invoked the rights of freer societies around them, much like medieval England’s baronial burgesses coalescing to the free borough and seeking rights
590. See supra notes 273–85, 306–11 (denization language to Warde, Gilbert, and those
immigrating to America).
591. See supra Part IV.D; supra notes 430, 498.
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of incorporation.592
The plea for the “privileges and immunities of Englishmen” served an
important role throughout the colonies but especially during the American
Revolution with the reoccurring claim for the right to participate in legislation and taxation. By the eve of the American Revolution, colonists attributed a broad degree of rights to the phrase. Following Independence,
colonists no longer needed to reference the privileges of Englishmen.
States crafted their own constitutions to replace charter privileges and immunities or the crown’s instructions. With Article IV of the Articles of
Confederation, the nation of former colonies as a whole replaced the role of
English citizenship and English regulation of intercolonial affairs in travel,
trade, and commerce. Defective on many grounds, the Articles were replaced by the Constitution. The Constitution advanced the efforts of Article IV of the Articles by expanding Congress’s role to regulate, among other things, interstate affairs and naturalization. With Article I’s structural
changes, the Framers established a body of general citizenship rights
among the states.
Following the American Civil War, the Reconstruction Congress
adopted the CRA to negate the slave codes and grant citizenship rights to
recently freed slaves. Citizenship rights granted to former slaves had similarities to denization clauses, to the freedoms granted to individuals suppressed by feudal obligations, and to the corporate rights granted to communities. The transformation involved a move from a non-recognized
person or entity to a citizen with the right to sue and be sued, to buy and
sell property, and to enjoy associated civil rights.593 Concerns over the
constitutionality of the Act motivated Congress to propose Section One of
the Fourteenth Amendment with privileges and immunities language to
constitutionalize the CRA.
The interpretation of privileges and immunities language has been
problematic. Modern commentary has suggested the phrase protects some
degree of rights ranging from personal rights to fundamental law.594 Given
the broader history of royal privileges and immunities discussed above, one
questions the merit of substantive, self-executing constructions of the language. Such constructions leave the judiciary free to interpret, and perhaps
create, “privileges and immunities”—concepts historically derived from
state authority.
592. See supra notes 147–50, 499 (liber burgus and charter association); supra notes
415, 423 (influence of freer colonies).
593. See supra notes 541–42 (comparing citizenship rights to newly freed slaves, denization provisions, and incorporation rights).
594. See supra note 1.
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